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ABSTRACT 
The determinants of residing arrangements of senior citizens to explain household 
formation behaviour, the role of public education expenditure to change income distribution, 
and the success of educational policies to increase school attendance in Bangladesh are the 
research objectives of this thesis which consists of four independent essays. Theoretical 
models and empirical analysis have been conducted both in the first and second essays to find 
appropriate determinants of residing arrangements of senior citizens in developing and 
developed countries respectively. The results suggest that economic growth and religion 
determine co-residence arrangements in developing countries while life-cycle pensionable 
wealth and cultural factors determine solitary residing patterns in developed countries.  The 
third essay investigates, theoretically and empirically, the impact of public education 
expenditure on income inequality. The findings show that public education expenditure 
reduces income inequality for developed OECD countries but increases for developing 
countries. Finally, the success issues of two education policies in Bangladesh - the 
―(Obligation to) Primary Education Act 1990‖ (PEA 1990) and the ―Female Secondary 
School Stipend Program 1994‖ (FSSSP 1994), are theoretically and empirically evaluated. 
The results highlight that the PEA 1990 policy is not fully successful but the PEA 1990 and 
the FSSSP 1994 policies jointly make remarkable success in school attendance and literacy 
rates in the country. 
Key words: Co-residing arrangements, solitary residing attitudes, senior citizens, public 
education expenditure, income inequality, educational policies of Bangladesh. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 Core Issues 
This thesis is concerned with some core multi-faceted issues in development 
economics ranging from the residence behaviour of the elderly (subsequently cited as ―senior 
citizens‖) within the family, to the impact of public education expenditure on the young and 
its consequential impact on income inequality. When analysing co-residency, we also 
undertake a comparative analysis between developing and developed countries so that the 
differences (or similarities) may be examined. In addition, we analyse the impact of public 
policy (in terms of the legal stipulation to primary education) on school attendance and 
literacy – often considered as a sine qua non for development.  This issue is analysed for a 
poor developing country, Bangladesh, and the case study allows us insight into education 
policy issues in development. Although the topics are different conceptually and 
methodologically, they allow an insight into the economic decision-making behaviour of a 
member in an ―extended family‖ (a family consisting of older and younger generations) in 
terms of residence, education and policy. We know members of an extended family make 
decisions based on economic perspectives. In an extended family, making residing 
arrangement decision is an important issue for the old and that investing human capital 
development via education is vital for the young. In addition, in both cases, the role of 
government has significant consequences on these decision processes. We have attempted to 
analyse all these issues in this thesis. 
Residing behaviour of senior citizens, the impact of public education expenditure on 
income inequality and the consequences of education policies in Bangladesh are the three 
individual topics of the thesis. Chapters Three and Four cover the essays titled ―Altruism 
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and residing arrangements of senior citizens in developing countries‖ and ―Solitary residing 
senior citizens in European countries‖ respectively; and Chapters Five and Six present the 
other two essays titled ―Impact of public education expenditure on income inequality‖ and 
―Effects of two education policies on educational development in Bangladesh‖ respectively. 
As ageing baby-boomers approach retirement age, their economic behaviour and 
corresponding socio-economic impact have become an important research agenda. Population 
ageing is becoming a big challenge for the policymakers in all societies as it involves several 
socio-economic consequences especially in the pension and health care systems, family 
composition, and the residing arrangement of generations. Although many studies (Ermisch, 
2003; Becker,1991; Samuelson, 1958) have stressed the necessity of the family composition 
decision of the younger generation, a concentrated research focus on the residing arrangement 
of senior citizens is a relatively new theme. It is driven by concerns raised around the world 
that the residing arrangements of senior citizens matter both in developing and developed 
countries: however, the natures of concern of these arrangements are different in developing 
and developed countries. 
Thorough out the thesis, we consider people aged 60 years and above as senior 
citizens. Table - 1.1 shows that 73 percent of the senior citizens in North America and 69 
percent of the senior citizens in Europe live alone or in the couple typed family structure, 
while in Asia and Africa it is only 23 percent and 17 percent respectively. The statistics infer 
that residing arrangement of senior citizens in North America and Europe follows the nuclear 
family type while in developing Africa and Asia, the residing arrangement of senior citizens is 
the extended family type. The population Census - 2001 of Bangladesh reports that there has 
been a decreasing trend in the proportion of households with seven members and above since 
1981 and that the percentage of households of five members or less has shown increasing 
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trend: 33.7 percent, 37.8 percent and 50.6 percent respectively in 1981, 1991 and 2001. These 
statistics indicate that family size in developing countries is gradually turning from the 
extended family to the nuclear family. These phenomena have raised the question regarding 
the determinants of the residing arrangements of senior citizens both in developing and 
developed countries around the world. 
 
Table 1.1: Residing Arrangement of Senior Citizens (aged 60 and above) by Selected Regions 
and Sub-regions of the World 
 
Living 
Arrangement 
Region/Sub-
region 
 
Alone 
 
Couple 
only 
 
Alone or 
Couple only 
With 
children or 
grand 
children 
 
 
With 
other 
relatives 
or 
non 
relatives 
 
Total 
Asia 7 16 23 74 4 100 
(East 9 20 29 70 1 100 
▪Southeast 6 13 19 73 9 100 
South-central) 4 9 13 83 - 100 
Africa 8 9 17 74 8  
Europe 26 43 69 26 4 100 
(South) 19 39 58 38 4 100 
Latin America 
& 
Caribbean 
 
9 16 25 62 14 100 
North America 26 47 73 19 8 100 
Source: UN 2005, Table II.5, p 36 
 
Turning now to education conception in an extended family, investing in human 
capital accumulation is a significant decision making issue of the young generation. Human 
capital, at present, is considered as an essential factor of production which needs to be 
developed for achieving rapid economic growth. Education and training are the basic input of 
acquiring human capital. Human capital accumulation, whether it is private or public 
education, is a major conduit through persistent or cross-dynastic income change in reducing 
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inequality. Studies (Glomm and Ravikumar, 2003; Barro, 1999) have claimed that the public 
education system ensures the equality of opportunity and equal access to the inputs of 
learning technology across all pupils; as a result, incomes converge and income inequality 
declines in the society. An alternative viewpoint in the education and income inequality 
literature shows that the role of expanding public education provision by increasing public 
education expenditure creates more unequal income distribution in a society. The finding of 
Gould et. al. (2001) states that in many developing countries public education provision has 
expanded; as a result, the marginal product of labour has increased during the last few 
decades but wage inequality or income inequality has widened significantly. 
 
Figure 1.1: OECD countries: Income Inequality 2005 and Public education expenditure 2000 
 
Empirically we can say that ―Gini coefficient‖ and public education expenditure as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are two widely used indices respectively for 
measuring income inequality of a country and the contribution of government to human 
capital development via education.  It might be reasonable to assume that the change in public 
education expenditure affects the income distribution of a country at least 5 years later. In 
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Figure 1.1, we have plotted Gini coefficient of 2005 and public education expenditure of 2000 
of 18 Organizations of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries1. The 
estimated relationship between income inequality and public education expenditure is 
negatively sloped. It implies that an increase in 5-year earlier public education expenditure 
reduces income inequality of current year and vice versa if other things remain constant. 
Figure1.2: Poor countries: Income Inequality 2005 and Public education expenditure 2000 
 
 
In Figure 1.2, we have plotted Gini coefficient of 2005 and public education 
expenditure of 2000 of 31 African, Asian, Latin American and the Caribbean poor countries2. 
From the Figure 1.2, we see that the relationship between 5-year earlier public education 
expenditure and income inequality is positive. The contradictory impact of public education 
expenditure on income inequality of a country needs to be investigated meticulously. 
                                                          
1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States 
2Bangladesh, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Lao, Latvia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda and Zambia.  
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Like many other countries, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) invests nearly 4 
percent of her gross domestic product (GDP) on education every year. Several policies have 
been adopted to increase the returns to those investments. Among those, two are directly 
related to improve school attendance. One is the ―(Obligation to) Primary Education Act 
(PEA) 1990‖ aiming to eradicate illiteracy from primary school aged (6 years to 10 years) 
children throughout the country enrolling all of them into schools and to ensure universal 
primary education for all children in the country. Another one is the ―Female Secondary 
School Stipend (FSSS) program 1994‖ which has been implemented all over the country to 
increase female attendance at existing schools in secondary level aiming to reduce the gap 
between male and female school attendance. The Female Stipend Program (FSP) was created 
as a pilot project in 1982 in Bangladesh and was implemented initially in six villages only to 
increase the enrolment and retention of girls in secondary schools. The pilot FSP yielded 
positive results: girls‘ secondary enrolments increased from an average of 7.9 percent to 14 
percent in some project areas and dropout rates fell from 14.7 percent to 3.5 percent (Haq & 
Haq, 1998, p. 93). Therefore, the GoB extended the program nationwide in 1994 and it was 
called the ―Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSS)‖ program. 
On an average, one third of the total education budget has been allocated for primary 
education during the last fifteen years but still in reality, primary education in Bangladesh is 
very vulnerable. According to the report of Directorate of Primary Education (DPE), 2008, we 
see that there are at least four different types of primary educational institutions: out of 82218 
total primary educational institutions - 37672 are Government Primary Schools, 20083 are 
Registered Non-Government Primary Schools, 966 are Non-Registered Non-Government 
Primary Schools and 23497 are Other Primary level Institutions (Basically Religious 
unorganised institutes).  Similarly, out of 365925 primary school teachers - 182899 are in 
Government Primary Schools, 76875 are in Registered Non-Government Primary Schools, 
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2460 are in Non-Registered Non-Government Primary Schools, and 103691 are in Other 
Primary level Institutions. The academic curriculum for different types of primary institutions 
is also significantly different. That means the pupils of primary level have not got uniform 
and universal primary education yet. On the other hand, the government‘s contribution in 
secondary level of education is significantly declining. There are 317 Government managed 
secondary schools and 18,453 private High Schools, which receive teachers‘ salary from the 
Government (Bangladesh Country Report, 2009). Statistics show that the primary education 
expenditure as percentage of GDP is increasing but public secondary education expenditure is 
decreasing dramatically. As a result, the enrolment rate between primary and secondary level 
falls more than 50 percent. The demand for secondary level of education is continuously 
becoming a privately financed good and going beyond the reach of poor rural household.  In 
almost all the developed countries in the world, primary and secondary levels of education 
together are considered as basic education for their citizens. The impacts of these two 
important government education policies of Bangladesh on overall school attendance needs to 
be evaluated rigorously. 
1.1.1  Chapter Three 
We now consider preliminary discussion of each chapter separately. In developing 
countries, historically, households represent the main institution that distributes goods and 
services between generations (Becker 1991; Kuznets 1978; Thornton, Chang and Sun 1984). 
It can be noticed that due to altruistic attitude towards parents, children transfer money to 
their parents and/or grandparents in their old age because the senior citizens in developing 
countries hardly have any consistent flow of income which they could consider as their 
permanent income (Ghuman and Ofstedal 2004; Martin 1988, 1989; Mason 1992). Moreover, 
senior citizens (such as elderly parents) in that age do not want the financial support only but 
some logistical supports also which cannot be met by the direct transfer payments from 
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children. Nevertheless, co-residence of senior citizens with young citizens (for instance, 
parents with their children) can satisfy both the financial and logistical need of the senior 
people in developing countries. Policymakers in developing countries greatly value this 
family tie and like this tradition to be carried on rather than introducing governmental safety-
nets programs (Knodel, Chayovan and Siriboon 1992). Unfortunately, in the era of 
globalisation when the ―traditional values of familism and filial piety are being supplanted by 
the Western values of individualism‖ (Martin 1989; p. 627), the residing arrangement of 
senior citizens in the developing countries is a great concern for the policymakers because 
neither there is any developed public or private residing institution established yet nor there 
are hardly any socio-economic safety-nets by the governments (Bongaarts and Zimmer 2001; 
Mason 1992) for the senior citizens. We, therefore, investigate the research question that what 
are the factors determining co-residing pattern of senior citizens in developing countries. We 
have developed a theoretical framework which explains the residing arrangement of senior 
citizens with their altruistic children. Using panel data of 16 African and 6 Asian countries 
around the world, we have also empirically examined the significant factors which determine 
the co-residence pattern between two successive generations in developing countries. 
Estimated results suggest that the economic growth leads to a significant fall in the co-
residence arrangements of senior citizens with their children. Life expectancy and cultural 
issues are also found to be significant phenomena of residing pattern of senior citizens. This 
research question is answered in detail in Chapter Three. Let us now move into Chapter Four. 
 
1.1.2  Chapter Four  
On the other hand, in developed countries, the solitary residing arrangement of senior 
citizens concerns the policymakers. Studies (Pendry, Barrett and Victor 1999; Breeze, 
Sloggett and Fletcher 1999) show that solitary residing senior citizens are more likely to enter 
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an institution than those living with at least one other person. Even where institutionalisation 
does not take place because of cultural or social norms and values, solitary residing senior 
citizens are more likely to require special care either from the state or from relatives or 
neighbours, in the form of home helps and other social services, than those who live with 
others. Moreover, solitary residing senior citizens are more vulnerable than co-residing senior 
citizens. They need outside assistance in the case of illness or disability and are at greater risk 
of social isolation even though the systems of social security of developed countries are well 
organised. Studies (Hermalin, et. al., 2002; Gierveld, Jenny and Tilburg, Theo 2010; Casey, 
and Yamada, 2002) show that compared to those senior citizens co-residing either with a 
partner or in a multi-generation household, solitary residing senior citizens are more likely to 
be lonely and depressed, to have a small social network and to have infrequent contact with 
children. We, therefore, want to research on the question- what are the determinants of 
solitary residing behaviour of senior citizens in European countries. 
At present, Europe is the largest area with the highest proportions of senior citizens 
and is projected to remain so until 2050. In Europe, 22 percent of the population is aged 60 
years or over in the year 2009 and is projected to be 35 percent in the year 2050 which is the 
highest in any other regions in the world (United Nations, 2009). Approximately, 24 percent 
of total senior citizens reside alone in the more developed regions (Europe and North 
America), compared to 8 percent in the less developed regions (Africa, and Asia). Within 
Europe, the different regions show markedly different proportions of solitary residing senior 
citizens, ranging from 19 percent in Southern Europe to 34 percent in Northern Europe 
(United Nations, 2009) which is currently the highest in the World. We, therefore, have 
chosen 16 European countries to investigate the research question. We have developed a 
theoretical framework for co-residing and solitary residing decision of parent and child in a 
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household assuming that co-residing and solitary residing are mutually exclusive events for 
both of them. Using macro-level and gender-specific aggregate unbalanced panel data sets of 
16 European countries, we have empirically investigated the most relevant factors of solitary 
residing. The empirical results forecast that growth in life-cycle pensionable wealth, life 
expectancy after retirement, and religious culture of senior citizens reduce solitary residing 
attitude of senior citizens. Chapter Four covers the details of the essay. 
1.1.3 Chapter Five  
Continuing with Chapter Five, Becker and Kevin (1988) discuss both the altruistic 
intergenerational transfer of co-residing family and the investment in children‘s education 
decision. They argue that parents must trade-off between own consumption and investment in 
human capital of children. They show that poor parents or parents in poor economy behave 
like altruistic but there is a shortage in leaving bequest for the investment of children‘s 
education as the marginal utility of parents‘ old aged consumption is higher than the marginal 
utility of children‘s consumption in the future. Therefore, investment in human capital is less 
than the efficient amount without government intervention or social norms in a poor family or 
a poor country. Thus state intervention in the provision of education and other human capital 
could raise investments in children to the efficient levels and such intervention would also 
reduce the inequality because the opportunities of investing children‘s human capital for the 
poor family are possible. The findings of Sylwester (2002) say that the public education 
expenditure reduces income inequality of a country. The author mentions that ―the results 
appear to be stronger in the OECD countries although there is some evidence, albeit weaker, 
that public education expenditures slowly lessen income inequality in less developed 
countries‖ (Sylwester, 2002 p.49) but the author does not take any measure to show the 
effects separately for the OECD countries and the less developed countries. We have 
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attempted to investigate the impact of public education expenditure on income inequality of a 
country by forming a theoretical model for developing and developed countries, along with 
analysing empirically for the OECD region, for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAAM) 
region, developing Africa, Asia and East Europe (DAAE) region, and the least developed 
Africa and Asia (LAA) region. We have found that the impact of public education 
expenditure on income inequality depends on the development status of a country. The 
detailed answer of the question - what is the impact of public education expenditure on 
income inequality of a country, is covered in Chapter Five of the thesis. 
1.1.4 Chapter Six 
Finally with Chapter Six, the ―Universal Declaration of Human Rights‖ makes 
education a basic need for an individual. At present, it is no more an elitist need in any 
society. So, every government should be responsible to ensure meeting up this need for its 
citizens. Considering the importance of education, all developed countries around the world 
have made education up to a certain level free and compulsory for all of their residents at a 
very early stage of their development; for example Japan, the most developed country in Asia, 
had high levels of education before they advanced towards industrial development (Sen, 
1999). There are many developing countries that are far behind to introduce free and 
compulsory education up to a basic level. The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has 
introduced compulsory, universal primary education by ―(Obligation to) The Primary 
Education Act, 1990‖ (The Bangladesh Gazette, Act No. 27 of 1990) - cited as PEA 1990 here 
after, which was piloted partially in 1992 and has been implemented fully since 1993. But still 
the country is struggling to achieve universal primary education for all of her primary school 
aged children. In part one of this chapter, we have studied the question - why the government 
of Bangladesh is struggling to implement universal primary education successfully for all of 
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its primary school aged children after nineteen years of the policy inception. We have framed 
a theoretical model of the demand for compulsory education. The theory states that not 
essentially any rule imposed by the government determines equilibrium demand for schooling 
decision but the opportunity cost of education, preference for education, parent‘s income and 
the maximum years of compulsory education jointly resolves the demand for education. 
Using time series annual data from 1980 to 2005, we have considered both demand and 
supply sides factors of school attendance. Using ―Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL)‖ 
estimation model, we have operated ―Impulse Indicator Saturation (IIS)‖ technique to 
evaluate the success of the PEA 1990 policy measure. The estimated result illustrates that the 
PEA 1990 policy has not achieved the target yet. 
In part two of the chapter, we are concerned about two major education related policy 
measures that have been introduced since 1991. These are: (i) ―(Obligation to) Primary 
Education Act (PEA), 1990‖ and (ii) ―the Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSS) 
Programme, 1994‖.3 Moreover, the GoB has taken two national education policies since 1990. 
Not the impact of any specific policy are we going to evaluate in this section, but we are 
attempting to investigate the combined impact of both of these educational policies on overall 
school attendance of population aged between 5 and 24 years, and on literacy rates of 
population aged 5 years and over of the country. Part two wraps up the combined impact of 
two educational policies – the PEA 1990 and the ―Female Secondary School Stipend -1994 
(FSSS 1994)‖, on school attendance of population aged between 5 year and 24 year and on 
the literacy rate of the population aged 5 years and above. Using district level panel data of 62 
districts (out of 64 districts in Bangladesh) for two time periods 1991 and 2001, we have 
conducted fixed effects estimation method on the two indicators (number of school attendance 
                                                          
3Brief discussions about these policies are given in appendix of chapter six. 
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and literacy rate) of educational development. The estimated results demonstrate that the 
combined policies have an enormous effect on both indicators with some other development 
factors for instance family size, annual growth rate, possession of agricultural land etc. 
1.2 Structure of the Study 
Chapter Two presents the very important background literature of the whole thesis. 
We have covered theoretical literature related to co-residing behaviour, altruistic family 
behaviour, impact of public education expenditure and income inequality and the demand for 
education. We have also studied empirical literature regarding co-residing behaviour, public 
education expenditure and income inequality as well as educational policies in Bangladesh. 
Chapter Three provides the determinants of co-residing behaviour of senior citizens in 
developing countries. Chapter Four discusses the determinants of solitary residing behaviour 
of senior citizens in the developed European countries. Chapter Five highlights theoretically 
and empirically the impact of public education expenditure on income inequality around the 
world. Chapter Six covers the success of the PEA policy and combined impacts of the PEA 
and the FSSS policies on school attendance and literacy rates in Bangladesh. Finally, Chapter 
Seven presents the summary of the thesis and concludes with some policy implications. It also 
notes the limitations of the study. 
1.3 Contributions to Knowledge 
The study aims at contributing further to the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
co-residing behaviour of senior citizens in developing and developed countries, the impact of 
public education expenditure on income distribution and the success of different educational 
policies in Bangladesh.  
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We have studied four independent topics - theoretically and empirically: all these 
essays are novel contributions to relevant economic literature. The sets of data, the percentage 
of senior citizens residing with children in developing countries and the percentage of solitary 
residing senior citizens in developed countries are used in the empirical section of Chapters 
Three and Four respectively, which are the first ever used in economic literature to investigate 
residing arrangements of senior citizens around the world. Moreover, macro-level panel data 
are used throughout the thesis to empirically analyse co-residing behaviour of senior citizens 
in developing countries and solitary residing attitudes of senior citizens in developed 
countries, which is another significant contribution to the family formation literature. 
To theorise the effects of public education expenditure on income inequality, macro 
based theoretical models for developing and developed countries have been framed in Chapter 
Five. The theory provides an important result that public education expenditure is a Pareto 
improvement for any country under some conditions which gives new insight in education 
literature. 
The final contribution has been made in Chapter Six where educational policies of the 
GoB are evaluated. There are no theoretical and econometric works in this topic for 
Bangladesh. We conduct the first econometric analysis of evaluating the success of 
―(Obligation to) Primary Education Act 1990‖ in Bangladesh. Similarly, using district level 
panel data set and econometric estimation technique for assessing the success of educational 
policies on overall school attendance and literacy rate has never been done before for 
Bangladesh.  
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1.4 Concluding Remarks  
Around the world, the residing arrangement of senior citizens has become immensely 
important, which needs to be studied rigorously because of new challenges related to 
population aging. The residing structure of senior citizens is changing; as a result, a certain 
amount of the responsibility of consumption choice, choice of education and saving choice of 
a family is shifting from family to government. The governments of almost all the developed 
countries have already taken huge family responsibilities on their own shoulders. Due to 
enormous public responsibilities along with population ageing among these developed 
countries, governments are struggling to maintain the existing status of a welfare state; while, 
developing countries are trying to increase public responsibilities to improve their 
development status although they have shortage of necessary resources. The governments of 
these developing countries are also fighting to improve the existing status of their welfare. 
That is why the determinants of residing behaviour of senior citizens need to be studied 
seriously. At the same time, choice of education, expenditure on education, as well as 
educational policies has great impacts on income distribution, tax structure and pension 
provision of a country which are, at present, essential research agendas to be focused by 
researchers. We have endeavoured to highlight all these vital topics in the thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Background Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the thesis covers two different issues – co-residing decision of senior citizens 
and impacts of public education expenditure, we have reviewed literature related to each issue 
separately. The co-residing decision of senior citizens in developing and developed countries 
has different dimensions in theoretical and empirical literature and we have focused on the 
living arrangement of older people with younger one. Theoretical literature regarding the co- 
residing decision has mostly developed as an individualistic motive of two agents (usually a 
parent and child) and there are some literature focusing on altruistic intergenerational transfer 
of family behaviour where two agents (parent and child) are co-residing. On the contrary, we 
have framed a model for the developing countries where one agent (child) is altruistic, and the 
other agent (parent) is individualistic; and another for the developed countries where both 
agents are individualistic. We, therefore, review a few but very important literature about 
altruistic intergenerational transfer model also. The empirical literature about the determinants 
of the co-residing decision of senior citizens in the developing countries and determinants of 
solitary residing senior citizens in the developed European countries are mainly reviewed 
separately. 
Similarly, as literature related to the impact of public education expenditure on income 
inequality and the impact of public education policies on school attendance in Bangladesh are 
quite different in nature; we have reviewed the most relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature of the impact of public education expenditure on income inequality. We also have 
highlighted the empirical literature about different public education policies in Bangladesh. 
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2.2 Theoretical literature about co-residing decision 
Ermisch (2003) develops a model of co-residing decision of a selfish (individualistic) 
child with a selfish parent. Assuming that housing service is a pure public good, the basic 
objectives of the author are to analyse theoretically when and why a child co-resides with a 
parent, how much benefit the parent and child get individually  from housing service and 
when the child prefers not to co-reside with the parent. In Ermisch (2003), both parent and 
child have own utility function and income. Individualistic parent is head of the family and 
charges a rental transfer from the co-residing child. The individualistic child makes co-
residing decision as long as the total utility from residing alone does not exceed the total 
utility from co-residing. From the model, the author derives that as parent income increases, 
the total demand for housing and rental transfer from child to parent increases in case of co-
residing. How much transfer payment a parent can charge from the child depends on the 
child‘s taste of independence or privacy but the author does not include any parameter or 
variable for measuring the taste of independence in his model. Housing is a pure public good 
for co-residing parent and child which is a strong assumption intuitively because co-residing 
creates loss of privacy and congestion problem. The author mentions that changing this 
assumption does not change the results significantly. We have frameworked our co-residing 
decision model of senior citizens based on Ermisch (2003) but included negative externality 
of co-residing (such as congestion) in both parent and child‘s utility functions. We have 
assumed that housing is a semi-public good rather than pure public good. Including this 
negative externality effect in co-residing decision, we have got significantly different results 
from that of Ermisch (2003). For instance, an increase of parent or child income cannot 
definitely predict the direction (increase or decrease) of the effect on demand for housing 
when they are co-residing whereas Ermisch‘s (2003) result does. 
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Chiappori (1992) develops a model about the collective labour supply decision of a 
household based on individual preference and shows that the outcomes are Pareto efficient. 
The author explains that in the early stage of life an agent behaves altruistically because he 
shares non-labour income with other family members and the agent behaves 
individualistically about his labour supply decision in later stages of life. In Chiappori (1992), 
the author is aggregating individual utility maximisation process by imposing some weight of 
each individual decision which he calls- collective utility maximisation decision. We have 
used this collective utility maximisation concept for the analysis of our co-residing behaviour 
of senior citizens where the working citizen is the head of the family and follows the 
collective utility maximisation concept of co-residing senior citizens by assigning specific 
weight on the equilibrium maximum utility of solitary residing senior citizens. 
 
Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1997) develop a two-period overlapping generation 
model where parents are altruistic to their children but children may or may not be altruistic to 
the parents. They argue theoretically that the altruistic transfer would be one to one that 
means a dollar increase (decrease) in the permanent income of an altruistic parent, who makes 
a transfer to her child, increases (decreases) the same amount of altruistic transfer towards 
children. They empirically test the hypothesis using the 1988 wave of ―the 1968–89 Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data set‖ of the United States of America. Their finding 
shows that a reduction in parents‘ income by one dollar reduces their transfer by only five 
cents and a one-dollar increase in the child‘s income reduces the transfer he receives by less 
than eight cents. Thus, the hypothesis of the dollar-to-dollar altruistic relation is rejected by 
the empirics and it significantly rejects pure altruism hypothesis between generations for the 
developed countries like the United States of America. However, we have developed a model 
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on co-residing behaviour of elderly parent and young child for the developing countries where 
we assume that the young child is altruistic towards the elderly parent. We are not going to 
test the degree of altruism in the co-residing behaviour. 
 
Becker and Kevin (1988) cover both the altruistic intergenerational transfer of co-
residing family and the investment in children‘s education decision. They show that under 
some conditions, an altruistic parent and selfish child maximise family resources better than 
the state intervention. They argue that parents must trade-off between own consumption and 
investment in human capital of children. The equilibrium criterion of investing human capital 
for altruistic parents is the marginal rate of return on human capital that equals the rate on 
assets. Parents are better off with efficient investments because they can trade between 
bequests and investments. Poor parents or parents in poor economy behave like altruistic but 
there is a shortage in leaving bequest for the investment of children‘s education because the 
marginal utility of parents‘ old aged consumption is higher than the marginal utility of 
children‘s consumption in the future. They would like to raise their own consumption at the 
expense of their children‘s, but they cannot do without leaving debts to children. They argue 
that both parents and children could be better off by a contract that parents invest in human 
capital of children up to an efficient level if children would repay their elderly parent not less 
than their invested amount. That means - although poor parents are altruistic, their attitude 
about investment in human capital is based on exchange motive.  They also say that younger 
children cannot agree to make such contracts; therefore, investment in human capital is less 
than the efficient amount without government intervention, social norms or guilt by parents 
and children in a poor family or a poor country. Thus, state intervention in the provision of 
education and other human capital could raise investments in children to the efficient levels 
and such intervention would also reduce the inequality because the opportunities of investing 
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in children‘s human capital in the poorer family are possible. They argue that state 
interventions in the market for schooling, the provision of old-age pensions are necessary for 
the poor country. In our analysis of co-residing behaviour, we use the opposite direction of 
altruism – child altruistic towards parent in the developing countries but elderly parent is 
individualistic. We also utilise the concept that state intervention in human capital 
accumulation reduces income inequality in the second part of the thesis. 
 
Andreoni (1989) modifies pure altruistic natured models for gift and intergenerational 
transfer by introducing ―warm glow‖ concept. Using the ―warm glow‖ concept, he gives the 
theory of intergenerational transfer a new foundation, i.e., the altruistic intergenerational 
transfer does not necessarily be a pure altruistic motive always; hence, does not need to 
follow ―Ricardian equivalence‖ condition perfectly.  He states that individuals contribute to a 
public good for two reasons – people demand more public good and people get some benefit 
like benefit from private goods from their gift which he calls as a warm glow.  Because of 
selfish motive, pure altruism is rare except ―impure altruism‖. Contrary to the previous 
literature, this model generates identifiable comparative statics results. We also use the 
concept of impure altruism in forming the model of co-residing behaviour in developing 
countries but do not estimate the degree of impure altruism. 
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2.3 Empirical literature of co-residing behaviour in the developing countries 
 
The existing empirical literature mainly investigate the significant determinants of co-
residing arrangements of senior citizens where the results are more or less contradictory. A 
group of literature explains some of the determinants as significant determinants whereas 
some other literature explain them as insignificant determinants for residing arrangement. 
 
Martin (1989) tries to find out the socio-economic, cultural and demographic 
determinants of the living arrangements of the senior citizens in four developing countries 
(Fiji, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines) in north-south region of the Pacific 
Ocean.  In her analysis, ―data from a 1984 round of surveys of persons aged 60 and over, 
sponsored by the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for the Western Pacific, 
are used to analyse the living arrangements of the elderly in Fiji, the Republic of Korea, 
Malaysia, and the Philippine‖4 (p 628). At the first stage, the author has taken observations of 
the elderly who has at least one living child so the sample size is 695 for Korea, 953 for 
Malaysia, 656 for the Philippines and 636 for Fiji. In the second stage, the author restricts it to 
the elderly who has spouse and uses 743 observations for Korea, 982 observations for 
Malaysia, 689 observations for the Philippines and 664 observations for Fiji. Both simple 
Logit and multinomial Logit estimation methods are respectively used for the first and the 
second stage of analysis; where in the first stage, there is a contrast of two types of responses 
in the dependent variable (living with children or not living with children) and in the second 
stage, there are four types of responses (alone, with spouse, with children and others).The 
author has hypothesised that the modernisation variables, such as- year of education, living in 
urban area, year at a current address; the economic variables, such as- self-supporting, home 
                                                          
4see detail data collection method in Martin (1989) 
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ownership, health status; the demographic variables, such as- gender, age,  spouse alive, 
children alive and the cultural variables, such as- religion, ethnicity are considered as the 
determinants of co-residence of the senior citizens in these areas. Results show that the 
hypothesis of modernisation theory is mostly not significantly justified and the hypothesis of 
economic ability to buy privacy regarding the co-residence decision of the elderly people in 
these countries is weakly justified. The author has found that there is negative relationship 
between self-support and home ownership variable and co-residence with children for Korea 
and Malaysia but these variables are positively related when it is a co-residing situation with 
spouse and the other two outcomes. The result implicitly suggests that living spouse or 
availability of children with whom an elderly can live might be a determining factor of 
explaining co-residency of the elderly. The results say that sex and age have significant 
influence on co-residency of the elderly as well as other demographic variable as divorce and 
remarriage behaviour significantly determine the co-residence pattern in Malaysia only. We 
have used macro-level data and included a combination of economic, demographic and 
cultural determinants of co-residing of elderly population in developing countries. 
 
The United Nations Population Divisions (2005) have produced a report which covers 
the data on the living arrangement of older persons, trends in living arrangement, some 
determinants of living arrangement such as- age, marital status, gender, head of households, 
educational level, availability of kin etc; assembled to get a complete picture of the current 
older people‘s living arrangement around the world. The report consists of five chapters 
including an introduction and conclusion. In chapter two, it discusses the patterns and trends 
of living arrangement. In chapter three, it covers the economic and social factors of older 
persons‘ living arrangement and chapter four highlights the informal supports and transfers 
between generations. Some of the data are collected from original secondary sources that 
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include published articles and books, reports of the United Nations and other organizations, 
and special databases. However most of the ―micro-level‖ data are collected at the individual 
level from primary sources such as population censuses and surveys including the 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), the United States Current Population Survey (CPS) 
and the Health, Well-being and Ageing Survey (SABE). Mostly all analyses are descriptive in 
nature using percentage of different factors and describe the results. The report also uses 
‗Odd–value‘ for most of the determinants of living arrangement of older persons. It is found 
in the report that gender determines living arrangements of older persons. Females are more 
likely to live alone than their male counterparts especially where the overall population of 
elderly people is high. Only in 25, out of 127 countries‘ proportion of the elderly men living 
alone is higher than that of the elderly women. Contrary to the results by gender, more 
unmarried older men are living alone than the unmarried women. The percentage of solitary 
living is the lowest in Southeastern and South central Asia, Eastern and Western Asia and all 
regions within Africa; the Latin America and the Caribbean have middle positions; and the 
Europe, Northern America and Oceania have the highest percentage of solitary living 
arrangement of older persons. Age differential also determines the living pattern of older 
people. In societies with less availability of institutional supports, the oldest old, who are 
more likely to need assistance in their daily life, are more prone to co-reside with children or 
other relatives. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and Africa, living with a child or 
grandchild is the most common for older persons; in Europe and the United States of 
America, the most common arrangement is the couple-only household, followed by 
individuals‘ living alone.  The findings of the report also suggest that there is a global trend 
towards independent living such as alone or with spouse only among older persons; as a 
result, co-residence with children or grandchildren or other relatives is declining. As in many 
developing countries, the amount and pace of this decreasing trend are small; so, the 
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difference between developed and developing countries will continue for many years. The 
report also predicts that the living arrangements of older persons differ greatly within 
countries according to demographic characteristics like age, gender and marital status; and 
also due to socio-economic characteristics like place of residence, education and material 
well-being (p.107). We have collected our data from this source but our estimation methods 
and results are different from the report. 
 
Bongaarts and Zimmer (2002) work on the living arrangements of senior citizens of 
forty three (43) developing countries around the world. Their study emphasises on the 
comparisons of living patterns of older people according to gender, geographical region and 
socio-economic development of these sample countries. Their study is based on justifying the 
―convergence theory‖ i.e., after the industrial revolution extended family is becoming nuclear 
family.  Using original data of 43 developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America 
from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) done between the period 1990 and 1998, 
they examine several indicators of the living arrangement of older people like household size, 
percentage of living alone, the headship of households and co-residence with kin and others. 
Bongaarts and Zimmer (2002) have considered each country as a unit of analysis and 
calculate the average (mean) of each indicator for all these three regions without putting any 
weight of a country‘s sample size. They also analyse the role of socio-economic factors in 
living arrangement by estimating OLS regressions of the country average for these indicators 
on levels of education, GNP per capita, and percentage of urban population controlling the 
effect of region and gender. The results of the study indicate that household size is 
significantly different among these three regions; more senior citizens live with smaller 
household size than that of the average, only a very small percentage of the population live 
alone, and the average proportion of living alone across all countries is twice as high for 
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women as for men. In the Asian region, living alone is very uncommon for older men. The 
diversity of living arrangement pattern is the greatest in Africa and the least in Latin America. 
The study also mentions that the co-residence pattern of senior citizens among these regions 
varies significantly. Co-residence with adult child for both male and female elderly is the 
highest in the Asian region and the lowest in the Latin American region. Bongaarts and 
Zimmer (2002) argue that co-residence of senior citizens differs significantly according to the 
gender of older people. They estimate that 76.7 percent older males live with their spouse 
while only 27.8 percent older females do, and 58.9 percent older females live with at least one 
adult child while 52.5 percent older males do. The average proportion of females in Africa 
living with any adult (78.4 percent) is lower than that of the other regions. Their estimated 
results show that levels of schooling significantly determine the living arrangement of older 
people except the proportion of senior citizens living with a spouse. Schooling positively 
correlates with the percentage of living alone and percentage of the elderly who is the head of 
household; and negatively correlates with household size, percentage of older people living 
with adult children and the percentage of people living with another adult. GNP per capita and 
percentage of older people living in rural area do not have any correlation with living 
arrangement. Life expectancy has positive association with living with an adult child. We 
have used the findings of Bongaarts and Zimmer (2002) as an empirical basis about choosing 
the determinant of co-residence of senior citizens in developing countries but our estimation 
methods and data set are different from their work. 
Ghuman and Ofstedal (2004) examine the nature of economic and social supports that 
children and siblings are making for the elderly people in Bangladesh. They pay attention on 
co-residence, exchange of money, goods or services, child care and social visits. They also 
examine the role of gender as a support recipient and a support provider in the patterns of 
exchange. Using the Matlab Health and Socioeconomic Survey conducted in Matlab, 
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Bangladesh in 1996, they calculate percentage distributions of different choice variables and 
test whether there are significant differences between the senior men and women.  Their 
results suggest that strong family tie and strong intergenerational co-residence exist in 
Bangladesh. More than 82 percent of older parents are living with one or more child. Between 
one half of married and two-thirds of unmarried elderly live with a married son. Since married 
children often have children of their own, living with married children typically implies a 
three-generation household. The study finds that less than 50 percent senior citizens receive 
money, goods or other services from family members outside the household; and most elderly 
parents who do not live with children, either have a child who lives nearby or receive money 
or other assistance from a non-coresident child. Children or other relatives keep frequent 
(weekly or daily) contact with their elderly parents or grandparents who are living alone. It 
also suggests that married sons are considerably more likely to co-reside with parents than 
married daughters and sons are more likely to coreside or live within a close distance, provide 
money, goods or services, and be in frequent contact with their parents than that of the 
daughters.But the daughters are actively involved in exchanges with their parents, particularly 
their mothers. Nearly one fifth of older women, married or unmarried, receive money, goods 
or services from a non-coresident married daughter. They mention that Bangladesh is about a 
half to two-thirds as likely to receive monetary or material aid from non-coresident children 
compared to the Philippines or Thailand. There is no consistent evidence that women are at a 
disadvantage when it comes to receiving support from children or siblings. Older women are 
more likely to receive aid from a non-coresident sibling than men irrespective of marital 
status. Although we are not estimating economic and social support from children to elder 
parents, the study of Ghuman and Ofstedal (2004) helps us to construct the theoretical 
framework of coresidence pattern for the senior citizens in developing countries by assuming 
the working generation (children) to be altruistic towards the elderly generation. 
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Chuks (2005) investigates the demographic determinants of living arrangement of 
older South African population using 10 percent observations of a micro-level data of the 
―1996 Population Census of South Africa‖. In this paper, percentage distribution and ‗odds 
ratio‘ (odds=proportion/(1–proportion) p. 24) of several demographic variables like age, 
gender, marital status and race are calculated in determining the residing pattern of the older 
people of South Africa. The results of this study state that gender and race significantly 
determine living areas of the older population in South Africa. For example, older women 
(gender) and African (race) are more likely to live in rural areas than their male counterparts 
and White, Coloured and Asian counterparts. More than 48.9 percent among all African non-
White aged 60 and above and 56 percent aged 80 and above reside in the extended family. 
The majority of African, Asian and Coloured older people(58 percent, 53 percent, and 57 
percent respectively) live in extended households, while only a minority (17.2 percent) of 
White older people do. Similarly, African and Coloured older people (16 percent) are much 
more likely to live in augmented households than Whites (9 percent) do. Conversely, the 
majority of White older South Africans lives in nuclear households (55 percent) while only 
about (20–25 percent) of the other racial groups do. Similarly, almost 1 in 5 White older 
people live alone – compared to only 6 percent, 5 percent and 4 percent among Africans, 
Coloureds and Asians respectively.  Although we study cross-country analysis of the co-
residence pattern of elderly people; unlike Chuks (2005) where only South Africa is studied, 
we have realised that race and gender have an important role in determining co-residing 
behaviour of the senior citizens. We, therefore, include gender as a determining factor in our 
empirical analysis. 
 
 28 
 
Pal (2007) argues that co-residence decision is a joint decision of both agents - 
children and parents, and depends upon the comparison of each agent‘s utility level when they 
live alone or co-reside. Using the data of the 52nd round National Sample Survey (NSS) of 
Indian rural sectors, the author constructs some indicators combining different benefits 
(financial and non-financial) both for the adult and elderly to evaluate their utility gains from 
co-residing.  The finding of the study is that the probability of co-residence is generally lower 
among the better off the elderly; the likelihood is also lower for the older and female elderly 
without a spouse and also those with poor health, thus necessitating social protection for these 
disadvantaged elderly. Our work focuses on cross-country analysis and therefore, estimation 
method and data sets are different from Pal‘s (2007).  
 
Hamoudi and Thomas (2006) wanted to find out empirically the preferences of 
different motives of altruistic transfers (pure altruistic, altruistic exchange or altruistic 
belief/inter-temporal preference) between generations. Using the ―Mexican Family Life 
Survey and the Mexican Family Survey Preferences Pilot of the year 2002 and 2005‖, they 
found very preliminary evidence on the relationship between intergenerational transfers and 
three dimensions of preferences of adults. They found little evidence of altruistic motive but 
relatively more support went to risk and inter-temporal preferences. So, they concluded that 
the evidence of altruism is not exactly pure but it is mixed with pure, inter-temporal and 
exchange motives. They did not highlight the factors of co-residing decision. 
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2.4 Empirical literature on solitary residing behaviour of senior citizens in developed 
countries 
 
Pampel (1992) discusses the prevalence and change in solitary residing senior citizens 
in European nations from 1975 to 1989 and examines the influence of individual factors on 
the solitary residing arrangement of senior citizens in the region.  Using the twice-yearly 
―Eurobarometer Survey‖ of nations in the European Community data of 1975 - which is the 
first survey and that of 1989 - which is the last survey, the author considers 13 European 
countries being in the European Community at the time of the first survey. Pampel (1992) 
uses a logistic regression method with micro data sets of cross-national study. Results show 
that the effects of variables proxies for income are in the expected direction, but they are 
trivial in magnitudes. Pampel (1992) also finds that all Catholic countries (Italy, Ireland and 
Northern Irelands) have the lowest solitary residing elderly people and comments that in all 
European countries ―the effect of religion, and its implications for these country patterns 
subsequently‖ (p. 106) but the estimated results predict that ―none of the religious variables 
has significant effects for both types of models‖ (p. 110) regarding the solitary residing 
decision of senior citizens. He has also found that the trend over time in living alone across all 
nations is upward.  Age, education, sex, marital status, and occupation are positively related to 
the solitary residing pattern of the European region. We use this study as the baseline study of 
the determinants of solitary residing senior citizens and develop our empirical model for this 
study but our chosen countries, data set and estimation techniques are different from Pampel 
(1992). 
 
Hotz, McGarry and Emily (2010) discuss the living arrangement of elderly women 
and their adult children over the life cycle of an elderly woman, where special attention has 
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been given to find out the relationship between the evolution of living arrangements over time 
and the socioeconomic status of elderly women and their adult children.They use the ―Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)‖ data of the United States of America. In the data set, each 
respondent has life time family behaviour (nearly 40 years); thus, the authors are able to 
analyse the life cycle behaviours of a respondent and her children. Initially they try to find out 
the variables that are correlated to the living arrangements of the elderly women, after that 
they use multinomial Logit estimation methods assuming that living arrangement is a function 
of elderly women‘s age, schooling, income, race, number of children and health status along 
with her children‘s mean age, income, disability status and unemployment. Their findings 
suggest that elderly mothers are motivated to retain their wealth as they age. They have tried 
to find the simultaneous correlation between living arrangement and current or lagged income 
but the relationship between living arrangements and financial resources at older ages is 
present far earlier in life long before resources are likely to be altered because of living 
arrangements. We are studying the factors of the solitary residing decision of senior citizens 
in the developed European countries and our estimation method and data sets are different 
from them. 
 
Manacorda and Moretti (2002) discuss why Italian young boys (aged 18-30 years) 
prefer to co-reside with their parent.  They argue that Italian young men are co-residing with 
their parents because parents prefer to do so. They investigate the role of parental preference 
by estimating the effect of exogenous changes in parental income on the rates of cohabitation 
in Italy using the ―Survey of Households‘ Income and Wealth (SHIW)‖ micro data from 1989 
to 2000 (1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998 and 2000). To find the endogeneity of parental 
income, they use change in father retirement age as an instrumental variable. Their results 
suggest that 10 percent increase in annual parental income results in approximately 10 percent 
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rise in the proportion of boys living with their parents. The main shortcoming in their paper is 
that they assume co-residing behaviour depends on parental preference of income change. In 
their paper, financial gain of co-residing that children have enjoyed is not focused. They use 
micro data of Italy and instrumental variable estimation technique, which might not be fit for 
all countries over the world. So, we have used macro pooled data of 16 developed European 
countries. 
 
The fundamental objective of Gaymu et. al.(2006)‘s article is to find the determinants 
of different types of living arrangement of senior citizens in nine European countries. Using 
micro-level data and ―logistic estimation method‖ for finding the determinants of living alone 
for these countries, they show that health status, age, gender, region and number of child are 
important determinants of solitary residing senior citizens. In our study, we use macro-level 
data and ―panel estimation method‖ for finding the factors of solitary residing. 
 
Karagiannaki (2005) focuses on the determinant of trends of living arrangement of 
senior citizens in Greece.  Using five cross-sections of the Greek Household Budget Surveys 
(GHBS) and ―probit estimation method‖, the author tries to find determining factors of trends 
in residing arrangement. In our study, we cover 16 European countries and ―panel estimation 
method‖ using macro-level data set. 
 
Gaymu and Springer (2010) focus on finding life satisfaction of the senior European 
living alone from gender and cross-country perspective. Their estimation results say that 
health has always been the strongest determinant of life satisfaction, whichever the 
subpopulation analysed. However, we are focusing on the residing arrangement of senior 
citizens, not on their life satisfaction. 
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We can summarise from the above literature of co-residing behaviour of senior 
citizens in both developed and developing countries that (i) theoretically both parent and child 
want to maximise own utility from housing service; (ii) either parent or child or both can 
behave altruistically regarding co-residing decision; (iii) co-residing in a house and solitary 
residing are considered as mutually exclusive event, and co-residing in a house creates some 
negative externality; (iv) empirically income, age, education, gender, culture and regional 
factors are the most significant in determining co-residing or solitary residing behaviour of 
both elderly parents and younger children.     
 
2.5 Literature on impacts of public education expenditure on income inequality  
 
The second part of the thesis consists of two chapters of which one covers the impact 
of public education expenditure on changing income inequality of an economy and another 
investigates the impacts of education policies on school attendance in Bangladesh. Now we 
briefly discuss the most relevant literature related to these topics. 
Sylwester (2002) empirically examines the relationship between ‗Gini‘ value and 
public education expenditure using a cross section of 50 countries around the world. The 
change in income inequality value from 1970 to 1990 is the dependent variable which is 
regressed on the average of ratio of public education expenditure to GDP from 1960 to 1969. 
The other explanatory variables used in this regression equation are - the natural log of GDP 
per capita in 1970, the average number of years of schooling within the adult population in 
1970, a dummy for whether or not a country was a member of the OECD in 1970, and 
regional dummy variables for East Asia, Latin American, and Africa. Using the Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) estimation technique, Sylwester (2002) predicts that public education 
expenditure reduces income inequality of a country. He also mentions that ―the results appear 
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to be stronger in the OECD countries although there is some evidence, albeit weaker, that 
public education expenditures slowly lessen income inequality in less developed countries‖ 
(Sylwester, 2002 p.49) but he does not take any measure to show the effects separately for the 
OECD countries and the less developed countries. Since Sylwester (2002) includes 4 
dummies as additive form, not as a multiplicative form with any of the explanatory variable, 
the above results do not actually reflect the effect of public education expenditure on income 
inequality of different regions. We have replicated Sylwester‘s (2002) method with the data 
sets of 64 countries starting from 1980 to 2005. We then extend our analysis to find a specific 
model by sequentially eliminating the most insignificant variable from the general model. We 
have also conducted panel analysis for all the sample countries and separately for different 
groups of countries, such as- the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries, Latin America and the Caribbean countries etc.     
 
Glomm, G. and Ravikumar, B. (2003) have constructed an overlapping generation 
model where each individual‘s human capital investment depends on the quality of schools. 
They have shown that the income gap between the rich and the poor may widen when the 
quality of public education is the same for all individuals. This implies that public education 
expenditure does not have any impact on changing the income distribution. Moreover, they 
have found that the tax effect on income inequality is also ambiguous. We have developed a 
static macro model for both developed and developing countries. Results of our model explain 
that public education expenditure reduces income inequality for developed countries and 
increases income inequality for developing countries. 
 
Biggs and Dutta (1999) work on the distributional effects of education expenditure to 
evaluate the change in long run income distribution through reductions in public education 
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expenditure of the United Kingdom. In a dual education system, where public and private 
education systems coexist, they have derived a dynamic model of the earnings distribution 
which is determined by an individual‘s quality of education and ability. Using the simulation 
technique, they have shown that an increase in public education expenditure increases the 
income of future generations and the dispersion of income falls; and in the other direction, a 
decrease in public expenditure reduces the participation rate which leads to the higher earning 
differential. They have also argued that the participation response in public education in a 
dual education system can induce a U-shaped relation between education and average income. 
A dual education system may generate substantially higher inequality than a fully private 
education system. As demonstrated later, this chapter differs from their paper regarding the 
data set, estimation methods as well as results. 
Fraja (2002) discusses optimal education policies in altruistic framework. The author 
constructs a model with a continuum of households consisting of two generations. During the 
lifetime of an individual- one receives education, possibly a bequest, works, has a child and 
spends for own consumption and possibly leaves bequest for children. The findings of the 
paper are that the level of optimal education depends on parental income for less able child 
and the children from better off families receive a more optimal level of education. The high 
ability child of better off family enjoys the benefit of government provision of education but 
the cost of providing this education is borne by the low ability child of a poor family. We 
have developed a macro level model for public education expenditure and income inequality 
in developing countries as well as developed countries and we have also conducted empirical 
analysis. 
 
Hendel, Shapiro, and Willen (2005) analyse educational opportunity and income 
inequality. They construct static and dynamic multigenerational model of wage determination 
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where education is a signalling factor and ability is a skill factor. Generations leave bequest 
for the payment of educational cost of the next generation. They show that making education 
more affordable means- as more and more high-ability workers become educated, the wages 
of unskilled workers fall; therefore, wage and income inequality between skilled and unskilled 
workers increase. They also argue that reducing financial constraints for post secondary 
education reduces the average ability of the uneducated pool and therefore increases the wage 
gap. Our model and empirical analysis are different from them and will be discussed in detail 
in the relevant chapters of the thesis. 
 
Galor and Moav (2006) prove that compulsory public education demises the class 
structure in the economy that means wealth differential gradually turns to zero level. They 
consider a closed overlapping-generations economy in a process of development. In every 
period - a generation, which consists of a continuum of individual, is born. Each individual, 
within as well as across generations, is identical in their preferences and innate abilities. 
Individuals allocate the resulting wage income, along with their interest income, between 
consumption and transfers to their children. They also assume that the economy endogenously 
evolves through two fundamental regimes: Regime-I is the early stage of development, which 
is characterized by a stable class structure. Regime-II is the later stage of development and is 
characterized by the onset of the gradual demise of the Capitalists-Workers class structure. 
They argue that capital accumulation in the process of industrialization gradually intensifies 
the relative scarcity of skilled labour and generates an incentive for human capital 
accumulation. Due to the complementary nature between physical and human capital in 
production, the capitalists are among the prime beneficiaries of the accumulation of human 
capital by the masses. They, therefore, have the incentive to support the provision of public 
education that improves their economic well-being, contributing significantly to the demise of 
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the existing class structure. Since we developed a macro level model of public education 
expenditure and income inequality, we have not considered individual ability to receive 
education. We also empirically evaluate our model and propositions. 
 
Saha and Sensarma (2011) empirically estimate returns to different levels of academic 
specialisation of Indian corporate sector workers. They modify earning function of Mincer 
(1974) by incorporating several dummy variables for different types of higher education (arts, 
science, commerce, etc.) and diplomas to compare the earning differences from these different 
types of academic specialisation in the corporate workers of India. Using data on the annual 
reports of six large Indian private sector firms for the financial year April 1986 to March 
1987, they estimate the modified earning function by Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
(MLE) techniques. Their results show that returns to college education is significantly higher 
than that of school education, and that the earning returns of management and engineering 
specialists are considerably larger than that of the science, arts and commerce specialists. 
They also find that short-course diplomas are also providing additional returns. This study 
highlights the importance of higher and specialised education in changing income distribution 
of developing countries. 
 
Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) agree that public education provision implicitly 
transfers resources from high-income individuals to low-income individuals that mean we can 
say that public education provision reduces income inequality, but they show reverse 
causation between income inequality and public education expenditure. Fernandez and 
Rogerson (1995) develop a model in which education is only partially publicly provided and 
individuals vote over the extent to which it is subsidized. They show that (i) the majority 
voting equilibrium consists of a positive subsidy to education but with only the rich and 
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middle class obtaining an education while the poor is subsidising the education; (ii) the 
efficiency consequences of subsidisation with excludability (relative to an equal-subsidy 
system) may be positive for a poor economy, but never for a wealthy economy; (iii) 
economies with more unequal income distributions are more likely to perpetuate this 
inequality over time; and (iv) finally there are instances in which wealthier individuals would 
profit from making education more costly since this affects their ability to exclude others and 
extract resources from them. The most distinct finding of Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) is 
that economies with more unequal income distributions are more likely to perpetuate this 
inequality over time that leads to an unequal distribution of public education expenditure. One 
can therefore say that income inequality determines the public education expenditure over 
time while most literatures argue the reverse causation. We have considered this reverse 
causality issue in our public education expenditure and income inequality chapter; therefore, 
have done endogenity test. 
 
2.6 Literature about impacts of public education policies on school attendance in 
Bangladesh  
Mincer (1974) theoretically develops schooling model of an individual whose working 
life is fixed. During the working life, an individual can either go to work or school. If the 
individual goes to school, he postpones earnings for the time spent in school and reduces the 
span of his working life which is called time cost. The total investment in schooling is the 
summation of these time costs and direct money outlays for schooling. Individual‘s internal 
rate of return from schooling is defined as ―the present value of real earnings streams with and 
without investment‖ (p.7). Mincer (1974) concludes theoretically that (i) the ratio of annual 
earnings of two different years of schooling is larger than unity that means having more 
schooling commands higher income; (ii) the ratio is a positive function of internal rate of 
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return, in detail we can say that people with more schooling get higher annual pay; the 
difference between earnings of individuals due to a constant difference in years of schooling 
is higher as the rate of return on schooling is higher; and (iii) a negative function of entire 
working life implies the difference is larger that occurs when the general span of working life 
is shorter. Mincer (1974) also shows that ―the larger the dispersion of schooling, the larger a 
negative function of entire working life implies the difference is larger that occurs when the 
general span of working life the relative dispersion and skewness in the distribution of 
earning‖ (p.25) and ―the higher the rate of return from schooling, the higher the income 
inequality and skewness‖ (p.25). The empirical analysis of schooling model is not very 
satisfactory but in Mincer‘s (1974) words ―the disappointing performance of the schooling 
model need not cast doubt on the relevance or importance of human capital analysis‖(p.44). 
We have used direct cost and opportunity cost of schooling while developing the theoretical 
model of demand for compulsory primary level of education. We have also conducted an 
empirical analysis using education related data of Bangladesh. 
 
Becker (1975) develops a theoretical model of investment in different aspects of 
human capital development such as school education, on job training, health, morality etc. 
Assuming that an individual or family has a certain amount of time that can be allocated 
between consumption and investment in human capital, the equilibrium condition of human 
capital investment is that the present value of the marginal cost of investing in human capital 
equals the present value of future returns.  Becker (1975) shows that the amount of time spent 
investing in human capital would tend to decline with age because the remaining lifetime and 
the present value of future return would decline with age as well as the cost of investment 
would tend to rise with age because foregone earnings would be higher. Another important 
result of Becker‘s (1975) is that hours of work would be lower at younger ages and rise more 
 39 
 
rapidly than if there were no investments in human capital. We have used the concept of 
foregone cost of time as the opportunity cost of schooling for developing our theoretical 
model of demand for education. Moreover, we also pursue empirical analysis using education 
related time series and panel data of Bangladesh. 
Saha and Sarkar (1999) analyse the significance of schooling, formal and informal job 
experiences on the earnings of corporate workers in India. They empirically estimate the 
earnings function of 3196 male workers of six big firms in India using the cross-section data 
of these firms in 1987. To framework the estimation model of the study, they modify the 
earnings function of Mincer (1974) by tenure and non-tenure job experiences instead of work 
experience in the Mincer‘s (1974) equation. They also introduce various levels of educations 
(called as ―linear splines‖) to capture the possible existence of differential rates of earnings 
due to different levels of schooling. Using the annual reports of six large companies in 1987 
of India, they estimate the model with the MLE method. Their results show that the rate of 
return to schooling is low up to the junior level, increases significantly up to the 
undergraduate levels and sharply declines at the master level. Both seniority and tenure (firm 
specific) job experiences are significant determinants of earnings of a worker. When years of 
unemployment and informal experience are incorporated, earnings of low-educated workers 
appear to be driven entirely by formal-sector experience.The paper shows the significance of 
schooling in the developing countries, like India and Bangladesh. 
 
Hendry, Johansen, and Santos (2006) discuss an econometric process of selecting a 
regression model when there are more variables than the number of observations. They call 
the variables impulse dummies (or indicators) and consider one of the impulse dummies for 
every observation. The selection process is called general-to-specific model specification and 
is known as automatic general-to-specific model selection procedures when a model is 
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saturated with a complete set of impulse indicators. The method helps us to find those 
regressors that genuinely matter from those that are in fact irrelevant but unknown to 
investigators. We have used automatic ―impulse indicator saturation‖ method via 
―OxMetrics‖ software to evaluate the impact of ―Obligation to Primary Education Act -1990‖ 
considering the year 1993 is one of the impulse indicators. 
Samarrai (2007) discusses education finance trends for Bangladesh. Using 1990 to 
2006 data, the author has argued that Bangladesh government has made a substantial increase 
in primary education financing but it is still low compared to the other countries in the region 
and countries at similar levels of development. The author also says that the impact on 
education outcome at primary level is still insignificant compared to the increase in 
government funding. Our analysis significantly differs both theoretically and empirically from 
Samarrai (2007). 
Ahmed and Ninno (2002) evaluate food for education programme in Bangladesh. 
Using primary data collected in school, household, community, and food grain dealer surveys; 
they show that the introduction of this program has increased primary school enrolment, 
promoted attendance, and reduced dropout rates despite the fact that the quality of education, 
however, remains a problem. They have also found that the increase in enrolment is greater 
for girls than for boys. It is because the opportunity cost of a girl in rural area is lower than the 
boys, which is not mentioned in their discussion. Their finding is an empirical support for our 
theoretical model of Bangladesh chapter that the opportunity cost of education plays an 
important role in establishing compulsory basic education in a developing country like 
Bangladesh. 
 
Ardt, Kalene, et. al. (2005) reports on the challenges and success of primary education 
in Bangladesh. They identify two fundamental issues: equity and access issues and quality 
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issues. In equity and access issues, gender inequity is the most serious problem of a primary 
education system in Bangladesh. They mention that 1.5 million primary school age girls are 
un-enrolled in primary education although the government has given emphasis on girls‘ 
enrolment. Referring to studies they say that girls‘ attendance rates are considerably lower 
than the rates for boys because girls are often kept at home to work and take care of younger 
siblings. Urban poverty and child labour, and quality of primary education are identified as 
the other significant problems of achieving compulsory primary education in Bangladesh.  
They address that the following reform measures are necessary to implement compulsory 
primary education successfully in Bangladesh. 
―The reforms are: 
• To increase the absolute number of teachers in Bangladesh until class sizes can be limited to 
approximately 30 students, rather than 60 or even 100 students as is seen today. 
• To change the form of the educational system to one that is more enjoyable for students and 
that can be tailored to the needs of different communities. The fact that many parents are 
uneducated, as well as a relative lack of teacher-student interaction, should be taken into 
account when deciding the type and amount of homework expected from students. 
• To improve school facilities and to provide incentives for families to educate their sons and 
daughters: most importantly free food, the elimination of all school fees, and stipends for 
working children‖ (p.19). We have done rigorous investigations theoretically and empirically 
on the impact of obligatory primary education in Bangladesh. 
 
Asadullah and Chaudhury (2009) discuss the experience of incentive‐based reforms in 
the secondary Islamic education sector in Bangladesh. The main issues of the reform are 
changes in curriculum and policy regarding admission of female students. Using a 
cross‐sectional census data‐set on formal secondary schools and Islamic schools, they point 
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out that a significant fraction of the existing post‐primary registered religious schools 
comprises of formerly all‐male registered and unregistered religious schools that previously 
offered traditional, religious education. Furthermore, these religious schools have embraced 
female students in recent years because the government introduced cash incentives for female 
secondary level education. They show that modernized religious education helps to achieve 
gender parity in secondary enrolment during 1999–2003, holding the number of secular 
secondary schools constant. This finding highlights the previously undocumented role played 
by religious schools in removing gender disparity in rural Bangladesh. We have focused both 
obligation to primary education act 1990 and female secondary school stipend programme, 
not religious education only. We have conducted theoretical and empirical analysis which has 
not yet been done in any study for Bangladesh. 
Literature on public education expenditure and income inequality show contradictory 
findings. Some literature show that public education expenditure reduces income inequality. 
There are some studies that predict public education expenditure increases income inequality 
and a very few literature theoretically say that income inequality changes the public education 
expenditure of a country. Theoretically ability plays an important role in determining wage 
and income of an individual, as a result, the income distribution of the society also changes. 
Demand for education is a function of direct education cost, opportunity cost of attending 
education and time cost of schooling as well as family income, taste and supply of educational 
instruments. There are a few empirical literature regarding education system, government 
policies and achievements in Bangladesh. Moreover, most of them have not conducted both 
theoretical and empirical analysis. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Altruism and residing arrangements of senior citizens in developing countries 
Abstract 
Unlike developed countries, there is no formal ‗social safety-nets‘ arrangements for 
retired senior citizens in developing countries. Consequently in most of the developing 
countries, elderly parents have been co-residing with their working children (working 
citizens) which ensure their social and economic safety. However, the structure of co-residing 
has been changing rapidly. This study develops a theoretical framework which explains the 
residing arrangement of senior citizens with their altruistic working citizens. The study also 
empirically examines the significant factors which determine the co-residence pattern 
between two successive generations in developing countries. Estimated results suggest that 
economic growth leads to a significant fall in co-residence arrangements of elderly parents 
with their children. Life expectancy and cultural issues are also found to be significant 
phenomena of residing pattern of senior citizens. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Existing literature (see, for example, Ghuman and Ofstedal 2004; Martin 1988, 1989; 
Mason 1992) suggest that senior citizens in less developed countries (LDCs) have hardly any 
consistent flow of income which they could consider as their permanent income. As a result, 
they depend on public or private transfer payments. Although occasionally governments of 
developing countries5 introduce some transfer payment programs for senior citizens, those are 
often temporary in nature and not enough for surviving smoothly. Consequently, unlike 
developed countries, in LDCs, almost all transfer payments for senior citizens come from 
their working children and relatives, not from the government. 
Due to increase in the average life expectancy rate, the percentage of senior citizens is 
increasing around the world. The proportion of the world‘s population aged 60 years or over 
is projected to increase from about 10 percent in 2000 to 13 percent by 2020. By 2050, it is 
                                                          
5 The government of Bangladesh has implemented old age pension system since 1997 but the amount of pension 
is very nominal Taka 100/- per month per person and the number of older people receiving the pension is a few 
but the number is increasing gradually.  
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likely to be over 20 percent (United Nations 2003). In most of the developed countries, there 
are social safety-nets (Bongaarts and Zimmer 2001) by the governments which assure the 
senior citizens some sort of social security after their retirements. However, there are hardly 
any socioeconomic safety-nets by the governments of developing countries (Bongaarts and 
Zimmer 2001; Mason 1992) for their senior citizens. Consequently, how the senior citizens 
can maintain their lives after retirement (for example, in respect of their residing 
arrangements, health status, pension provisions and overall safety-nets) is an issue of great 
concern in developing countries. 
Historically, households around the developing world represent the main institution 
that distributes goods and services between generations (Becker 1991; Kuznets 1978; 
Thornton, Chang and Sun 1984). It has been noticed that due to altruistic attitude towards 
parents, working children transfer money to their parents and/or grandparents in their old age. 
However, parents at that age do not want the financial support only but some logistic supports 
also which cannot be met by the direct transfer payments only. Thus, co-residence of parents 
with their children can satisfy both the financial and logistic needs of elderly parents. Hence, 
usually working children take responsibilities of their elderly parents‘ livelihood especially in 
developing countries. Martin (1988, 1989) and Mason (1992) find that in the United States 
only about 15 percent of the senior citizens live with their working children, where as more 
than three-quarters of Asian senior citizens reside with their offspring. 
It is a cultural norm in Asia and the Pacific region that the younger generation of a 
family takes care for its older generations (Martin 1989; Nydegger 1983). In China, there is 
even written law (Wu 1994) for this.  Policymakers in developing countries greatly value this 
family tie and like this tradition to be carried on rather than introducing governmental safety-
nets programs (Knodel, Chayovan and Siriboon 1992). Although the United Nations (UN) has 
forecast a substantial change in living arrangement around the world over time, however, 
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during the last two decades there was no study on the change of residing patterns of the senior 
citizens in developing countries. Besides, in the era of globalization when the ―traditional 
values of familism and filial piety are being supplanted by the Western values of 
individualism‖ (Martin 1989; p. 627), studies on the change in the living arrangements in 
developing countries are going to be extremely useful. 
As mentioned earlier that in the US only about 15 percent of senior citizens live with 
their working children, while more than three-quarters of Asian senior citizens reside with 
their offspring; which implies that the pattern of residing arrangements for senior citizens are 
extremely diverse between the developed and developing countries. Although there is quite a 
large number of literature which estimate the residing arrangements of senior citizens in the 
developed countries (see, for example, Burch and Matthews 1987; Chiappori 1992; Gaymu 
et.al. 2006), there is hardly any literature on the residing arrangements of the senior citizens of 
the developing and the least developed countries. Although Bongaarts and Zimmer (2001), 
Hashimoto (1991), Martin (1989), Ofstedal, Knodel and Chayovan (1999), and Zimmer and 
Dayton (2003) investigate the determinants of residing pattern of the senior citizens in 
developing countries by using cross-sectional study, they have not looked into the changing 
pattern of residing arrangement due to the change in income levels of working citizens.  
Subsequently, studies on the determinants of residing arrangements as well as the change in 
the residing pattern of developing countries are equally important for policy implication. 
Whilst the existing literature (although there are only a few) attempts a static analysis of 
living arrangement of the senior citizens of the least developed countries, we examine both 
the significant determinants as well as the changing pattern of residing arrangements due to 
the growth and development in developing countries. 
Historically, there is very little consensus about the factors that affect residing 
arrangements of family members with the evolution of societies and economies. Economists 
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(Ermisch 2003; Samuelson 1958; Pal 2007) theorise that trade-off between the utility from 
residing in an extended family and in a nuclear family determines the household formation 
behaviour. Sociologists (Pampel 1992, 1982; Wall 1990) generally hypothesise that 
industrialisation, urbanisation and technological advancement (also known as modernisation) 
change household structures from an extended family to a nuclear family. Hypotheses related 
to demography say (Bongaart 2001; Grundy 1992; Kobrin 1976) that rising life expectancy 
and declining fertility are the determinants of changing family structures. Studies (Grundy 
1992; Pampel 1982, 1992; Martain 1989) those highlight psychological point of view of 
residing arrangements, say that changing social norms, culture and values determine the 
change in households‘ structures. Subsequently, there is an underlying economic 
interpretation of the above mentioned hypotheses that the declining economic benefits of co-
residence in the extended family and increasing importance of privacy for both the young and 
the elderly may decide the residing arrangements of senior citizens both in the developed and 
the developing countries. 
Nonetheless, this is not unusual that with the increase in income level of the working 
citizens (i.e. children of elderly people), their workloads and responsibilities increase in their 
workplaces. Increasing workload and preferring personal privacy would have to create 
externality of congestion for the working children if they co-reside with their parents and 
grandparents. Moreover, with changes in income, working generations are able to afford to 
pay transfer to their parents and thus co-residence may go down although they still maintain 
the same level of altruistic attitude towards parents and grandparents. Subsequently, it is not 
unlikely that with the increase in income levels of working children the degree of co-
residency falls. May be that is why people in developed country are less likely to reside in an 
extended family compared to their counterpart in the developing economy. This also suggests 
that the co-residing pattern in developing countries may have been changing with their 
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economic growth. Hence, this area is needed to be investigated for policy purpose. However, 
to the best of our knowledge, there is no literature which focuses on the change in residing 
pattern for senior citizens in developing countries due to changes in the income levels of 
working citizens. 
Although the level of income may financially assist the families to co-reside, however, 
we hypothesise that change in per capita income of working citizens negatively influence the 
co-residence of senior citizens. This may happen due to negative externality for the working 
generation (it is worth noting that the working generation is usually the decision maker in 
developing countries) which emerges from congestion, preference for personal privacy, 
migration for better opportunity and increased workloads. Secondly, housing price may also 
affect the pattern of co-residence. Thirdly, some cultural issues such as religion and 
geographical difference may affect the living arrangement. Finally, there are some other 
socio-economic variables such as literacy rate, life expectancy rate, labour force 
participation, urban migration which may affect the residing pattern of senior citizens in 
developing countries. Consequently, it is important to investigate whether religion, 
geographical area, literacy and life expectancy rates along with income level and housing 
price influence the residing arrangement of senior citizens in developing countries. 
 
3.2 The Model 
We solve utility maximization problem for an altruistic child and his/her 
individualistic elderly parent. We assume that the elderly parent does not have any income 
and consequently, the child takes care of the elderly parent (traditionally, son takes the 
responsibility of elderly parents in developing countries; hence, we use ‗he‘ from now on). 
Hence, the utility function of altruistic child is: 
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𝑈𝐶,𝑗 = 𝑈  𝑋𝐶,𝑗 , 𝑕𝐶,𝑗 , 𝑈𝑃,𝑗  𝑋𝑃,𝑗 , 𝑕𝑃,𝑗                                                                                    (3.1) 
where, 𝑈𝐶  and 𝑈𝑃 are utility function of altruistic child and elderly parent 
respectively; 𝑋𝐶 , 𝑕𝐶  stand for consumption of material goods and housing for the child 
respectively and 𝑋𝑃 , 𝑕𝑃 denote consumption of material goods and housing for the elderly 
parent according to order. The superscript, 𝑗 = 𝑎, 𝑟 where "𝑎" represents the child and parent 
are residing apart and "𝑟" represents they are co-residing. The utility of the child depends on 
his own consumption of material goods, housing, and the total utility of an elderly parent. 
Since the total utility of the elderly parent is an argument of the child‘s utility function, the 
child is considered as altruistic. Elderly parent does not have any income and his consumption 
of material goods and housing depends on the amount of transfers made by the child. Thus, 
the utility function of a child is directly depends on his own consumption, parent‘s utility, 
while indirectly depends on own consumption and the amount of transfer he makes for the 
elderly parent. In this way, the child gets a ―warm-glow‖ (Andreoni 1990) from the utility of 
the elderly parent. 
The altruistic child makes a lump-sum transfer to his parent and lives apart from the 
parent - we call this case as ―Situation A‖. The transfer works as ―warm-glow‖ (Andreoni, 
1990) in the total utility of the child. However, when the child and the parent co-reside and 
the child takes utility maximisation decision for both of them - we name this case as 
―Situation B‖. In ―Situation B‖, the child does not make any cash transfer to his parent. 
Instead of transfer, he gives a certain weight on parent‘s total indirect utilityderived 
from―Situation A‖. How much weight the child has assigned toa parent‘s total indirect utility 
depends on the child‘s degree of altruism toward the parent. 
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Situation A:Working child and elderly parent are residing apart 
Housing is a pure private good for both the altruistic working child and individualistic 
elderly parent. Since the elderly parent does not have any income flow, the child makes a 
lump-sum transfer, 𝑇, to his parent. As the child and the elderly parent reside separately, they 
take their own consumption decision. We generally assume that a utility function is 
continuous, concave and twice differentiable in all arguments. However, to get specific 
results, we are simplifying the assumption that the utility function is log-linear for both the 
parent and the child.  
Utility maximisation problem for separately living adult child is : 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑋𝐶 ,𝑎 ,𝑕𝐶 ,𝑎 ,𝑇 ln 𝑈
𝐶,𝑎 = 𝛼 ln 𝑋𝐶,𝑎 + 𝛽 ln 𝑕𝐶,𝑎  + 𝜏 ln 𝑉𝑃,𝑎(𝑇)                                              (3.2) 
Subject to the budget constaint is: 
𝑌𝐶 = 𝑃𝑥𝑋
𝐶 ,𝑎 + 𝑃𝑕𝑕
𝐶,𝑎 + 𝑇                                                                                                    (3.3) 
where, ln 𝑈𝐶,𝑎  is the utility function of adult child residing apart, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are 
individual utility share in total utility derived from the consumption of material goods and 
housing respectively and 𝜏 is the degree of altruism towards elderly parent. The argument 
𝑙𝑛 𝑉𝑃,𝑎(𝑇) is the indirect utility function of the elderly parent, which is: 
𝑙𝑛 𝑉𝑃,𝑎(𝑇) ⇒ 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑋𝑃 ,𝑎 ,𝑕𝑃 ,𝑎 ln 𝑈
𝑃,𝑎 = 𝛾 ln 𝑋𝑃,𝑎 + 𝛿 ln 𝑕𝑃,𝑎                                                   (3.4) 
Subject to the budget constaint is: 
𝑇 = 𝑃𝑥𝑋
𝑃,𝑎 + 𝑃𝑕𝑕
𝑃,𝑎                                                                                                                          (3.5) 
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where, 𝛾 and 𝛿 are utility share in total utility derived from the consumption of 
material goods and housing respectively. 𝑇 is the amount of transfer received from the 
altruistic child, 𝑃𝑥  and 𝑃𝑕  are price of material goods and rent of housing respectively. 
Solving the parent‘s problem for any given transfer 𝑇, one gets the demand function 
for material goods and housing of the parent as follows. 
Parent‘s demand for material goods is: 
𝑋𝑃,𝑎∗ =
𝛾𝑇
(𝛾+𝛿)𝑃𝑥
                                                                                                                     (3.6) 
Parent‘s demand for housing is: 
𝑕𝑃,𝑎∗ =
𝛿𝑇
(𝛾+𝛿)𝑃𝑕
                                                                                                                    (3.7) 
Substituting parent‘s demand for material goods and housing in his utility function, 
one gets the indirect utility function of the parent as follows. 
ln 𝑉𝑃,𝑎 (𝑇) = 𝛾 ln 𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝛿 +  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝑇 −  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln(𝛾 + 𝛿) − 𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥 − 𝛿 ln 𝑃𝑕        (3.8) 
Now, carrying out the adult child‘s optimisation problem after substituting parent‘s 
indirect utility function in equation (3.2) and solving it subject to budget constraint given in 
equation (3.3), one gets, 
Demand for material goods for separately residing adult child is: 
𝑋𝐶,𝑎∗ =
𝛼𝑌𝐶
{ 𝛼+𝛽 +𝜏 𝛾+𝛿 }𝑃𝑥
                                                                                                      (3.9) 
Demand for housing for separately residing adult child is: 
𝑕𝐶,𝑎∗ =
𝛽𝑌𝐶
{ 𝛼+𝛽 +𝜏 𝛾+𝛿 }𝑃𝑕
                                                                                                     (3.10) 
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The demand for housing of the child is a function of child‘s income, rent of the 
housing, degree of altruism, and preference parameters of both the child and elderly parent. 
The demand for housing is directly related to income and inversely related to rent. A unit 
increase in the degree of altruism towards parent decreases child demand for housing 
 
𝛽 𝛾+𝛿 𝑌𝐶
  𝛼+𝛽 +𝜏 𝛾+𝛿  2𝑃𝑕
  amount and vice versa if other things remain constant, which is called 
altruistic effect. The intuition behind this outcome is that an increase in child‘s degree of 
altruism indicates that child‘s relative preference switches from the consumption of housing 
to altruistic transfer and other material goods. Therefore, demand for housing decreases. 
Equilibrium amount of transfer that the altruistic child is making to his elderly parent 
is: 
𝑇∗ =
𝜏(𝛾+𝛿)𝑌𝐶
{ 𝛼+𝛽 +𝜏 𝛾+𝛿 }
                                                                                                             (3.11) 
The equilibrium amount of transfer is a function child‘s income, degree of altruism 
and preference parameters of both the child and the elderly parent.  
After substituting the equilibrium amount of transfer in equation (3.7), we get optimal 
demand for housing of the separately residing parent is: 
𝑕𝑃,𝑎∗ =
𝜏𝛿𝑌𝐶
{ 𝛼+𝛽 +𝜏 𝛾+𝛿 }𝑃𝑕
=
𝜏𝛿
𝛽
𝑕𝐶,𝑎                                                                                      (3.12) 
The demand for housing for the elderly parent residing apart from the child is a 
function of child‘s income, rent of housing, degree of altruism, and preference parameters of 
both the child and elderly parent. The demand function follows all general properties of law 
of demand such as positive income effect and negative substitution effect. A unit increase in 
the degree of altruism increases parent‘s equilibrium demand for housing  
𝛿 𝛼+𝛽 𝑌𝐶
  𝛼+𝛽 +𝜏 𝛾+𝛿  2𝑃𝑕
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amount and vice versa if other things remain constant which we like to call as altruistic effect. 
The intuition behind this result is that an increase in child‘s degree of altruism toward parent 
indicates that parent receives more transfer from his child so that parent can spend more on 
the consumption of housing and on other goods. Thus, the demand for housing increases of 
the parent. 
Substituting the equilibrium amount of transfer that maximises the total utility of the 
altruistic child in the indirect utility function of parent, we get the following indirect utility 
function for the parent. 
ln 𝑉𝑃,𝑎 (𝑌𝐶) = 𝛾 ln 𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝛿 +  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝜏 +  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝑌𝐶
−  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  − 𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥
− 𝛿 ln 𝑃𝑕                                                                                                             (3.13) 
The equilibrium total utility of parent residing apart is a function of child‘s income, 
degree of altruism, price of material goods, rent of housing, and preference parameters of both 
the elderly parent and the altruistic child.  
The indirect utility function of altruistic child who resides in a separate house is as follows. 
ln 𝑉𝐶 ,𝑎  𝑌𝐶 = 𝛼 ln 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln 𝛽 + 𝜏𝛾 ln 𝛾 + 𝜏𝛿 ln 𝛿 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝜏
+  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  ln 𝑌𝐶 −  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  ln  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  
− 𝛼 ln 𝑃𝑥 − 𝜏𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥 − 𝛽 ln 𝑃𝑕 − 𝜏𝛿 ln 𝑃𝑕                                                  (3.14) 
The equilibrium total utility of altruistic child residing apart is a function of child‘s 
income, price of material goods, rent of housing and preference parameters of both parent and 
child.  
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Special case: Now assume that, preferences for material goods and housing for the child and 
the parent are equal to each other. That is, 𝛼 = 𝛾; 𝛽 = 𝛿;  𝛼 + 𝛽 = 𝛾 + 𝛿 = 1. With these 
simplifications, we can get, 𝑕𝑃,𝑎 = 𝜏𝑕𝐶 ,𝑎  . That is, if 𝜏 < 1 consumption of housing of the 
parent‘s will be less than that of the child and 𝜏 > 1 consumption of housing of the parent‘s 
will be higher than that of the child. 
Proposition 1: The demand for housing of a separately residing parent directly changes with 
a change in child‟s income or a change in child‟s degree of altruism.While the change in 
demand for housing of a separately residing child with a change in his income is positive but 
the change in demand for housing of a separately residing child with a change in degree of 
altruism is negative. 
Proof: See mathematical appendix of Chapter Three. 
Situation B: Child and parent are co-residing 
Assume that altruistic child likes to co-reside with his elderly parent in a house and he 
takes care of all consumption expenditures of his elderly parent. So the child now does not 
make any direct transfer. Ermisch (2003) assume that housing is a public good that means 
residing more people in a house does not reduce residential utility of each individual in the 
family. We assume that housing is a semi-public good. Co-residing in a house might create a 
negative externality for the altruistic child and the elderly parent. Examples of some negative 
externality of co-residing are congestion problem, loss of privacy etc. for both the child and 
parent. Housing is therefore, considered as a semi-public good not a pure public one (Ermisch 
2003) for both the child and parent due to negative externality of co-residing. 
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It might be possible that co-residing creates economies of scale in the housing. But we 
assume that the housing market is perfectly competitive and rent is not affected by the amount 
of the demand for housing. 
Let us assume that the externality parameter for the child and parent are 𝜃𝐶  and 𝜃𝑃  
respectively. To internalise this externality, let us assume that the partial utility of housing for 
every agent is the difference between the utility generated by residing in a private house and 
the effect of externality due to co-residing. Thus, we assume the log-linear utility function of 
the elderly parent co-residing with the child becomes as follows. 
ln 𝑈𝑃,𝑟 = 𝛾 ln 𝑋𝑃,𝑟 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 ln 𝑕𝐶,𝑟 ;   0 < 𝛾, 𝛿 < 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃𝑃 < 𝛿                                 (3.15) 
where, 𝛾 and 𝛿 are the utility share of consumption of goods and housing respectively; 
which are similar as that of residing apart. Since parent and child co-reside in a house which 
is rented by the child, partial utility of housing for the parent is generated from the 
𝑕𝐶,𝑟argument. 𝜃𝑃 < 𝛿 this restriction on externality parameter indicates that the magnitude of 
externality effect cannot exceed the utility share of private housing for the parent. Although 
the elderly parent has a specific utility function when co-residing, the altruistic child takes 
utility maximising decision for both parent and himself. Therefore, the parent does not have 
any budget constraint. 
The log-linear utility function of a co-residing altruistic child becomes as follows. 
ln 𝑈𝐶,𝑟 = 𝛼 ln 𝑋𝐶 ,𝑟 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 ln 𝑕𝐶,𝑟 + 𝜏 ln 𝑈𝑃,𝑟 ;  
0 < 𝛼, 𝛽 < 1; 𝜏 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜃𝐶 < 𝛽                                                                                     (3.16) 
where, the argument 𝑙𝑛 𝑈𝑃,𝑟  is the direct utility function of the elderly parent, which is 
inserted in the utility function because the child is altruistic and he is maximising co-residing 
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parent‘s wellbeing. 𝛼 and 𝛽 are utility share in total utility derived from the consumption of 
material goods and housing respectively, which are the same as that of residing apart. 𝜃𝐶 < 𝛽 
this restriction on the externality effect parameter indicates that the magnitude of externality 
effect cannot exceed the utility share of private housing for the child.𝜏is the degree of altruism 
towards elderly parent and also altruistic utility share in the total utility of the child. The 
budget constraint of the child is as follows. 
𝑌𝐶 = 𝑃𝑥(𝑋
𝐶,𝑟 + 𝑋𝑃,𝑟) + 𝑃𝑕𝑕
𝐶,𝑟                                                                                           (3.17) 
where, 𝑌𝐶  is the income of working child, 𝑕𝐶,𝑟  is the amount of housing consumed by 
both the child and parent. The utility maximisation problem for the altruistic child becomes as 
follows. 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑋𝐶 ,𝑟 ,𝑋𝑃 ,𝑎 ,𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟 ,𝜆𝐿
= 𝛼 ln 𝑋𝐶,𝑟 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 ln 𝑕𝐶,𝑟 + 𝜏 ln 𝑈𝑃,𝑟
+ 𝜆 𝑌𝐶 − 𝑃𝑥 𝑋
𝐶,𝑟 + 𝑋𝑃,𝑟 + 𝑃𝑕𝑕
𝐶,𝑟                                                            (3.18) 
The demand for housing of co-residing child and elderly parent is as follows. 
𝑕𝐶,𝑟∗ =
{ 𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃 }𝑌𝐶
  𝛼+𝜏𝛾 +  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃    𝑃𝑕
                                                                                   (3.19) 
The demand of housing for co-residing child and elderly parent is a function of the 
child‘s income, rent of housing, degree of altruism, externality parameters and preference 
parameters of both the child and elderly parent.  The altruistic effect of demand for housing is 
𝑌𝐶 𝛼 𝛿−𝜃𝑃 −𝛾 𝛽−𝜃𝐶  
  𝛼+𝜏𝛾 +  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃    
2
𝑃𝑕
  which is ambiguous in sign. 
Lemma 1: The rate of change in demand of housing for co-residing child and parent due to 
changes in the child‟s degree of altruism depends on the relative magnitudes of the ratio of 
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elasticity of material goods to the elasticity of housing of the altruistic child  𝜀𝑋 ,,𝑟 𝜀𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟  and 
that of the elderly parent  𝜀𝑋𝑃 ,𝑟 𝜀𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟  . The demand for co-residing housing increases due to 
a unit rise in the degree of altruism if the  𝜀𝑋 ,,𝑟 𝜀𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟  >  𝜀𝑋𝐶 ,𝑟 𝜀𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟    and vice versa. 
Proof: See mathematical appendix of Chapter Three. 
The rate of change in demand for housing of the co-residing child and elderly parent 
with respect to own externality parameter is considered as externality effects in housing 
demand. A unit increase in externality of co-residing of the child decreases the demand for 
housing  
 𝛼+𝜏𝛾 𝑌𝐶
{  𝛼+𝜏𝛾 +  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃    }2𝑃𝑕
 amount and vice versa if other things remain constant. 
Similarly, a unit increase in externality of co-residing of the parent decreases the demand for 
housing  
𝜏 𝛼+𝜏𝛾 𝑌𝐶
{  𝛼+𝜏𝛾 +  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃    }2𝑃𝑕
 and vice versa if other things remain constant. 
Proposition 2: (a) A change in child‟s income directly changes demand for housing when 
child and parent are co-residing.  
(b) When co-residing, the effect of demand for housing on the change in child‟s degree of 
altruism is ambiguous.  
(c) The effect of demand for housing on degree of externality of either the child‟s or the 
parent‟s is negative in co-residing situation. 
Proof: See mathematical appendix. 
 An increase in child‘s income increases demand for housing for co-residing parent and 
child and vice versa if other things remain constant.The effect of child‘s degree of altruism on 
demand for housing of co-residing child and parent is ambiguous. An increase in child‘s 
degree of altruism increases demand for housing if and only if 𝛼 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 > 𝛾 𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  while 
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decreases demand for housing if and only if 𝛼 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 < 𝛾 𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  when other things hold 
constant. The effect of either child‘s or parent‘s externality of co-residing on demand for 
housing in co-residing situation is always negative if other things being constant. As we 
expact that an increase of child‘s income increases both degree of altruism and externality of 
co-residing to the child, the overall effect of child‘s income increase on the demand for 
housing in co-residing situation is ambiguous. We therefore, like to investigate empirically 
the income effect on co-residing decision of senior citizens (parents).  
The equilibrium total utility can be found from the indirect utility function for the 
elderly parent co-residing with the child, which is as follows. 
ln 𝑉𝑃,𝑟 = 𝛾 ln 𝜏 + 𝛾 ln 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 ln  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃  +  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃  ln 𝑌𝐶
−  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃  ln[ 𝛼 + 𝜏𝛾 + { 𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 ] − 𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥
−  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 ln 𝑃𝑕                                                                                               (3.20) 
The equilibrium total utility of co-residing elderly parent is a function of the amount 
of income, price of material goods and services, rent of housing and preference parameters of 
both the altruistic child and elderly parent. The elasticity of total utility with respect to 
income, (𝜀
𝑌𝐶
𝑉𝑃 ,𝑟 =
𝜕 ln 𝑉𝑃 ,𝑟
𝜕 ln 𝑌𝐶
), is  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   which is constant and depends on preference 
parameters of the elderly parent. 
The equilibrium total utility is the indirect utility function of the altruistic child co-
residing with elderly parent, which is as follows. 
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ln 𝑉𝐶,𝑟 = 𝛼 ln 𝛼 +   𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝐶  ln  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝐶  + 𝜏𝛾 ln 𝜏 + 𝜏𝛾 ln 𝛾
+   𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  + 𝜏 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   ln 𝑌𝐶
−   𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  
+ 𝜏 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   ln  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  + 𝜏 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   −  𝛼 + 𝜏𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥
−   𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝐶  ln 𝑃𝑕                                                                   (3.21) 
The equilibrium total utility of co-residing altruistic child is a function of the amount 
of income, price of material goods and services, rent of housing and preference parameters of 
both the altruistic child and elderly parent. The elasticity of total utility with respect to 
income, (𝜀
𝑌𝐶
𝑉𝐶 ,𝑟 =
𝜕 ln 𝑉𝐶 ,𝑟
𝜕 ln 𝑌𝐶
), is   𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  + 𝜏 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃    which is constant and 
depends on preference parameters of both the child and elderly parent. 
Proposition 3: Total indirect utility is less elastic with respect to child‟s income when co-
residing than when residing apart for both the parent and the child. 
Proof: See mathematical appendix of chapter three. 
Proposition 4: Child will be indifferent between co-residing and residing apart when his 
income is 𝒀𝑪 =     𝜶+𝜷 +𝝉 𝜸+𝜹   
  𝜶+𝜷 +𝝉 𝜸+𝜹     𝜷−𝜽𝑪 +𝝉 𝜹−𝜽𝑪   
  𝜷−𝜽𝑪 +𝝉 𝜹−𝜽𝑪  
 𝑷𝒉 
 𝜽𝑪+𝝉𝜽𝑪 
  𝜶+ 𝜷−𝜽𝑪  +𝝉 𝜸+ 𝜹−𝜽𝑷   
  𝜶+ 𝜷−𝜽𝑪  +𝝉 𝜸+ 𝜹−𝜽𝑷   
𝜷𝜷𝜹𝝉𝜹𝝉𝝉𝜹
 
𝟏
(𝜽𝑪+𝝉𝜽𝑷)
. If income is 
higher than the threshold level, the child decides to reside apart and vice versa. Similarly, 
elderly parent will be indifferent between co-residing and residing apart when child income is 
𝒀𝑪 =  
   𝜶+𝜷 +𝝉 𝜸+𝜹    𝜸+𝜹    𝜷−𝜽𝑪 +𝝉 𝜹−𝜽𝑷   
 𝜹−𝜽𝑷 
 𝑷𝒉 
𝜽𝑷
[ 𝜶+𝝉𝜸 +{ 𝜷−𝜽𝑪 +𝝉 𝜹−𝜽𝑷 ] 𝜸+ 𝜹−𝜽
𝑷  𝜹𝜹𝝉𝜹
 
𝟏
𝜽𝑷
. If child income is higher than the threshold 
level elderly parent prefers to reside apart and vice versa. 
Proof: See mathematical appendix of the chapter.  
The elasticity of total utility in co-residing with respect to child‘s income is lower 
compared to that of the residing apart for both the child and elderly parent. That means, the 
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percentage change in total utility of co-residing situation due to a unit increase in child‘s 
income is lower than the percentage change in total utility of separately residing situation due 
to a unit increase in child‘s income for both the child and elderly parent. This outcome infers 
that as the child‘s income increases both the child and elderly parent are more willing to 
reside separately than to co-reside when other things are constant because the percentage 
increase in total utility is greater when residing apart. 
The theoretical analysis suggests that co-residing decision for the elderly parent 
depends on the income of the child, degree of altruism, the degree of externality of co-
residing, and rent of housing service. The discussion of proposition 2 and proposition 3 result 
that as income of the child increases, co-residing decreases and vice versa. The intuition 
behind this negative correlation between child‘s income and co-residency of parent with child 
is that an increase in individual income increases solitary residing attitude because 
privacy/independence is considered as a purchasable good, and therefore, co-residing attitude 
of an individual decreases (Pampel 1992). 
We, therefore, hypothesise from the model that (i) increase in income of working 
citizens decreases the co-residency of senior citizens and (ii) increase in the price of housing 
also decreases the demand for housing of a senior citizen. 
These two hypotheses are going to be empirically tested with the other relevant 
explanatory factors in the next sections of the chapter. 
3.3 The Empirical Model, Methodology and Data 
3.3.1 The Empirical Model 
According to the theory developed in this chapter, co-residency decision of senior 
citizens depends on income of working citizens and rent of housing. We use per capita 
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income of an employed person (GDP6) as a proxy of income of working citizen and inflation 
(CPI) as a proxy of the rent of housing. Although inflation is not considered as a good proxy 
of rental price variable, we have used it because in most of the developing countries, rental 
markets are not developed and organised. Moreover, the majority of the people in developing 
countries lives in rural areas where the rental housing market does not exist at all. 
Consequently, data on the housing price index is unavailable in existing data sources in the 
sample countries. Along with these two explanatory variables, we have considered some other 
determinants that have been found to be important factors on explaining co-residency 
behaviour of senior citizens.Chuks (2005) and Ghuman and Ofstedal (2004) find that age of 
senior citizens is an important determinant of their residing arrangement. We, therefore, use 
the life expectancy at birth (LIEF) as one of the explanatory variables in this study. In 
developed countries, the level of education of the senior citizens plays an important role in 
determining the residing pattern of them. Gaymu et.al. (2006), Kathleen and Schoeni (2000), 
and Kinsella (1990) find that having higher levels of education of the senior citizens indicates 
less likelihood of co-residing with an adult child. We use the literacy rate of the adult 
population (LITE) in our study. The level of human development may affect the residing 
arrangement of senior citizens.  Gaymu et. al. (2006), Kinsella (1990) find that a less number 
of senior citizens co-reside with their children in developed countries and a large number of 
senior citizens co-reside with adult child in developing countries. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) introduces the ―Human Development Index (HDI)‖ in 
1990. It is a hybrid measure of three development indicators namely: life expectancy, literacy 
rate and GDP of a country. In this paper, we use HDI as a substitute of three independent 
variables (GDP, LIFE and LITE). Martin (1989) indicates that a larger proportion of urban 
migration might be a reason for weakening ties of children with their elderly parents. We, 
                                                          
6 Italicised words in parathesis indicate the symbol used for the variable in this chapter.  
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therefore, include the ratio of urban to rural population (RUR) as an explanatory variable. The 
ratio is a measure of the relative number of population living in an urban area to a rural area 
within a country. Kinsella (1990) and the United Nations (2005) find that the higher the 
female labour force participation, the higher the possibility of co-residing with senior citizens. 
Consequently we include the labour force participation rate (LFP) of both male and female in 
our study. Gaymu et. al., (2006) and Pampel (1983, 1992) suggest that culture may be an 
important determinant of the residing arrangement. Region and religion could be good proxies 
for culture variable. We use the percentage of the population who are either Muslim or 
Christian or Hindu, Buddhist and others. 
We use the percentage of senior citizens living with their child (PEPCH) to the total 
number of senior citizens of a country in a year as our dependent variable7. People who are 60 
years of age or above are considered as senior citizens and the people aged 25 to 59 years are 
considered as working citizens. Male (MPEPCH) and female (FPEPCH) are also used in the 
estimation to examine whether they are significantly different if we separately estimate co-
residing arrangements. 
Although the PEPCH and labor force participation rate (LFP) are separate variables 
for male and female; all other explanatory variables, such as, per capita income of employed 
people (GDP), life expectancy at birth (LIFE), adult literacy rate (LITE), consumer price 
index (CPI), ratio of urban to rural population (RUR), human development index (HDI), 
percentage of Muslim people (MUS), percentage of Christian people (CHR), percentage of 
Hindu, Buddhist and Others (HBO) are common for both male and female. We also use a 
combined (male and female) PEPCH variable in our estimation. 
                                                          
7The household composition of older persons is classified into mutually exclusive categories which include 
living alone, living with spouse only, living with children/children-in-law, living with grandchild (without 
children), living with other relatives and living with non-relatives‘(United Nations 2005, p.133).  
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Usually economic theory does not provide a very precise guideline about specifying 
linear versus log-linear functional form for regression analysis (Godfrey and Wickens, 1981). 
However, the choice of functional form has important implications for statistical tests, for 
forecast and for policy analysis (Hall, 1978). In this chapter, we have used Sargan (1964)8 
criterion because of computational simplicity, for getting clear cut decision and also (Godfrey 
and Wickens, 1981) for choosing one functional form. Sargan‘s (1964) criterion suggests that 
the log-linear model is appropriate for this estimation rather than a simple linear model. 
Subsequently, we employ the following model for estimation: 
ln 𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 +𝛽3 ln 𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ln 𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ln 𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 ln 𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑈𝑆00𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑅00𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐵𝑂00𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖                                                                                                   (3.22)     
 
ln 𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 +𝛽3 ln 𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ln 𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ln 𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 ln 𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑈𝑆00𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑅00𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐵𝑂00𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖
+ 𝜗𝑖                                                                                                                    (3.23)   
ln 𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ln 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 +𝛽3 ln 𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ln 𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ln 𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 ln 𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑙𝑛𝑀𝑈𝑆00𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝐶𝐻𝑅00𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐵𝑂00𝑖 + 𝛽10𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖
+ 𝜗𝑖                                                                                                                     (3.24)  
 
where, 𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻, 𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻 and 𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻 are percentage of senior citizens living with 
their children, the percentage of senior male living with their child and percentage of senior 
female living with their child respectively. 𝐺𝐷𝑃 is per capita income of employed people, 
𝐶𝑃𝐼 is consumer price index, 𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸 is life expectancy at birth, 𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸 is literacy rate, 𝐿𝐹𝑃 is 
labour force participation rate, 𝑅𝑈𝑅 is ratio of urban to rural population, 𝐻𝐷𝐼 is human 
                                                          
8 See empirical appendix of chapter three for Sargan (1964) method and empirical result. 
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development index (which is not shown in any equation (3.22), (3.23) or (3.24); however, we 
employ this cumulative variable instead of 𝐺𝐷𝑃, 𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸 and 𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸 variables), 𝑀𝑈𝑆 is the 
percentage of Muslim population, 𝐶𝐻𝑅 is the percentage of Christian population, 𝐻𝐵𝑂 is the 
percentage of Hindu, Buddhist and other people, 𝑆𝐸𝑋 is a gender dummy and 𝐴𝐹𝑅 is a 
regional dummy. 𝜗~𝑁(0, 𝜎2) is the disturbance term assumed to be distributed normally with 
zero mean and constant variance across the countries. 
 
3.3.2 Estimation Method 
A large number of studies use multinomial Logit model for estimating the causal 
relationship between residing arrangement and the explanatory variables which is an 
appropriate measure when the dependent variable is dichotomous variable. In this study 
dependent variable is the percentage of senior citizens living with children which is not a 
dichotomous variable; that is why, ordinary least square (OLS) estimation method is more 
appropriate than the any other method. There are a lot of studies using the OLS estimation 
method for finding a causal relationship (Bongaarts and Zimmer, 2002; Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, United Nations, 2005) between residing 
arrangements of senior citizens and the factors that determine this relationship. 
Although, the panel analysis we have conducted here is included two waves of time 
due to unavailability of data, the study definitely enriches knowledge of residing 
arrangements literature. Because neither we found any literature using panel data analysis 
technique to find the determinants of residing arrangements of the senior people for 
developing countries, nor there is any trend analysis been conducted yet regarding the 
residing arrangements of the senior citizens in these two regions. 
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There are several attractive features of panel analysis if one has the panel data set.  
Firstly, panel data analysis is very helpful to deal with the heterogeneity in the micro unit, in 
our case it is individual country. The heterogeneity means that all these countries are different 
from one another in a fundamental unmeasured way. Therefore, using cross-section analysis, 
one cannot include all the relevant variables which are appropriate for each country. As a 
result, cross-section analysis might produce biased results, while panel data analysis helps to 
correct this problem. Secondly, panel analysis uses more variability by combining variation 
across the country and over time which helps to alleviate the multicollinearity problem.  
Thirdly, panel analysis can address the turnover question because the data track a common 
sample of country over different years. Finally, panel data analysis helps to get a dynamic 
adjustment while cross-section data analysis cannot. This study employs the unbalanced panel 
estimation technique using twenty two cross-sectional and two time series observations. We 
deliberately ignore developed country data to avoid prospective heterogeneity problem. Time 
gap for each country is at least five years up to ten years. Overall the time period includes 
between 1990 and 2002. 
We use the fixed effects and random effects models9 for (i) overall co-residence 
(senior citizens living with working citizens) pattern as well as for co-residence of (ii) senior 
male and (iii) senior female separately. The study uses unbalanced panel data of twenty two 
Asian and African countries. 
The study uses the Hausman (1978) test10 criterion for model selection between 
random effects and fixed effects. Estimated results suggest that random effects are appropriate 
for separate male and female model but the fixed effects model is preferable for combined 
model. 
                                                          
9 Brief explanation of fixed effects and random effects model is given in empirical appendix of chapter three.  
10 Briefly explain Hausman (1978) test procedure in appendix of chapter three. 
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We employ the ‗general-to-specific‘ modelling technique by sequentially eliminating the most 
insignificant variables from the general model. 
3.3.3 Data 
The sample consists of 22 countries in the African and Asian regions. Among these 22 
countries, 16 are taken from the African region, and 6 are chosen from Asian regions; which 
are specifically known as ‗South and South East Asia‘. According to the definitions provided 
by the United Nations, 9 countries among these 16 African countries are from West Africa: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal; 5 
countries are from East Africa and Horn of Africa: Kenya, Malawi, United Republic of 
Tanzania (Tanzania), Zambia and Zimbabwe; and 2 countries are taken from Central and 
Southern Africa: Madagascar, and Rwanda. 6 South and South East Asian countries are: 
Bangladesh, India, Nepal, China, Indonesia and the Philippines. Senegal, Burkina Faso, 
Ghana, Benin, Cote d‘Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Cameroon are neighbouring countries 
in the West Africa; and Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda and 
Madagascar are neighbouring countries in the Eastern and Southern region of Africa. These 
countries are socially, economically and culturally not very much different from each other. 
Bangladesh, India and Nepal are the neighbouring countries in South Asia having social, 
economic and cultural similarity. China is adjacent to India and a little far from Indonesia and 
the Philippines, which are two neighbouring countries in South East Asia; but has a great 
socio-economic and cultural similarity with these countries.  Almost all these countries are the 
least developed countries in the world though South and South East Asian countries are 
growing relatively faster than the African countries. 
In this study, observations of dependent variables are directly related to the senior 
citizens residing with working child and the observations of independent variables are related 
 66 
 
to the working citizens because the aggregate data on explanatory variables at a particular 
time are representing existing situation that means existing working citizens of the economy 
at that time. Reasons of using this specific nature of data in this study are: (i) the theoretical 
model and also many studies (Martin 1988, 1989; Mason 1992; Ghuman and Ofstedal 2004) 
have found that senior citizens in the least developed countries hardly have any consistent 
flow of income which they can consider as permanent income. As a result, they have to 
depend on the transfer from mainly working children and other relatives for maintaining their 
livelihood, (ii) the senior citizens are defined as age 60 and above at the time of collecting 
data, so the aggregate variables at that specific year are actually representing both the senior 
citizens and working citizens. 
The theoretical model in this chapter is based on micro behaviour of elderly parent and 
working child. In this situation, household survey panel data sets should be ideal for 
conducting empirical analysis. But it is nearly impossible to gather household survey panel 
data sets for 22 developing countries around the world because most sample countries do not 
have such type of data sets specifically in English version and also the time cost of collecting 
such data sets is huge. Due to this limitation, we have used macro-level (aggregate) data sets 
for all sample countries. One may raise the question - how does the micro model link with 
macro-data set or empirical analysis? We know macro variables are the aggregation of micro 
variables in most of the cases, for example- income approach is one way of measuring gross 
domestic product (GDP) where all factors‘ income are added up, and wage income 
contributes more than 50 percent of GDP in any country. Similarly, the consumer price index 
(CPI) is the percentage change in the weighted average of all consumer goods in a households 
consumption bundle between the base year and current years. The weight is given according 
to the amount of spending on consumption good in the consumption bundle. So each 
product‘s price matters for calculating consumer price index. Therefore, we can say macro 
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data is the reflection of micro-data and vice versa. Moreover, there are many studies 
(Bongaarts and Zimmer 2001; Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division, United Nations 2005) where macro-level data have been used instead of micro-level 
datafor empirically investigating the living arrangement behaviour of senior citizens in case of 
cross-country analysis. 
The detail description of all variables and sources of gathering data is presented in 
Data appendix of Chapter three. 
Throughout the text, we have omitted the subscripts of all variables for ease of 
reading. 
 
3.4 Empirical Results  
Overall the time period includes between 1990 and 2002. Descriptive statistics of the 
variables are given in Table 3.1. The statistics indicate that co-residing pattern of senior 
people with working children is more likely in the Asian region than that of African region. 
On average 65.23 percent senior citizens of the research areas, among which 61.72 percent 
African and 74.58 percent Asian senior citizens co-reside with their children. If we consider 
the gender issue, we find that on average 70.34 percent male (MPEPCH) and 59.83 percent 
female (FPEPCH) senior citizens co-reside with at least one working child. If we consider the 
regional difference we find that 68.43 percent male and 54.58 percent female of Africa and 
75.44 percent male and 73.84 percent female of Asia co-reside with their children. In the first 
wave, 70.86 percent male and 60.17 percent female senior citizens co-reside with their 
children. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
pepch Panel 44 65.23 10.55 45.7 88.1 
1st 
wave 
Total 22 65.74 10.29 45.7 88.0 
Africa 16 62.01 8.13 45.7 75.6 
Asia 6 75.68 9.12 64.5 88.0 
2nd 
wave 
Total 22 64.72 11.02 46.5 88.1 
Africa 16 61.44 9.53 46.5 80.1 
Asia 6 73.47 10.52 62.8 88.1 
mpepch Panel 44 70.34 
 
9.22 52.3 89.7 
1st 
wave 
Total 22 70.86 8.76 54.8 88.5 
Africa 16 68.68 8.05 54.8 83.5 
Asia 6 76.68 8.49 68.2 88.5 
2nd 
wave 
Total 22 69.81 9.84 52.3 89.7 
Africa 16 68.17 9.06 52.3 85.0 
Asia 6 74.2 11.35 60.1 89.7 
fpepch Panel 44 59.83 12.51 35.6 87.3 
1st 
wave 
Total 22 60.17 12.60 35.6 87.3 
Africa 16 54.68 8.40 35.6 67.6 
Asia 6 74.82 10.04 61.0 87.3 
2nd 
wave 
Total 22 59.49 12.71 41.4 86.1 
Africa 16 54.48 9.75 41.4 75.2 
Asia 6 72.87 9.91 60.4 86.1 
gdp 44 2617.64 1757.84 527.0 8688 
cpi 44 52.99 29.20 0.05 93.61 
rur 44 45.86 27.50 7.53 138.10 
lfp 44 60.34 17.05 29.0 87.0 
hdi 44 0.42 0.15 0.078 0.74 
mus 44 29.27 30.29 0.3 90.7 
chr 44 39.33 31.72 0.1 102 
hbo 44 33.98 26.09 0.9 96.5 
life 44 53.19 8.22 32.7 70.5 
lite 44 56.43 22.33 14.7 94.8 
 
Among them 68.68 percent male and 54.68 percent female of Africa and 76.68 percent 
male and 74.82 percent female of Asia co-reside with their children. While, in the second 
wave, 69.81 percent male and 59.49 percent female co-reside with their children. Among 
them, 68.17 percent male and 54.48 percent female of Africa and 74.2 percent male and 72.87 
percent female of Asia co-reside with their children. When compared between these two 
waves, we observe that co-residence arrangements for senior male have fallen in the second 
wave by 5.87 percent in China and 5.23 percent in Rwanda; the maximum fall in two regions, 
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Asia and Africa, respectively. However, co-residence arrangements for senior female have 
fallen in the second wave by 3.82 percent in China and 5.17 percent in Kenya; the maximum 
fall in Asia and Africa, respectively. Surprisingly, co-residence arrangements have increased 
in the 2nd wave by 5.37 percent in Senegal. Overall, the rate of change in co-residing 
arrangements is higher in Asia compared to Africa. 
We employ the ‗general-to-specific‘ modelling technique by sequentially eliminating 
the most insignificant variables. The result of specific model11 is presented in Table 3.2. 
Estimated results suggest that the income of working child has a negative and significant 
impact on co-residence. Specifically, a one percent increase in the income of employed child 
leads to about 0.10 percent fall in co-residence. The magnitude of the coefficient of income 
varies from -0.097 (senior female co-residence) to -0.111 (all seniors‘ co-residence). As we 
have mentioned in the theoretical model that if the income of the child increases, co-residing 
becomes very costly for child (due to highly negative externality); it would have a negative 
impact on co-residence and therefore, a direct transfer payments to parents and residing in 
separate houses may be preferable to co-residence for the child in that case. 
More specifically, an increase in the income of aworking child may increase the 
demand for privacy; which influences him to reside in a separate house. This also might be 
because employed adults may require moving to different cities or different countries when he 
gets promoted in his job. It may also be the case that a new job offers more salary to the 
working child requiring them to move to a new place. Both of the above mentioned cases are 
not unlikely in developing countries. Subsequently, a good job offer or a promotion may 
cause a reduction in co-residence. 
 
                                                          
11 The results of general model is given in empirical appendix of chapter three 
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Table 3.2:  Regression results for overall co-residing senior citizens as well as for co-residing 
male and female separately 
 
 Combined Male Female 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects  
Fixed 
Effects  
Random 
Effects  
Fixed 
Effects  
LGDP 
 
-0.105***    
(0.037) 
-0.111* 
(0.062) 
-0.101*** 
(0.034) 
-0.153** 
(0.054) 
-0.097** 
(0.046) 
-0.147* 
(0.788) 
LLIFE 
 
0.342*** 
(0.105) 
0.522*** 
(0.112) 
0.229** 
(0.107) 
0.334** 
(0.132) 
0.327** 
(0.141) 
0.500** 
(0.177) 
LLITE  0.141*** 
(0.043) 
    
LRUR  -0.103** 
(0.046) 
    
LLFP  0.343** 
(0.161) 
    
LMUS 
 
0.045***   
(0.016) 
0.065** 
(0.030) 
0.044*** 
(0.017) 
0.052 
(0.036) 
0.049** 
(0.019) 
0.106** 
(0.050) 
AFR 
 
-0.186*** 
(0.070) 
Omittedↄ -0.121* 
(0.065) 
Omittedↄ -0.303*** 
(0.083) 
Omittedↄ 
Const. 
 
3.634*** 
(0.483) 
1.208 
(0.997) 
4.107*** 
(0.482) 
3.966*** 
(0.601) 
3.609*** 
(0.628) 
2.937*** 
(0.869) 
Obs. 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Cross-section 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Wald,  𝝌𝟐 27.79*** F= 6.26*** 20.23*** F=3.44** 29.61*** F=3.33** 
Hausman  Supportedṧ Supportedṧ  Supportedṧ  
Note: standard errors in parenthesis *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. ↄ is omitted because of collinearly. ṧHausman test supports respective 
Fixed or Random effects model. 
 
Rent is not found to be a significant variable for co-residence. It may suggest that 
income, altruism and externality are such important phenomena that rentof housing becomes 
immaterial for co-residence. This may also be because of using a weak proxy (CPI) for rent in 
our study. However, since there is no rental index available for developing countries; we do 
not have any better alternative proxy for this variable. 
Life expectancy (LIFE) has a positive and significant impact on co-residence. 
Estimated result indicates that a one percent increase in life expectancy at birth increases the 
co-residence by 0.23-0.52 percent. With an increase in the life expectancy rate, the female 
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senior citizens are more likely to co-reside (+0.23) with their children compared to the male 
senior citizens. Since the existing co-residents are likely to continue co-residing and some 
new retired elderly parents start co-residing with their children as well, the number of co-
resident increases with the increase of life expectancy rate. 
The literacy rate (LITE) of the adult population has a positive impact on co-residence. 
This variable has been found to be significant only in overall senior citizens‘ co-residence. 
However, the ratio of urban to rural population (RUR) has a negative and significant effect on 
co-residence of overall senior citizens. Consequently, if the number of urban working 
migrants increases (which reduces the number of rural working children), the rate of (overall) 
co-residence falls. The labour force participation rate (LFP) has a positive and significant 
impact on (overall) co-residence. It can be noted that none among the literacy rate, ratio of 
urban to rural population, labour force participation rates has been found to be significant 
determinants of male or female co-residence separately. Culture (religion and region) is found 
to be a significant determinant for co-residence. Muslim senior citizens are more likely (and 
significantly) to be co-residing with their children compared to their Christian, Hindu, 
Buddhist and other religious counterparts. This variable is found to be positive and significant 
in all cases (i.e., male, female and overall senior citizens‘ co-residence). The coefficients of 
Muslim variable suggest that a 1 percent increase in Muslim population (to total population) 
increases co-residence for male, female and overall senior citizens by 0.044, 0.049 and 0.065 
percent respectively.  Regional dummy (ARF) is found to be negative and significant for co-
residence, which suggests that African people are less likely to co-reside compared to Asian 
people. 
Health expenditure might play an important role in determining residing behaviour of 
senior citizens in developing countries because health expenditure is privately managed by the 
household in all countries in our data set. We therefore consider health expenditure as 
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percentage of GDP (HEALTH) as an independent variable with all other independent 
variables to check the robustness of our estimated results. We have estimated general models 
for male and female senior citizens separately and conducted Hausman (1987) test between 
Fixed effects and Random effects models12. Estimated results show that Random effects 
model is preferred for both male and female senior citizens. The log value of health 
expenciture as percentage of GDP (LHEALTH) is found statistically insignificant in all 
models without affecting the significance of other variables that have found significant in our 
primary estimations.     
In development literature, it is usual that economic growth has positive impact on life 
expectancy, educational development, health status, urbanisation, labour force participation 
rates and overall human development of all citizens in a country. In our data set, there might 
be correlation among the variables LGDP,LLIFE, LLITE, LHEALTH, LHDI, LRUR,and  
LLFP variables. To check correlation among these independent variables, we have estimated 
correlation matrix13 of independent variables. We have found that the variable, LGDP is 
significantly correlated with LLIFE, LLITE, LHEALTH, LHDI, LRUR, LLFP and LHBO 
variables. But we believe that our estimated results of both general model and specific models 
do not suffer multicolinearity problem because the variable LLIFE and LLITE variables are 
highly significant with t-value is more than two. This is one of the remedial measures of 
multicolinearity problem.  
3.5 Conclusions 
The study develops a theoretical model which captures the altruism, congestion 
problem and negative externality concepts which can emerge from co-residence of the senior 
citizens with their working children. We also empirically estimate the significant determinants 
                                                          
12The estimated result is given in Empirical Appendix of Chapter Three in Table 3.5 
13 The estimated correlation matrix is given in Empirical Appendix of Chapter Three in Table 3.6 
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of co-residence pattern of senior citizens in developing countries, specifically, in Asia and 
Africa. Changing pattern in co-residence due to changes in the determinants over time is also 
investigated. Our theoretical model indicates that although housing price negatively affects 
the co-residence pattern; income, however, affects the co-residence pattern depending on the 
relative effectiveness of altruism and negative externality emerged from co-residence. 
Empirically, we examine whether per capita income of employed people, housing 
price, the life expectancy rate, literacy rate, migration from rural to urban area and culture 
(religion and region) can influence the co-residence pattern of the senior citizens in 
developing countries. We use the data of senior citizens (collectively), senior male and senior 
female who are co-residing with their working children and subsequently employ the fixed 
effects and random effects models for estimation. Sargan‘s (1964) criterion suggests that the 
log-linear model rather than a simple linear model is appropriate for this estimation. We, 
therefore, estimate log-linear multiple regression models in the light of our theoretical model. 
However, in the empirical models, we include some additional explanatory variables which 
were suggested by the existing literature. Our theoretical model suggests that co-residence of 
the senior citizens may fall with the increase in children‘s income level which is found to be 
appropriate empirically. The estimated results suggest that income has a negative and 
significant effect on co-residence of the senior citizens with their working children which is 
slightly higher for male senior citizens compared to their female counterpart. The life 
expectancy rate has a positive and significant effect on co-residence which is higher for 
female than that of male senior citizens. One percent increase in the life expectancy rate 
increases about 0.5 percent of overall co-residence. Religious culture and regional culture 
significantly influence the co-residence pattern of the senior citizens. Muslim religion and 
Asian culture have a positive impact on co-residence of the senior citizens. 
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Since per capita income in developing countries is increasing over time, following our 
empirical findings, we conclude that co-residence will fall in developing Africa and Asia over 
time. Moreover, due to intensive family planning policy in developing countries, there are one 
or two working children in a family nowadays. Consequently, a growing number of senior 
citizens who are mainly dependent on their working children will have to maintain more 
vulnerable livelihood in near future. Besides, in this era of globalization, growing job 
opportunities are relocating the working generation and subsequently breaking the extended 
family into nuclear families. Hence, governments of developing countries need to be more 
concerned about residing arrangements for senior citizens and they require planning for a 
good alternative of co-residence for the senior citizens. 
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Appendices: Chapter Three 
Mathematical Appendix 
Proposition 1:  
Proof:   
𝜕𝑕𝑃 ,𝑎
𝜕𝑌𝐶
=
𝜕
𝜕𝑌𝐶
 
𝜏𝛿𝑌𝐶
  𝛼+𝛽 +𝜏 𝛾+𝛿  𝑃𝑕
 =
𝜏𝛿
  𝛼+𝛽 +𝜏 𝛾+𝛿  𝑃𝑕
> 0  
𝜕𝑕𝑃,𝑎
𝜕𝜏
=
𝜕
𝜕𝜏
 
𝜏𝛿𝑌𝐶
  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  𝑃𝑕
 =
 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝛿𝑌𝐶
   𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿   2𝑃𝑕
> 0 
𝜕𝑕𝐶,𝑎
𝜕𝑌𝐶
=
𝜕
𝜕𝑌𝐶
 
𝛽𝑌𝐶
  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  𝑃𝑕
 =
𝛽
  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  𝑃𝑕
> 0 
𝜕𝑕𝐶,𝑎
𝜕𝜏
=
𝜕
𝜕𝜏
 
𝛽𝑌𝐶
  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  𝑃𝑕
 =
−𝛽 𝛾 + 𝛿 𝑌𝐶
[  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  ]2𝑃𝑕
< 0 
𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝜏, 𝑃𝑕 > 𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑐𝑕𝑖𝑙𝑑
′𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 ∎ 
Lemma 1: 
Proof: The rate of change in the demand of housing for co-residing child and elderly parent 
with respect to the child‘s degree of altruism is as follows. 
𝜕𝑕𝐶,𝑟
𝜕𝜏
=
𝑌𝐶 𝛼 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 − 𝛾 𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  
  𝛼 + 𝜏𝛾 +   𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   2𝑃𝑕
 
𝜕𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟
𝜕𝜏
> 0 𝑖𝑓
𝛼
 𝛽−𝜃𝐶 
>
𝛾
 𝛿−𝜃𝑃  
and 
𝜕𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟
𝜕𝜏
< 0 𝑖𝑓
𝛼
 𝛽−𝜃𝐶 
<
𝛾
 𝛿−𝜃𝑃  
 
where,  𝜀𝑋𝐶 ,𝑟 𝜀𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟  =
𝛼
 𝛽−𝜃𝐶 
and  𝜀𝑋𝑃 ,𝑟 𝜀𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟  =
𝛾
 𝛿−𝜃𝑃  
∎ 
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Proposition 2: 
Proof: (a) 
𝜕𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟
𝜕𝑌𝐶
=
𝜕
𝜕𝑌𝐶
 
  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃  𝑌𝐶
  𝛼+𝜏𝛾 +  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃    𝑃𝑕
 =
  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃  
  𝛼+𝜏𝛾 +  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃    𝑃𝑕
> 0  
𝑖𝑓𝑓, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝑃𝑕 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 > 𝜃
𝐶  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿 > 𝜃𝑃∎ 
(b)  
𝜕𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟
𝜕𝜏
=
𝜕
𝜕𝜏
 
  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃  𝑌𝐶
  𝛼+𝜏𝛾 +  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃    𝑃𝑕
 =
𝑌𝐶 𝛼 𝛿−𝜃𝑃 −𝛾 𝛽−𝜃𝐶  
  𝛼+𝜏𝛾 +  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃    
2
𝑃𝑕
 
𝜕𝑕𝐶,𝑟
𝜕𝜏
> 0 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝛼 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 >  𝛾 𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  
𝜕𝑕𝐶,𝑟
𝜕𝜏
< 0 𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝛼 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 <  𝛾 𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  
𝑖𝑓𝑓, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝑃𝑕 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 > 𝜃
𝐶  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿 > 𝜃𝑃∎ 
(C) 
𝜕𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟
𝜕𝜃𝐶
=
𝜕
𝜕𝜃𝐶
 
  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃  𝑌𝐶
  𝛼+𝜏𝛾 +  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃    𝑃𝑕
 = −
 𝛼+𝜏𝛾 𝑌𝐶
{  𝛼+𝜏𝛾 +  𝛽−𝜃𝐶 +𝜏 𝛿−𝜃𝑃    }2𝑃𝑕
< 0 
𝜕𝑕𝐶 ,𝑟
𝜕𝜃𝑃
=
𝜕
𝜕𝜃𝑃
 
  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃  𝑌𝐶
  𝛼 + 𝜏𝛾 +   𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   𝑃𝑕
 
= −
𝜏 𝛼 + 𝜏𝛾 𝑌𝐶
{  𝛼 + 𝜏𝛾 +   𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   }2𝑃𝑕
< 0 
𝑖𝑓𝑓, 𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛾, 𝛿, 𝑃𝑕 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 > 𝜃
𝐶  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿 > 𝜃𝑃∎ 
Proposition 3: 
Proof: The elasticity of total utility with respect to child‘s income for the child residing apart 
is as follows. 
𝜀
𝑌𝐶
𝑉𝐶 ,𝑎 = { 𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿 } 
The elasticity of total utility with respect to child‘s income for co-residing child is as follows. 
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𝜀
𝑌𝐶
𝑉𝐶 ,𝑟 =  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  + 𝜏{𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 }. 
The difference of elasticity of total utility between residing apart and co-residing for the child 
is  
𝜀
𝑌𝐶
𝑉𝐶 ,𝑎 − 𝜀
𝑌𝐶
𝑉𝐶 ,𝑟 = 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏𝜃𝑃 > 0 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 0 < 𝜃𝐶 < 𝛽 < 1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 < 𝜃𝑃 < 𝛿 < 1   
Similarly, difference of elasticity of total utility between residing apart and co-residing for an 
elderly parent is  
𝜀
𝑌𝐶
𝑉𝑃 ,𝑎 − 𝜀
𝑌𝐶
𝑉𝑃 ,𝑟 =  𝛾 + 𝛿 − {𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 = 𝜃𝑃 > 0∎ 
Proof: Proposition 4: 
Threshold income by making co-residing decision for the child: 
 Comparison of indirect total utility of children residing apart and co-residing is 
ln 𝑉𝐶,𝑎 − ln 𝑉𝐶,𝑟
= 𝛼 ln 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln 𝛽 + 𝜏𝛾 ln 𝛾 + 𝜏𝛿 ln 𝛿 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝜏
+  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  ln 𝑌𝐶 −  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  ln  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  
− 𝛼 ln 𝑃𝑥 − 𝜏𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥 − 𝛽 ln 𝑃𝑕 − 𝜏𝛿 ln 𝑃𝑕 − [ 𝛼 ln 𝛼
+   𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝐶  ln  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝐶  + 𝜏𝛾 ln 𝜏 + 𝜏𝛾 ln 𝛾
+   𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  + 𝜏 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   ln 𝑌𝐶
−   𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  
+ 𝜏 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   ln  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  + 𝜏 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   −  𝛼 + 𝜏𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥
−   𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝐶  ln 𝑃𝑕 ] 
If indirect total utility between residing apart and co-residing remain same for the child, then 
ln 𝑉𝐶,𝑎 − ln 𝑉𝐶,𝑟 = 0 so that, 
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𝛽 ln 𝛽 + 𝜏𝛿 ln 𝛿 + 𝜏𝛿 ln 𝜏 +  𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏𝜃𝑃 ln 𝑌𝐶 −  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  ln  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  
−  𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏𝜃𝐶 ln 𝑃𝑕 −   𝛽 − 𝜃
𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝐶  ln  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝐶  
+   𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  
+ 𝜏 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   ln  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶  + 𝜏 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃   = 0 
 
𝒀𝑪 =  
   𝜶 + 𝜷 + 𝝉 𝜸 + 𝜹     𝜶+𝜷 +𝝉 𝜸+𝜹     𝜷 − 𝜽𝑪 + 𝝉 𝜹 − 𝜽𝑪     𝜷−𝜽
𝑪 +𝝉 𝜹−𝜽𝑪   𝑷𝒉 
 𝜽𝑪+𝝉𝜽𝑪 
  𝜶 +  𝜷 − 𝜽𝑪  + 𝝉 𝜸 +  𝜹 − 𝜽𝑷     𝜶+ 𝜷−𝜽
𝑪  +𝝉 𝜸+ 𝜹−𝜽𝑷   𝜷𝜷𝜹𝝉𝜹𝝉𝝉𝜹
 
𝟏
(𝜽𝑪+𝝉𝜽𝑷)
 
 
Threshold income by making co-residing decision for the elderly parent: 
Comparison of indirect total utility of parent residing apart and co-residing is 
ln 𝑉𝑃,𝑎 − ln 𝑉𝑃,𝑟
= 𝛾 ln 𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝛿 +  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝜏 +  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝑌𝐶
−  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  − 𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥 − 𝛿 ln 𝑃𝑕
− 𝛾 ln 𝜏
− 𝛾 ln 𝛾 −  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 ln  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃  −  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃  ln 𝑌𝐶
+  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃  ln[ 𝛼 + 𝜏𝛾 + { 𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 ] + 𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥
+  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 ln 𝑃𝑕  
If indirect total utility between residing apart and co-residing remain same for the parent, then 
ln 𝑉𝑃,𝑎 − ln 𝑉𝑃,𝑟 = 0 so that, 
𝛿 ln 𝛿 + 𝛿 ln 𝜏 + 𝜃𝑃 ln 𝑌𝐶 −  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln  𝛼 + 𝛽 + 𝜏 𝛾 + 𝛿  
−  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 ln  𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃  
+  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃  ln[ 𝛼 + 𝜏𝛾 + { 𝛽 − 𝜃𝐶 + 𝜏 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑃 ] − 𝜃𝑃 ln 𝑃𝑕 = 0 
𝒀𝑪 =  
   𝜶 + 𝜷 + 𝝉 𝜸 + 𝜹    𝜸+𝜹    𝜷 − 𝜽𝑪 + 𝝉 𝜹 − 𝜽𝑷    𝜹−𝜽
𝑷  𝑷𝒉 
𝜽𝑷
[ 𝜶 + 𝝉𝜸 + { 𝜷 − 𝜽𝑪 + 𝝉 𝜹 − 𝜽𝑷 ] 𝜸+ 𝜹−𝜽𝑷  𝜹𝜹𝝉𝜹
 
𝟏
𝜽𝑷
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Empirical Appendix 
Sargan (1964) method for Testing Linear versus Log-Linear Functional Form 
Assume that we are going to choose one model between linear regression model (𝑀1)in 
equation and log-linear regression model (𝑀2)in equation. 
 
𝑀1: 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼7𝑀𝑈𝑆00𝑖 + 𝛼8𝐶𝐻𝑅00𝑖 + 𝛼9𝐻𝐵𝑂00𝑖 + 𝛼10𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼11𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
and 
𝑀2: log 𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡
= log 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 log 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 log 𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 log 𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 log 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5 log 𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 log 𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 log 𝑀𝑈𝑆00𝑖 + 𝛽8 log 𝐶𝐻𝑅00𝑖
+ 𝛽9𝐻𝐵𝑂00𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽11𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖[𝑖 = 1, . .44, 𝑡 = 1𝑠𝑡, 2𝑛𝑑] 
According to Sargan (1964) mentioned by Godfrey and Wickens (1981), choosing one 
between these two models is based upon the ratio of the maximized likelihoods for the case in 
which 𝜀 and 𝜗 are both independently distributed normal variables with zero means and 
standard deviations 𝜎𝜀  and 𝜎𝜗   respectively (p.488). Assuming the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimators of linear model and log-linear model are denoted by tildes and hats 
respectively, we can write estimated variance-covariance matrices of linear model and log-
linear model in matrix notation respectively as follows. 
For linear model: 
𝜎 𝜀
2 = 𝑛−1𝜀 ′𝜀 
= 𝑛−1 𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻 − 𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻  
′
 𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻 − 𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻   
For log-linear model: 
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𝜎 𝜗
2 = 𝑛−1𝜗′𝜗 = 
𝑛−1 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻  
′
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻   
Where, 𝜎 𝜀
2 and 𝜎 𝜗
2 are sum of squares residuals from linear model and log-linear model 
respectively. 
Sargar‘s (1964) criterion is 
𝑆 =  
𝜎 𝜀
𝑔𝜎 𝜗
 
𝑇
           
Where, 𝑔 is the geometric mean of the vector of dependent variable 
𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻′ = [𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻11 , … . . 𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑛1]. 
The decision rule is that if 𝑆 < 1, linear model is supported by the data set and if 𝑆 > 1, log-
linear model is supported by the data set.  
Empirical results of linear versus log linear functional form 
Using Sargan‘s (1964) criterion of testing linear versus log linear model, I have found 
that both the 1st wave and the 2nd wave of data sets support log linear model instead of the 
linear model. The result is given in the following Table 3.3 
Table 3.3: Empirical results of linear versus log linear functional form 
 
 1st Wave Data Set 2nd Wave Data Set 
Square root of Residual 
Sum Square (RSS) for 
Linear Regression model 
907.91 1056.69 
Square root of Residual 
Sum Square (RSS) for Log 
Linear Regression model 
0.2974 0.3061 
Geometric Mean (g) 70.23 63.45 
Sargan’s criterion value 
𝑺 =  
𝝈 𝜺
𝒈𝝈 𝝑
 
𝑻
 
(43.48)44 > 1 
Log linear model is preferred 
(54.41)44 > 1 
Log linear model is preferred 
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The fixed effects model 
The linear functional form of male senior people is considered and assumed that an 
observation of the 𝑖 − 𝑡𝑕 country in the 𝑡 − 𝑡𝑕  waves of the data set is as follows. 
 
𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼7𝑀𝑈𝑆00𝑖 + 𝛼8𝐶𝐻𝑅00𝑖 + 𝛼9𝐻𝐵𝑂00𝑖 + 𝛼10𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼11𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
[𝑖 = 1, . .44 𝑡 = 1𝑠𝑡 2𝑛𝑑] 
 
Average of the 𝑖 − 𝑡𝑕 country in the  𝑡 − 𝑡𝑕  waves can be written as  
 
𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻         𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼1𝐺𝐷𝑃      𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸       𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸       𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑃𝐼     𝑖 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑈𝑅      𝑖 + 𝛼6𝐿𝐹𝑃     𝑖 + 𝛼7𝑀𝑈𝑆      𝑖
+ 𝛼8𝐶𝐻𝑅      𝑖 + 𝛼9𝐻𝐵𝑂      𝑖 + 𝛼10𝑆𝐸𝑋      𝑖 + 𝛼11𝐴𝐹𝑅      𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
By subtracting   
 
𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 − 𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻         𝑖
= 𝛼1(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃      𝑖) + 𝛼2(𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸       𝑖) + 𝛼3(𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸       𝑖) + 𝛼4(𝐶𝑃𝐼
− 𝐶𝑃𝐼     𝑖) + 𝛼5(𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑈𝑅      𝑖) + 𝛼6(𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 − 𝐿𝐹𝑃     𝑖) + 𝛼7(𝑀𝑈𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝑀𝑈𝑆      𝑖)
+ 𝛼8(𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐶𝐻𝑅      𝑖) + 𝛼9(𝐻𝐵𝑂𝑖 − 𝐻𝐵𝑂      𝑖) + 𝛼10(𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖 − 𝑆𝐸𝑋      𝑖) + 𝛼11(𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖
− 𝐴𝐹𝑅      𝑖) + 𝜀𝑖  
The OLS estimation gives us the fixed effect estimator.  The similar process needs to be used 
for estimating fixed effect estimator for log linear model. 
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The random effects model 
Instead of treating,𝛼𝑖  as a fixed constant, this specification assumes that 𝛼𝑖  is drawn 
from an identically and independently distributed (iid) distribution, 𝛼𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇
2)  and is 
uncorrelated both with the 𝜀𝑖and with the  𝑋𝑖𝑡  . The specification then becomes as follows. 
 
𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑃𝐶𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑅𝑈𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼7𝑀𝑈𝑆00𝑖 + 𝛼8𝐶𝐻𝑅00𝑖 + 𝛼9𝐻𝐵𝑂00𝑖 + 𝛼10𝑆𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼11𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
Where, 𝛼 is the mean of the random intercepts 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝜇𝑖   and the errors 𝜇𝑖and 𝜀𝑖  in the 
composite error term with variances 𝜎𝜇
2 and 𝜎𝜀
2respectively. So the expected value of 
𝐸 𝜇 = 0 and homoscadastic variance is 𝑉 𝜇 = 𝜎𝜇
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2 and an equi-correlated block-
diagonal covariance matrix exhibits serial correlation over time only between the disturbances 
of the same individual. 
𝑐𝑜𝑣 𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝜇𝑗𝑠  = 𝜎𝜇
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝑗, 𝑡 = 𝑠 
= 𝜎𝜇
2𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝑗, 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠 
And it is zero otherwise. This also means that the correlation coefficient between 𝜇𝑖𝑡  and 𝜇𝑗𝑠  
is 
𝜌 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙 𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝜇𝑗𝑠  = 1   𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝑗, 𝑡 = 𝑠 
=
𝜎𝜇
2
(𝜎𝜇 2 + 𝜎𝜀2 )
𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑖 = 𝑗, 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠 
Here, the appropriate estimator is the generalized least squares (GLS) which is known as 
random effect estimator. 
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Hausman (1978) test: Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects Model 
To test which model is the correct specification, Hausman (1978) assumes the following 
hypotheses. 
𝐻0: 𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑞 = 0     𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐻𝑎 ∶  𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑞 ≠ 0Where, 𝑞 = 𝛼
𝐺𝐿𝑆 − 𝛼𝑂𝐿𝑆  is the difference between 
consistent and efficient estimator (in matrix notation). 
Hausman test statistic is 
𝑚 = 𝑞 ′[𝑉 𝑞  ]−1𝑞   
Here, variance of𝑞 , is 𝑉 𝑞  = 𝑉 𝛼𝐺𝐿𝑆 − 𝑉(𝛼𝑂𝐿𝑆). The test statistic is asymptotically 
distributed under 𝐻0 as 𝜒𝐾
2 where 𝐾 denotes the dimension of slope vector, 𝛼. In order to 
make this test operational, the variance covariance matrix is replaced by estimated variance 
covariance matrix and GLS is replaced by corresponding feasible generalised least 
square(FGLS) estimator.The decision rule is that rejecting the null hypothesis means the 
random effect model is the preferred specification, otherwise the fixed effect model is the one. 
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Table 3.4: Estimated Results of General Models 
 Combined (PEPCH) Male (MPEPCH) Female (FPEPCH) 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
LGDP 
(S.E) 
-0.075   
(0.057) 
-0.096   
(0.071) 
-0.081   
(0.052) 
-0.098   
(0.070) 
-0.060   
(0.074) 
-0.116   
(0.108) 
LLIFE 
(S.E) 
0.380***   
(0.127) 
0.583***   
(0.131) 
0.288***   
(0.117) 
0.451***   
(0.129) 
0.376**   
(0.172) 
0.714***   
(0.199) 
LLITE 
(S.E) 
0.028    
(0.048) 
0.134***   
(0.048) 
0.010  
(0.044) 
0.108**   
(0.047) 
0.023   
(0.066) 
0.171**   
(0.072) 
LCPI 
(S.E) 
0.0004   
(0.012) 
0.003   
(0.012) 
0.001   
(0.011) 
0.007   
(0.012) 
0.003   
(0.016) 
0.001   
(0.018) 
LRUR 
(S.E) 
-0.038   
(0.049) 
-0.099   
(0.059) 
-0.031   
(0.044) 
-0.108*   
(0.059) 
-0.028   
(0.064) 
-0.060    
(0.091) 
LHDI 
(S.E) 
      
LLFP 
(S.E) 
-0.032   
(0.095) 
0.337*    
(0.192) 
-0.069   
(0.085) 
0.273   
(0.188) 
0.008   
(0.119) 
0.386   
(0.290) 
LMUS 
(S.E) 
0.040*   
(0.023) 
0.069*    
(0.040) 
0.031   
(0.021) 
0.037   
(0.040) 
0.041   
(0.029) 
0.126*   
(0.061) 
LCHR 
(S.E) 
-0.018   
(0.014) 
-0.014   
(0.016) 
-0.011   
(0.013) 
-0.003   
(0.016) 
-0.025  
(0.019) 
-0.031   
(0.024) 
LHBO 
(S.E) 
-0.011  
(0.016) 
-0.013   
(0.017) 
-0.013   
(0.015) 
-0.013   
(0.016) 
-0.015  
(0.022) 
-0.017   
(0.025) 
AFR 
(S.E) 
-0.113   
(0.090) 
omitted -0.052   
(0.081) 
omitted -0.214*   
(0.113) 
omitted 
Const. 
(S.E) 
3.452***   
(0.787) 
0.947   
(1.126) 
4.104***   
(0.712) 
1.998*   
(1.106) 
3.176***   
(1.018) 
-0.079   
(1.706) 
Obs. 44 44 44 44 44 44 
𝑹𝟐 within 0.57 0.737 0.488 0.676 0.428 0.622 
between 0.43 0.005 0.355 0.006 0.547 0.064 
overall 0.43 0.009 0.357 0.002 0.540 0.071 
 Wald-𝜒2 
=30.52*** 
F = 
4.05*** 
Wald-𝜒2 
=22.77*** 
F = 
3.02** 
Wald-𝜒2 
=29.38*** 
F = 2.38* 
Hausman 
Test 
𝜒2(d.f) 𝜒2(9)= 15.98 𝜒2(9)= 14.34 𝜒2(9)= 14.10 
Prob>𝜒2(d.f) Prob>𝜒2(9)= 0.067 Prob>𝜒2(9)= 0.111 Prob>𝜒2(9)= 0.119 
Hausman Test Result Supported  Supported  Supported  
Note: standard errors in parenthesis *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. ↄ is omitted because of collinearly. ṧHausman test supports respective 
Fixed or Random effects model. 
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Table 3.5: Estimated Results of General Models for Male and Female senior citizens 
including LHEALTH variable 
 Male (MPEPCH) Female (FPEPCH) 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
LGDP 
(S.E) 
-0.088* 
(0.053) 
-0.097 
(0.077) 
-0.078 
(0.076) 
-0.14 
(0.109) 
LLIFE 
(S.E) 
0.332***   
(0.133) 
0.489***   
(0.162) 
0.456** 
(0.193) 
0.755*** 
(0.23) 
LLITE 
(S.E) 
-0.002  
(0.048) 
0.11*   
(0.056) 
0.013 
(0.069) 
0.216**   
(0.079) 
LHEALTH 
(S.E) 
-0.039 
(0.069) 
-0.012 
(0.08) 
0.004 
(0.099) 
0.105 
(0.114) 
LCPI 
(S.E) 
0.009 
(0.013) 
0.007   
(0.015) 
0.014 
(0.019) 
-0.013   
(0.021) 
LRUR 
(S.E) 
-0.032 
(0.045) 
-0.106   
(0.063) 
-0.035 
(0.065) 
-0.056    
(0.09) 
LHDI 
(S.E) 
    
LLFP 
(S.E) 
-0.088 
(0.089) 
0.297   
(0.209) 
-0.014 
(0.122) 
0.484   
(0.298) 
LMUS 
(S.E) 
0.029 
(0.023) 
0.047   
(0.048) 
0.046 
(0.031) 
0.165**   
(0.068) 
LCHR 
(S.E) 
-0.01 
(0.013) 
-0.004   
(0.016) 
-0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.035   
(0.024) 
LHBO 
(S.E) 
-0.014 
(0.015) 
-0.014   
(0.018) 
-0.018 
(0.022) 
-0.019   
(0.025) 
AFR 
(S.E) 
-0.041 
(0.087) 
omitted -0.223* 
(0.119) 
omitted 
Const. 
(S.E) 
4.13*** 
(0.758) 
1.73   
(1.31) 
3.089***   
(1.06) 
-0.85   
(1.865) 
Obs.¬ 42 42 42 42 
𝑹𝟐 within 0.46 0.66 0.40 0.67 
between 0.38 0.01 0.60 0.017 
overall 0.38 0.005 0.59 0.02 
 Wald-𝜒2 
=20.85** 
F = 2.16 Wald-𝜒2 
=30.35*** 
F = 
2.19* 
Hausman 
Test 
𝜒2(d.f) 𝜒2(10)= 13.03 𝜒2(10)= 15.05 
Prob>𝜒2(d.f) Prob>𝜒2(10)= 0.22 Prob>𝜒2(10)= 0.13 
Hausman Test Result Supported  Supported  
Note: standard errors in parenthesis *, ** and *** indicate the significance level at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. ↄ is omitted because of collinearly. ṧHausman test supports respective 
Fixed or Random effects model. ¬ number of observation become 42 because data of health 
expenditure for Zimbabwe are not available.  
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Table 3.6: Correlation matrix of log variables 
𝑟 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
LGDP LCPI LLIF
E 
LLIT
E 
LHEA
LTH 
LHDI LRUR LLF
P 
LM
US 
LCHR LHBO LMPE
PCH 
LFPE 
PCH 
LGDP 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
1.00 
--- 
            
LCPI 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
0.01 
0.97 
1.00 
--- 
           
LLIFE 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
0.57 
0.00 
0.08 
0.56 
1.00 
--- 
          
LLITE 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
0.36 
0.02 
-0.29 
0.06 
0.30 
0.05 
1.00 
--- 
         
LHEALT
H 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
-0.33 
 
0.03 
-0.05 
 
0.77 
-0.38 
 
0.01 
-0.21 
 
0.18 
1.00 
 
--- 
        
LHDI 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
0.54 
0.00 
0.24 
0.12 
0.57 
0.00 
0.53 
0.00 
-0.08 
0.59 
1.00 
--- 
       
LRUR 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
0.70 
0.00 
0.01 
0.93 
0.36 
0.02 
0.39 
0.01 
-0.02 
0.88 
0.53 
0.00 
1.00 
--- 
      
LLFP 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
-0.37 
0.02 
-0.15 
0.35 
-0.14 
0.38 
0.24 
0.13 
0.04 
0.80 
0.11 
0.48 
-0.29 
0.06 
1.00 
--- 
     
LMUS 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
0.14 
0.39 
0.27 
0.08 
-0.09 
0.57 
0.52 
0.00 
-0.16 
0.32 
-0.28 
0.07 
-0.01 
0.96 
-0.37 
0.02 
1.00 
--- 
    
LCHR 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
0.08 
0.61 
-0.31 
0.04 
-0.20 
0.20 
-0.51 
0.00 
0.16 
0.30 
0.18 
0.25 
0.25 
0.11 
0.48 
0.00 
-0.32 
0.04 
1.00 
--- 
   
LHBO 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
-0.38 
0.01 
0.02 
0.91 
-0.07 
0.66 
-0.34 
0.26 
0.27 
0.08 
-0.15 
0.35 
-0.39 
0.09 
0.05 
0.74 
-0.17 
0.27 
-0.19 
0.21 
1.00 
--- 
  
LMPEPC
H 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
-0.02 
 
0.89 
0.37 
 
0.02 
0.14 
 
0.39 
-0.53 
 
0.00 
-0.20 
 
0.21 
-0.13 
 
0.39 
-0.11 
 
0.49 
-0.38 
 
0.01 
0.36 
 
0.02 
-0.60 
 
0.00 
-0.21 
0.90 
1.00 
--- 
 
LFPEPC
H 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 
0.17 
 
0.28 
0.42 
 
0.00 
0.45 
 
0.00 
-0.33 
 
0.03 
-0.38 
 
0.01 
0.09 
 
0.57 
-0.08 
 
0.61 
-0.32 
 
0.04 
0.21 
 
0.19 
-0.63 
 
0.00 
0.03 
 
0.84 
0.84 
 
0.00 
1.00 
 
--- 
Note: 𝑟 represents coefficient of correlation and 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏. represents corresponding probability value.  
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Data Appendix 
Percentage of senior citizens (PEP) 
The United Nations Departments of Economics and Social Affairs/Population 
Division has classified the data on living arrangement of older people into six mutually 
exclusive categories14 and calculates the percentage of each category to total senior 
population. That means the percentage of senior citizens for each category is defined as the 
number of senior citizens of a category divided by the total number of senior citizens of a 
country in a year. In the data set, people aged 60 years and above are considered as senior 
citizens and the child aged 25 years and above is considered as working citizens. Data on this 
variable are available on different points of time for different countries, for example- 
observations on Nigeria and China are in the year 1990; on Cameroon and Indonesia are in 
the year 1991; on Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia are in the year 
1992; on Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, India and the Philippines are in the year 
1993; on Cote d'Ivoire, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh are in the year 1994  and on Benin, Mali 
and Nepal are in the year 1996. That means the observations of different countries are 
scattered from the year 1990 to the year 1996, which we have called as the 1st wave of data. In 
the 2nd wave of data, the observations are scattered from the year 1997 to the year 2002 like 
the 1st one. In case of the 2nd wave of data, the observations on Madagascar, Senegal, and 
Indonesia are in the year 1997; on Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Niger, and the Philippines are in 
the year 1998; on Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and India are in 
the year 1999; on Malawi, Rwanda, Bangladesh and China are in the year 2000; on Benin, 
Mali, and Nepal are in the year 2001 and the observation on Zambia is in the year 2002. The 
                                                          
14‗The household composition of older persons in the present publication is classified into mutually exclusive categories, including living 
alone, living with spouse only, living with children/children-in-law, living with grandchild (without children), living with other relatives and 
living with non-relatives‘(p.133). See detail in United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division Living 
Arrangements of Older Persons Around the World, Annex3. 
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source of these two waves of data set comes from the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division Living Arrangements of Older Persons 
Around the World, Annex IV, Table A.IV.9.pp.192-198. 
We have compiled separate observations on the percentage of male senior citizens 
residing with at least one working child (MPEPCH) and the percentage of female senior 
citizens living with at least one workingchild (FPEPCH). Let us symbolise (MPEPCH) and 
(FPEPCH) variables as 𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻_𝑖𝑡 and 𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻_𝑖𝑡 where 𝑖[= 1 𝑡𝑜 22] indicates number 
of countries and 𝑡[= 1𝑠𝑡, 2𝑛𝑑] indicates number of waves.In this study family consists of at 
least two adult generations, considered as extended family and both 𝑀𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻_𝑖𝑡 and 
𝐹𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻_𝑖𝑡 variables are representing an extended family where either male or female or 
both senior citizens are co-residing with at least one working child. Either of these two 
variables is used as dependent variables in the study for finding the determinants and trends of 
co-residing arrangements of either male or female or both senior citizens. Although we have 
separate data for the percentage of male senior citizens (MPEPCH) and the percentage of 
female senior citizens (FPEPCH) residing with at least one working child; all explanatory 
variables, for example- per capita income of employed person (GDP), life expectancy at birth 
(LIFE), adult literacy rate(LITE), consumer price index (CPI), ratio of urban to rural 
population (RUR), human development index (HDI), percentage of people belonging to 
Muslim religion (MUS), percentage of people belonging to Christian  religion (CHR), 
percentage of people belonging to Hindu, Buddhist and Other religions (HBO)) are in macro 
measures so that they are applicable for both male and female observations of dependent 
variable; except labour force participation rate (LFP), which has separate observation for each 
male and female. We, therefore, have merged the male and female observations to construct a 
combined dependent variable, which we have called combined percentage of senior citizens 
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(PEPCH), and have created a corresponding explanatory dummy variable which we have 
called sex variable (SEX) to distinguish male observation from female observation. This 
merging process helps us to increase the total number of observation from 22 to 44 by adding 
only an explanatory variable (SEX) that is a way of removing multicolinearity problem in the 
estimated process. Let us symbolise (PEPCH) variable as𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻_𝑖𝑡 where [𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 44] 
indicates 22 countries and 2 observations for each country and 𝑡[= 1𝑠𝑡, 2𝑛𝑑] indicates two 
waves of data sets. 
The difference between the 1st wave of data and the 2nd wave of data is at least 5 years 
for all sample countries except Senegal, which has 4 years‘ of time difference; and at most 10 
years‘ of time difference happening in the case of China. 
 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per employed person 
The model suggests that the income of an adult child is an important determinant of 
making residing decision of the senior citizens. We use the GDP per employed person as an 
independent variable and symbolise as 𝐺𝐷𝑃_𝑖𝑡 where 𝑖[= 1 𝑡𝑜 22] indicates country and 
𝑡[= 1𝑠𝑡, 2𝑛𝑑] indicates wave. The source of data is the World Bank, data bank (indicators). 
Consumer price index (CPI) 
The model suggests that housing price or rent of a house is another important 
determinant of residing decision for working children as well as senior citizens. Data on the 
rent of a house are hardly available for the sample countries and these are too sporadic for 
different points of time for every country used in this study. We use inflation as a proxy of 
price of housing service in our analysis. The variable is an independent variable and 
symbolised as 𝐶𝑃𝐼_𝑖𝑡 where 𝑖[= 1 𝑡𝑜 22] indicates country and 𝑡[= 1𝑠𝑡, 2𝑛𝑑] indicates 
wave. 
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Life expectancy at birth (LIFE) 
Bongaarts and Zimmer (2002) and other researchers have found that there is a strong 
positive correlation between life expectancy and residing arrangement of senior citizens of a 
country. Many researchers have found that age of senior citizens is an important determinant 
of their residing arrangement (Bongaarts and Zimmer 2002; Ghuman and Ofstedal 2004; and 
Chuks 2005). We, therefore, have used life expectancy at birth in a country as an independent 
variable in this study. The variable is symbolised by 𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸_𝑖𝑡. The observations of this 
variable are collected from the several reports of the Human Development Report Office 
(HDRO) – an independent wing of the United Nations Development Programme. 
 
Literacy rate (LITE) 
In developed countries, the level of education of the senior citizens plays an important 
role in determining the resident pattern of them. Gaymu et.al. (2006), Kathleen and Schoeni 
(2000), and Kinsella (1990) find that having higher levels of education of the senior citizens 
indicates less likelihood of co-residing with working children. We have used the literacy rate 
of the adult population aged 15 years and above of a country as an independent variable in 
this study. The variable is symbolised by 𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸_𝑖𝑡. The observations of this variable are 
collected from the several reports of the Human Development Report Office (HDRO) – an 
independent wing of the United Nations Development Programme. 
Human development index (HDI) 
The level of development might affect the living arrangement of senior citizens 
because Gaymuet. al. (2006), Kinsella (1990) find that thesenior citizens residing with their 
children are small in number in developed countries, while a large number of senior citizens 
reside with working children in developing countries. Human development index (HDI), 
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introduced by the United Nations Development Programme (since 1990), is an indicator of a 
country‘s status of development.  It is a hybrid measure of three development indicators (Life 
expectancy, Literacy rate and GDP) of a country. We have used the variable HDI as an 
independent variable and as a substitute of three independent variables (GDP, LIFE and 
LITE). Human development index is symbolised by 𝐻𝐷𝐼_𝑖𝑡. The observations of this variable 
are collected from the several reports of the Human Development Report Office (HDRO) – an 
independent wing of the United Nations Development Programme. 
Ratio of urban to rural population (RUR) 
Martin (1989) indicates that a larger proportion of urban migration might be a reason 
for weakening ties of children with their elderly parents. Similarly, the modernisation theory 
believes that urbanisation, the more percentage of population living in urban area might be a 
reason of weakening ties between senior citizens and their children that leads to determine the 
residing arrangements of senior citizens. We have included the ratio of urban to rural 
population as an independent variable. The ratio is a measure of the relative number of 
population living in an urban area to a rural area of a country. The difference of ratios 
between two points of times measures the urban-rural migration pattern of a country. The 
variable is symbolised as 𝑅𝑈𝑅_𝑖𝑡. The data source is the World Bank, data bank (indicators). 
Labour force participation rate (LFP) 
Kinsella (1990) and the United Nations (2005) find that the higher the female labour 
force participation, the higher the possibility of co-residing with senior citizens. That is why, 
we have included the labour force participation rate both for male and female as an 
independent variable and symbolised as 𝐿𝐹𝑃_𝑖𝑡. The data are collected from the World Bank, 
data bank (indicators). 
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Religion (Muslim, Christian and Hindu plus Buddhist plus Others) 
Gaymu et.al. (2006) and Pampel (1983, 1992) suggest that culture may be an 
important determinant of the residing arrangement. Region and religion could be good proxies 
for culture variable. We, therefore, have used the percentage of the population belonging to 
one of these three different religious cultures- Muslim, Christian, and Hindu plus Buddhist 
plus others. These variables are used to capture the effect of religious culture (if any) on 
residing decision. These variables are symbolised as 𝑀𝑈𝑆70 , 𝐶𝐻𝑅70, and 𝐻𝐵𝑂70 
respectively for the percentage of Muslim, Christian and Hindu plus Buddhist plus other 
population of a country in the year 1970. 𝑀𝑈𝑆00, 𝐶𝐻𝑅00, and 𝐻𝐵𝑂00 are respectively the 
percentage of Muslim, Christian and Hindu plus Buddhist plus other population of a country 
in the year 2000. Since the observations of both the 1st wave and the 2nd wave of data sets 
cover the time period 1990 to 2002, we have used the observations of the year 2000 of these 
three variables for cross-country analysis of both waves of data sets. The data on religion are 
collected from the web site of Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary, who have compiled a 
cross-country dataset on the share of religious people in the population. ‗Adherence fractions 
of population are shown for 10 religion groups and non-religion (incl. atheists) in 1970, 2000, 
and 1900 (from Barrett).‘ 
 
Region (Africa and Asia) 
There is a vast difference between the cultures of these two sample regions. We, 
therefore, have utilised dummy variable to cover the cultural difference created due to 
geographical difference. One regional dummy variable is created to investigate the regional 
effect in this study that is symbolised as 𝐴𝐹𝑅. The variable takes the value 1 (one) if the 
country is in African region and value 0 (zero) when the country falls in Asian region. 
Therefore, regional differences are assessed with respect to the values for Africa. 
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Sex (Male and Female) 
Sex is a dummy independent variable used to find the effect of gender on co-residing 
decision for combined dependent variable. It is symbolised as 𝑆𝐸𝑋_𝑖𝑡. 𝑆𝐸𝑋is an independent 
variable for estimating 𝑃𝐸𝑃𝐶𝐻, the dependent variable only. The variable takes 0 (zero) value 
for male and takes 1 (one) value for female. In the 1st and 2nd wave of data sets, observations 
are different for male and female in the percentage of senior citizens living with children or 
alone or couple only and labour force participation rate. The variable is used as an 
independent variable in the estimation process when we merge both data sets of male and 
female. 
The natural logarithmic value of each observation is used in the analysis. All 
logarithmic variables are symbolised by adding a prefix of the letter ‗L‘ in the symbol of 
every variable, for an example - the logarithmic value of the symbol of per capita income of 
an employed person is symbolised as 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 . Since we have 22 countries and 2 observations 
for each country, one is for male and the other is for female in each wave of data set. As a 
result, our total observations of each wave of data set become 44 for combined dependent 
variable. This aggregation helps us to increase the number of total observations in estimation 
process; as a result, the degree of freedom in estimation process has increased. Another 
important issue about the data set is that the observation on this variable for each country is 
collected according to the year of dependent variable both in the 1st and the 2nd wave of data 
sets. For example- in the 1st wave of data set, the observation on the dependent variable for 
the country, Benin is taken in the year 1996; so we use the GDP per employed person in the 
year 1996 for it. In the 2nd wave of data set, the observation of the dependent variable for the 
country, Benin is 2001; so we use the GDP per employed person in the year 2001 for it. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Solitary residing senior citizens in European countries 
Abstract 
The percentage of solitary residing senior citizens in Europe is the highest in the world 
at present. The increasing nature of percentage of solitary residing senior citizens in Europe is 
a big issue for policymakers to find appropriate factors of explaining such behaviour. We 
have strived to find the factors that determine solitary residing behaviour of the senior citizens 
in Europe. We have developed a theoretical framework which includes negative externality of 
co-residing (such as privacy, congestion) and derived the criterion of choosing solitary 
residing decision by the senior citizens. Using macro-level and gender-specific unbalanced 
panel data sets of 16 European countries, we have empirically investigated the most relevant 
factors of solitary residing. The empirical results show that growth in life-cycle pensionable 
wealth, life expectancy after retirement and religious culture of senior citizens reduce their 
solitary residing attitude. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Currently population ageing is one of the most concerning policy making issues in the 
world because post-war baby-boomers around the world approach older generation of a 
society in the early decades of the 21st century. It involves not one but several socio-economic 
consequences in an economy having an impact on economic growth, savings, investment, 
consumption, labour markets, pensions, taxation, intergenerational transfers, family 
composition, housing services, health care services and specially residing arrangements. That 
is why, population ageing and its consequences around the world has been focused on 
rigorously by the policymakers and researchers. 
A concentrated research focused on the residing arrangement of senior citizens is a 
relatively new theme. It is driven by concerns raised around the world in general, and the 
developed countries in particular because residing arrangements matter a great deal over 
there. Studies (Pendry, Barrett and Victor, 1999; Breeze, Sloggett and Fletcher, 1999) show 
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that solitary residing senior citizens are more likely to enter an institution than those living 
with at least one other person. Even where institutionalisation does not take place because of 
cultural or social norms and values, solitary residing senior citizens are more likely to require 
special care either from the state or from relatives or neighbours, in the form of home helps 
and other social services, than those who live with others. In this study, attention has been 
paid to find the determinants of the residing arrangements of senior citizens and particular 
concentration is given on finding the factors affecting the solitary residing attitude of the 
senior citizens in 16 (sixteen) most developed European countries. 
This topic is of interest for several reasons. A few of these reasons are: Firstly, there are a 
few rigorous socio-economic studies, both theoretical (Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan 1996; 
Ermisch, 1981) and empirical (Soldo, Wolf and Agree, 1990; Pampel, 1992). Secondly, 
Europe is currently the major area with the highest proportions of senior citizens and is 
projected to remain so until 2050. All these 16 countries fall in the 1st quartile of country 
ranking by the percentage of population aged 60 and over (United Nations, 2009). In Europe, 
22 percent of the population was aged 60 years or over in the year 2009 and is projected to be 
35 percent in the year 2050, which is the highest in any other regions in the world (United 
Nations, 2009). Thirdly, approximately 24 percent of total senior citizens reside alone in the 
more developed regions (Europe and North America), compared to 8 percent in the less 
developed regions (Africa, and Asia). Within Europe, the different regions show markedly 
different proportions of solitary residing senior citizens, ranging from 19 percent in Southern 
Europe to 34 percent in Northern Europe (United Nations, 2009) which is currently the 
highest in the World. Finally, solitary residing senior citizens are more vulnerable than co-
residing senior citizens. They need outside assistance in the case of illness or disability and 
are at greater risk of social isolation even though the systems of social security of these 
countries are well developed. Studies (Hermalin, et. al., 2002; Gierveld, Jenny and Tilburg, 
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Theo 2010; Casey, and Yamada, 2002) show that compared to those senior citizens co-
residing either with a partner or in a multi-generation households, solitary residing senior 
citizens are more likely to be lonely and depressed, to have a small social network and to have 
infrequent contact with children. 
The significantly high solitary residing pattern of the senior citizens in these European 
countries has raised the question to find out the factors explaining this pattern. There are a few 
studies dealing with the factors determining residing arrangement of the senior citizens but 
our study is different from prior works in several ways. Firstly, we have developed a 
theoretical model for explaining co-residing decision (assuming that co-residing and solitary 
residing are mutually exclusive events) of senior citizens which has been rarely done in earlier 
studies except Manacorda, and Moretti, (2006). Secondly, a number of studies (Michael, 
Fuchs and Scott 1980; Macunovich, et. al. 1995; Glick, Bean, and Van Hook, 1997) use 
macro-data to explain changes in household structure over time. Another group (Wolf, and 
Soldo, 1988; Burr, and Mutchler 1992) uses cross-sectional micro-data to explain cross-
sectional variations in living arrangements; and a third (smaller) group (Mutchler, and Burr, 
1991) uses panel data to study the dynamics of changes in household structure at a micro 
level. In this chapter, we have used cross-country aggregate (macro-level) unbalanced panel 
data for 16 European countries which covers all the highly developed countries in this region. 
The advantage of macro-level data is that it exhibits overall information about a country not a 
specific cluster, region or group of citizens of a country. Therefore, cross-country analysis 
using macro-level data predicts reliable statistics about a country while cross-country micro-
level data provides limited information. The predictions using micro-level data is accurate for 
the cluster, region or group of people surveyed, not for the whole country especially when the 
sample size is relatively small compared to the whole population. Thus cross-country 
comparison is more authentic using macro-level panel data sets. Thirdly, we have included a 
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number of new variables in empirical analysis, for example - life-cycle pensionable wealth of 
senior citizens and mean income of working citizens as proxy of the income of senior and 
working citizens respectively; and the percentage of citizens belonging to the Christian 
religion as a proxy of cultural norms and values which have not been introduced in any of the 
previous works. Finally, we have conducted panel analysis which provides, empirically, the 
dynamics of solitary residing arrangement of the senior citizens in this region. 
 
4.2 The Model 
Usually an elderly parent (generation of senior citizen) residing with a working child 
(generation of working citizen) in a house is considered as co-residing behaviour of the 
generations while either a member of the generation of senior citizens or the generation of 
working citizens residing in separate house is considered as solitary residing behaviour. We 
have assumed that solitary residing or co-residing behaviour for a citizen is a mutually 
exclusive event. That means a solitary residing citizen excludes co-residing arrangement from 
his (her) preference and vice versa. Here we have developed a model that helps to answer the 
question to when a senior citizen likes to take a solitary residing decision from co-residing 
arrangement. 
Assume that the senior citizen and the working citizen consume only two goods – 
material goods and housing. Housing is considered as a purely private good for both of the 
types of citizens when they reside in separate house. We call this as ―Solitary residing 
situation‖. According to Ermisch (2003) housing is considered as a purely public good for 
both the senior and working citizens when they are co-residing. Instead of Ermisch‘s (2003) 
assumption, we assume co-residing creates some kind of negative externality such as 
congestion and loss of privacy for both the senior and working citizens; thus, we consider 
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housing as a semi-public good when they are co-residing. We call this as ―Co-residing 
situation‖. In both of the situations, the working citizen has wage income and the senior 
citizen has pension income and they spend all their income for the consumption of these two 
goods. 
Solitary residing situation: 
Let us assume that both senior and working citizens have ―Cobb-Douglas‖ form of 
utility function such as 𝑈𝑗  𝑋𝑗 , 𝑕𝑗  = (𝑋𝑆)𝛾(𝑕𝑆)𝛿  and 𝑈𝑗  𝑋𝑗 , 𝑕𝑗  = (𝑋𝑊)𝛼(𝑕𝑊)𝛽  where 
𝑗 = 𝑆, 𝑊 with ′𝑆′ standing for the senior citizens and ′𝑊′ standing for the working citizens,  
𝑋𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑕𝑗   are material goods and housing respectively, they are substitute to each other. The 
utility function is continuous, concave, non-negative, and twice differentiable for all 
arguments. For reaching specific results we assume that all utility functions are log-linear. 
The log-linear form of the utility function of senior citizens is as follows.  
ln 𝑈𝑆 = 𝛾 ln 𝑋𝑆 + 𝛿 ln 𝑕𝑆  ;  𝛾, 𝛿 > 0                                                                                 (4.1) 
where, ln 𝑈𝑆 is the total utility of senior citizen who consumes 𝑋𝑆 amount of material 
goods and 𝑕𝑆 amount of housing. The budget constraint of senior citizens is as follows. 
𝑌𝑆 = 𝑃𝑥𝑋
𝑆 + 𝑃𝑕𝑕
𝑆                                                                                                             (4.2) 
 where, 𝑌𝑆 is income of senior citizen, 𝑃𝑥𝑋
𝑆  is the amount of money senior citizen 
wants to spend for material goods, and 𝑃𝑕𝑕
𝑆 is the amount spent for the consumption of 
housing, 𝑃𝑥  and 𝑃𝑕  are price of material goods and rent of housing respectively. 
The log-linear utility function of the working citizen is as follows. 
ln 𝑈𝑊 = 𝛼 ln 𝑋𝑊 + 𝛽 ln 𝑕𝑊 ;  𝛼, 𝛽, > 0                                                                              (4.3) 
 99 
 
where, ln 𝑈𝑊 is the total utility of working citizen who consumes 𝑋𝑊  amount of 
material goods and 𝑕𝑊  amount of housing service. The budget constraint of working citizen is 
given in equation (4.4). 
𝑌𝑊 = 𝑃𝑥𝑋
𝑊 + 𝑃𝑕𝑕
𝑊                                                                                                            (4.4) 
where, 𝑌𝑊  is the income of working citizen, 𝑃𝑥𝑋
𝑊  is the amount of money working 
citizen wants to spend for material goods, 𝑃𝑕𝑕
𝑊  is the amount spent for the consumption of 
housing, 𝑃𝑥  and 𝑃𝑕  are price of material goods and rent of housing respectively. 
The utility maximisation problem for senior citizen is given in equation (4.5). 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑋𝑆 ,𝑕𝑆 ,𝜆𝐿 = 𝛾 ln 𝑋
𝑆 + 𝛿 ln 𝑕𝑆 + 𝜆[𝑌𝑆 − 𝑃𝑥𝑋
𝑆 − 𝑃𝑕𝑕
𝑆]                                                (4.5) 
The utility maximisation problem for working citizen is given in equation (4.6). 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑋𝑊 ,𝑕𝑊 ,𝜆𝐿 = 𝛼 ln 𝑋
𝑊 + 𝛽 ln 𝑕𝑊 + 𝜆[𝑌𝑊 − 𝑃𝑥𝑋
𝑊 − 𝑃𝑕𝑕
𝑊]                                        (4.6) 
Demand for housing in solitary residing senior citizen is: 
𝑕𝑆∗ =
𝛿𝑌𝑆
(𝛾+𝛿)𝑃𝑕
                                                                                                                      (4.7) 
Demand for housing in solitary residing working citizen is:  
𝑕𝑊∗ =
𝛽𝑌𝑊
(𝛼+𝛽)𝑃𝑕
                                                                                                                     (4.8) 
Total demand for housing in solitary residing situation for both citizens is: 
𝐻∗ =
𝛿 𝛼+𝛽 𝑌𝑆+𝛽(𝛾+𝛿)𝑌𝑊
 𝛼+𝛽  𝛾+𝛿 𝑃𝑕
                                                                                         (4.9) 
The indirect utility function in solitary residing senior citizens is given in equation (4.10). 
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ln 𝑉𝑆 = 𝛾 ln 𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝛿 +  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝑌𝑆 −  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln(𝛾 + 𝛿) − 𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥 − 𝛿 ln 𝑃𝑕           (4.10)   
The indirect utility function in solitary residing working citizen is given in equation (4.11). 
ln 𝑉𝑊 = 𝛼 ln 𝛼 + 𝛽 ln 𝛽 +  𝛼 + 𝛽 ln 𝑌𝑊 −  𝛼 + 𝛽 ln(𝛼 + 𝛽) − 𝛼 ln 𝑃𝑥 − 𝛽 ln 𝑃𝑕       (4.11)    
When housing is a purely private good and both the senior citizen and the working 
citizen reside in separate houses, the demand for housing is a function of individual income, 
rent of housing and corresponding preference parameters only. This follows the standard 
properties of a Marshallian demand function, such as - income effect is positive, 
𝛿
(𝛾+𝛿)𝑃𝑕
 and 
𝛽
(𝛼+𝛽)𝑃𝑕
 respectively for the senior citizen and the working citizen; the price effect is negative 
𝛿𝑌𝑆
 𝛾+𝛿 (𝑃𝑕 )2
 and 
𝛽𝑌𝑊
(𝛼+𝛽)(𝑃𝑕 )2
  respectively for the senior citizen and the working citizen. 
 Co-residing situation 
Assume that the senior citizen and the working citizen co-reside in a house and bear 
the cost of housing according to their marginal utility derived from housing. Housing, in this 
case, is not a purely private good because each agent can exclusively enjoy some parts of 
house but not all parts; for example - each agent might exclusively use some bedrooms but 
commonly use living room, kitchen and washroom. Along with that, both agents have to bear 
some amount of externality effect due to congestion in housing and might lose some amount 
of privacy due to residing together. The externality effect is negative for them because they 
loss privacy and feel congested. To compare the total utility from the solitary residing 
situation and co-residing situation, we have to internalise the externality effect.Assume that 
utility of housing in co-residing situation equals the difference between the partial utility of 
housing from the solitary residing situation and the disutility of externality effect from co-
residing situation. It might be possible that the economy of scale in housing may exist for co-
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residing situation but we assume that the housing market is perfectly competitive and rent is 
not affected by the amount of demand for housing. 
Let the utility function for both citizens be similar to the solitary residing situation 
except externality parameters being inserted in both agents‘ utility share of housing. Assume 
that parameter 𝜃𝑗  indicates degree of externality effect for co-residing. Also assume that the 
working citizen is the decision maker, and therefore, he has got more bargaining power than 
the senior citizen. 
Let us assume that the working citizen rents a house and invites the senior citizen to 
co-reside in that house. The working citizen is individualistic, he (she) wants to maximize his 
(her) total utility and the senior citizen is also individualistic and he (she) faces externality 
effect from co-residing if he (she) accepts the working citizen‘s offer. The senior citizen 
wants to maximise total utility from co-residing that would not less than the utility of solitary 
residing. The working citizen is the decision maker, he (she) maximizes following utility 
function subject to following two constraints. 
The log-linear version of the utility functions of both senior citizen and working 
citizen are as follows.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑋𝑊 ,𝑋𝑆 ,𝐻, ln 𝑈
𝑊 = 𝛼 ln 𝑋𝑊 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 ln 𝐻 + 𝛾 ln 𝑋𝑆 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 ln 𝐻      (4.12) 
Where, the utility function of senior citizen is - 
ln 𝑈𝑆 = 𝛾 ln 𝑋𝑆 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 ln 𝐻 ;  𝛾, 𝛿 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿 > 𝜃𝑆                                                 (4.13) 
where, ln 𝑈𝑆 is the total utility of senior citizen who consumes 𝑋𝑆 amount of material 
goods, 𝜃𝑆 is the degree of externality of co-residing for senior citizen and 𝐻 is the amount of 
housing.  
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The utility function of working citizen is - 
ln 𝑈𝑊 = 𝛼 ln 𝑋𝑊 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 ln 𝐻 ;  𝛼, 𝛽 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽 > 𝜃𝑊                                             (4.14) 
where, ln 𝑈𝑊 is the total utility of working citizen who consumes 𝑋𝑊  amount of 
material goods, 𝜃𝑊  is the degree of externality of co-residing for working and 𝐻 is the 
amount of housing.  
The constraints are: (i) budget constraint and (ii) co-residing constraint of senior 
citizen. 
The Budget constraint is  
𝑌𝑊 + 𝑌𝑆 = 𝑃𝑥 𝑋
𝑊 + 𝑋𝑆 + 𝑃𝑕𝐻                                                                        (4.15) 
 where, 𝑌𝑊  and 𝑌𝑆 are respectively the income of working citizen and senior citizen, 
𝑃𝑥  and 𝑃𝑕  are price of material goods and rent of housing respectively. 
The co-residing constraint of the senior citizen is given as follows. 
𝛾 ln 𝑋𝑆 + (𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆) ln 𝐻 ≥ ln 𝑉𝑆                                                                                       (4.16) 
 where, ln 𝑉𝑆 is the indirect utility function of the senior citizen in solitary residing 
situation.The co-residing constraint indicates that the total utility of senior citizen from co-
residing situation must be greater than or equal to that of the solitary residing situation. 
The utility maximising problem of the working citizen is become as follows. 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑋𝑆 ,𝑋𝑊 ,𝐻,𝜆 ln 𝑈
𝑊
= 𝛼 ln 𝑋𝑊 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 ln 𝐻 + 𝛾 ln 𝑋𝑆 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 ln 𝐻 + 𝜆[𝑌𝑊 + 𝑌𝑆
− 𝑃𝑥 𝑋
𝑊 + 𝑋𝑆 − 𝑃𝑕𝐻                                                                                               (4.17) 
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The total demand for housing is: 
𝐻∗ =
{ 𝛽−𝜃𝑊  + 𝛿−𝜃𝑆 }(𝑌𝑊 +𝑌𝑆)
[ 𝛼+ 𝛽−𝜃𝑊   + 𝛾+ 𝛿−𝜃𝑆  ]𝑃𝑕
                                                                                       (4.18) 
While the housing is a public good, the demand for housing either for the senior 
citizen or for the working citizen is a function of joint income of the senior citizen and the 
working citizen, degree of the externality effect of both the senior and the working citizen, 
preference parameters of both citizens and the price of housing. Therefore, a unit increase in 
the income of either senior citizen or working citizen increases the demand for co-residing 
housing of the senior citizen 
{ 𝛽−𝜃𝑊  + 𝛿−𝜃𝑆 }
[ 𝛼+ 𝛽−𝜃𝑊   + 𝛾+ 𝛿−𝜃𝑆  ]𝑃𝑕
 amount and vice versa if other things 
remain constant. We would like to call this as income effect of co-residing housing demand. 
On the other hand, a unit increase in the degree of the externality of either senior citizen or 
working citizen reduces the demand for housing  
 𝛼+𝛾 (𝑌𝑊 +𝑌𝑆)
 𝛼+𝛾+ 𝛽−𝜃𝑊  + 𝛿−𝜃𝑆  
2
𝑃𝑕
 amount and vice 
versa if other things are held constant. We would like to call this as an externality effect of co-
residing.  
Proposition 1:(a) The change in income of either working citizen or senior citizen directly 
(positively)  changes demand for housing when other things hold constant. 
(b)The change in externality parameter of either working citizen or senior citizen indirectly 
(negatively) changes demand for housing when other things remain fixed. 
Proof: see mathematical appendix of chapter four. 
From proposition 1 we can conclude that co-residing decision of the senior citizen and 
working citizen is determined by the income effect and externality effect. Income effect 
increases co-residing demand for housing and externality effect decreases co-residing demand 
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for housing. Assuming that own externality parameter is positively correlated with own 
income. As a result, the overall sign of co-residing demand for housing with own income is 
ambiguous. The demand for housing is negatively related to price (rent) of housing in all 
cases. 
The indirect utility function of co-residing senior citizen is: 
ln 𝑉𝑆(𝐶𝑜𝑅)∗ = 𝛾 ln 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 ln{(𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊) + (𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆)} +  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆  ln 𝑌𝑊 + 𝑌𝑆 
−  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆  ln  𝛼 + 𝛾 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆   − 𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥
−  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 ln 𝑃𝑕                                                                                                  (4.19) 
The indirect utility function of co-residing working citizen is: 
ln 𝑉𝑊(𝐶𝑜𝑅)∗ = 𝛼 ln 𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 ln{ 𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 } +  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊  ln 𝑌𝑊 + 𝑌𝑆 
−  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊  ln  𝛼 + 𝛾 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆   − 𝛼 ln 𝑃𝑥
−  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 ln 𝑃𝑕                                                                                                  (4.20) 
Proposition 2: (a) At the equilibrium total utility, senior citizen will be indifferent between co-
residing and solitary residing with a cut-off income, which is the function of utility 
parameters, externality parameters of both citizens and rental price of housing. The cut-off 
proportion of is  
𝑌𝑠
𝑌𝑊
=
 𝛽 + 𝛿− 𝜃𝑊 −𝜃𝑆 
 𝛿−𝜃𝑆 
 1−𝜃𝑆  𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑆
 1−𝜃𝑆 
 𝛿
𝛿
(1−𝜃𝑆)  2 −𝜃𝑊 −𝜃𝑆  𝑌𝑆 
𝜃𝑆−1
−  𝛽 + 𝛿− 𝜃𝑊 −𝜃𝑆 
 𝛿−𝜃𝑆 
 1−𝜃𝑆  𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑆
 1−𝜃𝑆 
                      (4.21) 
(b) At the equilibrium total utility, working citizen will be indifferent between co-residing and 
solitary residing with a cut-off income, which is the function of utility parameters, externality 
parameters of both citizens and rental price of housing. The cut-off proportion of is  
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𝑌𝑊
𝑌𝑆
=
 𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛽−𝜃𝑊 
 1−𝜃𝑊  𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑊
 1−𝜃𝑊 
𝛽
𝛽
 1−𝜃𝑊  2 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  𝑌𝑊 𝜃
𝑊−1 −  𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛽−𝜃𝑊 
 1−𝜃𝑊  𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑊
 1−𝜃𝑊 
                      (4.22) 
Proof: see mathematical appendix of chapter four. 
Although we cannot definitely say about the impact of an increase in the income of 
senior citizens on decision of co-residing housing demand.If we assume that 𝛼 = 𝛾, 𝛽 =
𝛿 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛼 + 𝛽 =  𝛾 + 𝛿 = 1,  then we can say an increase in income of senior citizen from 
the cut-off level income increases total utility form co-residing and vice versa. We, therefore, 
investigate that an increase in the life- cycle pension income of senior citizen decreases 
solitary residing decision. We are going to test this proposition empirically along with other 
relevant factors. 
 
4.3 Empirical Analysis 
4.3.1 The Empirical Model 
The empirical findings of earlier literature provide ambiguous decisions about the 
determinants of solitary residing behaviour of senior citizens in the European countries and 
other parts of the world. Many studies have attempted to find the answer to this question 
using several hypotheses: studies using data for the United States (Michael, Fuchs and Scott, 
1980; Wolf and Soldo, 1988; Soldo, Wolf and Agree, 1990; Wolf, 1990; Kotlikoff and 
Morris, 1990; Ruggles, 1994, 1988; Kramarow, 1995) find that the income of senior 
citizens,especially women have a strong positive correlation with the solitary residing pattern. 
While Pampel (1992) using 13 European cross-national data shows that the effects of 
variables that are utilised as proxies for income are in the expected direction, but they are 
trivial in magnitudes. However, Kramarow (1995) also finds that proxies for an income 
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account for a fraction of all changes during the twentieth century, although the income 
variable does not behave as expected. That means, although the income of senior citizens has 
an important role in determining their residing pattern, studies have not provided concrete 
support about the magnitude and sign of this hypothesis. 
The model, we have developed, has found that solitary residing decision depends not 
only on the income of senior citizens but also on the income of working citizens. Moreover, 
privacy or congestion parameters and preference parameters are also significant factors. Since 
privacy, congestion and preference are subjective issues and we do not have data on these 
variables, we have assumed these are unobserved heterogeneity and fixed over time to time 
and country to country. We also know that the senior citizens are usually retired from works 
and maintain their livelihood from the pension income. We, therefore, have used life-cycle 
pensionable wealth (LPWS) of male and female senior citizens as a proxy of income of senior 
citizens which is not considered as proxy of income in earlier literature. We believe that life-
cycle pensionable wealth is a more appropriate proxy of the income of senior citizen. Since 
the senior citizens are retired from work, they can accurately calculate their life-cycle pension 
allowance and life expectancy after retirement and be able to estimate the life-cycle wealth 
from the pension. We also assume that senior citizens spend all their wealth smoothly for 
everyday consumption till death and do not keep anything for the bequest. In such a situation, 
life-cycle pensionable wealth of senior citizens is the best proxy for measuring their income. 
Since the income of working citizens is also an important factor, derived in the model, 
for making residing decision of the senior citizens, we have used mean realincome of working 
citizens (MRIW) as an explanatory variable in our empirical model. 
The model shows that rent of housing is another important determinant of residing 
decision for the senior citizens. An increase in rent decreases housing demand if other things 
remain constant; as a result, the solitary residing tendency of the senior citizens decreases and 
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vice versa. The data on rent of a housing service are hardly available for the sample countries 
and these are too sporadic for different points of time for every country used in this study. We 
have used an inflation rate (CPI) as a proxy of housing price in our empirical model. 
Some studies (Mutchler 1992; Ruggles, 1994) find that ‗older old‘ non-married people 
are significantly more likely to live alone than their ‗younger old‘ counterparts. The 
hypothesis is not uniquely appropriate for both male and female senior citizens15. Therefore, 
age or life expectancy after retirement of senior citizens (LIFE) is considered as another 
determining factor of solitary residing decision in the empirical model. 
Gender differences between female and male (female minus male) plays a significant 
role. The ―Pearson correlation coefficient‖ between the percentage of solitary residing senior 
citizens and the size of the gender difference between female and male is 0.70 (United 
Nations, 2005). One of the reasons of the solitary residing female senior citizens being more 
in number is their longer widowhood compared to their male counterpart. This implies that 
the gender of senior citizens affects residing pattern. That is why we have estimated two 
separate models for male and female senior citizens. 
In developed countries, the level of education of the senior people plays a significant 
position in determining the resident pattern. Pampel (1992) finds that having higher level of 
education among the senior citizens indicates less likelihood of co-residing with working 
citizen. We have used average years of schooling of the senior male (MAYS) and female 
(FAYS) citizens as an explanatory variable in this study. 
Labour force participation of the working generation is considered as another 
important determinant of solitary residing behaviour of the senior citizen. Children typically 
move out of the parental home as they complete study, enter into the job market, and also find 
                                                          
15 Female senior citizens are more likely to reside alone than their counterpart male.  
See detail Gaymu J. et.al. (2006). 
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their partner leaving their parents alone (United Nations, 2005). We have included labour 
force participation rates of male and female working citizens (LFP) as an explanatory 
variable. 
The proportions of solitary residing senior citizens are much higher in northern than in 
southern and eastern Europe. These differences are caused because of the survival of ancestral 
family systems in the southern European region characterised by strong family links (Gaymu 
and Springer, 2010; Reher, 1998).  The typical culture of many developed countries is that 
woman in the family such as wives look after ailing or disabled husbands and adult daughter 
or in lesser extent daughter-in-law takes care of the widowed senior citizens (Shanas, 1979; 
Kulys, and Tobin, 1980). We believe that religious culture has a significant influence on 
overall culture (such as determining residing arrangement of family members, developing 
social norms and values of a person etc.) of a personin a society. The percentage of people 
belonging Christian religion is significantly different among sample countries. The average 
number of the percentage of Christian believers in sample countries is 87.80 percent with a 
standard deviation is 7.88 in 1970 and in 2000 the statistics are 79.64 percent and 11.03 
respectively. In 1970 the number of the highest percentage of Christian believers is 
97.7percent in Norway and the lowest number is 73.7 percent in Sweden.In 2000 the 
maximum number of percentage of population belonging Christian religion is 92.7 percent in 
Poland and the minimum number is 61.5 percent in the Netherland and the United Kingdom. 
These statistics indicate that there is significant difference in religious culture and also it is 
changing significantly over the time among sample countries.  Since family tradition, norms 
and values of citizens also influence solitary residing behaviour and the majority of the 
population residing in the sample countries are belonging to a Christian religious belief, we 
have included the percentage of the population belonging to the Christian religion (CHR) in 
our empirical model as a proxy of culture, norms and values. 
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Usually economic theory does not provide a very precise guideline about specifying 
linear versus log linear functional form for regression analysis (Godfrey and Wickens, 1981). 
However, the choice of functional form has important implications for statistical tests, for 
forecast and for policy analysis (Hall, 1978). In this chapter, we have used Sargan16 (1964) 
criterion because of computational simplicity and for getting clear cut decision (Godfrey and 
Wickens, 1981) and for choosing one functional form. Sargan (1964) criterion suggests that 
the linear model is appropriate rather than log-linear model for the data set. Subsequently, we 
employ the following linear models. 
 
The empirical model for male senior citizens: 
𝑃𝑀𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑃𝑊𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑅𝐼𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑀𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑀𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝑀𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  𝑖 = 1, . .16 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 = 1𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 2𝑛𝑑       (4.26) 
 
The empirical model for female senior citizens: 
𝑃𝐹𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑃𝑊𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑀𝑅𝐼𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐹𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼7𝐶𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  𝑖 = 1, . .16 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑡 = 1𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 2𝑛𝑑                                   (4.27) 
 
where,  𝑃𝑀𝑆𝑅𝐴 and 𝑃𝐹𝑆𝑅𝐴 are percentage of male and female senior citizens 
residing alone respectively. 𝐿𝑃𝑊𝑀 and 𝐿𝑃𝑊𝐹 are life cycle pensionable wealth of male and 
female senior citizens respectively. 𝑀𝑅𝐼𝑊 is the meanreal income of working citizens, 𝐶𝑃𝐼 is 
the inflation rate, 𝑀𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸 and 𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸 are life expectancy after retirement of male and female 
senior citizens respectively. 𝑀𝐴𝑌𝑆 and 𝐹𝐴𝑌𝑆 denote average years of schooling of male and 
female senior citizens according to order. 𝑀𝐿𝐹𝑃 and 𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃 are respectively labour force 
                                                          
16 Sargan (1964) criterion is discussed briefly in the empirical appendix of previous chapter. We have provided 
the estimated results with current data sets in Table 4.1 in the empirical appendix of this chapter.  
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participation rate of male and female working citizen, and 𝐶𝐻𝑅 is the percentage of the 
Christian population. 𝜀~(0, 𝜎2) is a disturbance term assumed to be distributed normally with 
zero mean and constant variance across the countries. 
 
4.3.2 Estimation method 
Though the panel analysis conducted here has only two points of time in data sets, the 
study obviously gives insights into the area of residing arrangements literature. There are 
several attractive features of panel analysis if one has the panel data set.  Firstly, panel data 
analysis is very helpful to deal with the heterogeneity in the micro unit, in our case it is 
individual country. The heterogeneity means that all these countries are different from one 
another in a fundamental unmeasured way. Therefore, using cross-section analysis, one 
cannot include all the relevant variables which are appropriate for each country. As a result, 
cross-section analysis might produce biased results.  This is where panel data analysis helps to 
correct this problem. Secondly, it uses more variability by combining variation across the 
country and over time which helps to alleviate the multicollinearity problem.  Thirdly, it can 
address the turnover question because the data track a common sample of country over 
different years. Finally, panel data analysis helps to get a dynamic adjustment which cross-
section data analysis cannot do. 
We have employed the ‗general-to-specific‘ modelling technique by sequentially 
eliminating the most insignificant variables from the general model. 
We also have utilized the Hausman (1978) test17 criterion for model selection between 
random effects and fixed effects models. Estimated results suggest that random effects are 
appropriate for the general model of male senior citizens and fixed effects model is preferable 
                                                          
17Since we briefly explain Hausman (1978) test procedure in empirical appendix of previous chapter, we just 
report Hausman test results. 
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for the general model of female senior citizens but only random effects models are 
appropriate for the specific models for both male and female senior citizens. 
We use the fixed effects and random effects models for (i) male senior citizens and (ii) 
female senior citizens separately but report the appropriate one. The study uses unbalanced 
panel data of 16 European countries and 2 time periods. Thus our number of observations is 
32. 
4.3.3 Data 
The sample consists of 16 European countries that are members of the Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Among these 16 countries - Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are the original signatory members of the 
OECD convention held in December 1960. Finland has joined in the year 1969 while 
Hungary and Poland have joined in the year 1996. In the year 2010, per capita GDP measured 
in US$ constant purchasing power parity (PPP) of these countries range between 16958 
(Hungary) and 46908 (Norway); in the year 2007, life expectancy at birth of these countries 
lies between 73.3 years (Hungary) and 81.9 years (Switzerland); in the year 2009 fertility rate  
per woman aged 15 years to 49 years, lies between 1.3 (Hungary, Spain) and 2.0 (France, 
Norway); in the year 2009, the percentage of population aged 65 years and over lies between 
13.5 (Poland) and 20.8 (Germany); in the year 2009, the population growth rate of these 
countries lies between -0.6 (United Kingdom) and 1.3 (Norway, Switzerland)18. All these 
countries are ranked ―very high human development‖ countries according to the Human 
Development Index (HDI) Report 2009 except Hungary and Poland which are ranked as 
―high human development‖ countries. All of these countries have 70 percent and above of the 
                                                          
18 See Table 4.2 in empirical appendix of chapter four 
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total population believing in Christian religion. We, therefore, can say that these countries are 
economically, demographically, socially, and culturally nearly similar. 
In this study, the observations of dependent variable and independent variables are 
directly related to the senior citizens during the time periods and all these data sets are gender 
specific aggregate (macro-level) data except the income of working citizens, which is not 
gender specific though macro-level data. We include the income of working citizens in this 
study because the theoretical model developed in this study suggests that senior citizens may 
or may not co-reside with working citizens depending on the income of both the senior citizen 
and the working citizen and the price of housing services. In this study, we have developed a 
theoretical model based on the micro behavior of senior citizen and working citizen but the 
empirical analysis is based on macro level data sets. One might raise the question- how does 
the micro model link with aggregate (macro level) data set in empirical analysis? We know an 
aggregate observation is the summation of all individual observations, for example- income 
approach is one way of measuring gross domestic product (GDP) where all factors‘ income 
are added up, and wage income contributes more than 50 percent of GDP in any country. The 
consumer price index (CPI) is the percentage change in the weighted average of prices of all 
consumer goods in a household consumption bundle between the base year and current years. 
The weight is given according to the amount spent on consumption of goods in the 
consumption bundle. So each product‘s price matters in calculating consumer price index. 
Therefore, we can say macro level data is the reflection of micro-data and vice versa. 
Moreover, in case of cross-country analysis, there are many literatures where macro-level data 
are used instead of using micro-level data (Bongaarts and Zimmer 2001; Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, United Nations 2005). 
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The detail explanation of definition of each variable, source of data is provided in Data 
Appendix of the Chapter Four. 
4.4 Results and Discussions 
4.4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Before we go to rigorous empirical results, we would like to start with descriptive 
analysis of both the waves of data sets for getting socio-economic status of this region during 
the two waves of time. Tables 4.3a, 4.3b, 4.3c and 4.3d (in empirical appendix), show that in 
the 1st wave of data set, on average 13.14 percent male and 35.76 percent female senior 
citizens are residing alone; while in the 2nd wave of data set, the percentages are respectively 
15.26 percent and 38.95 percent. The statistics indicate that female seniors are more likely to 
reside alone than their male counterpart. The difference is remarkable because more than 
double female senior citizens are residing alone than the male in both the waves of data sets. 
Another important feature is that solitary residing trends are rising over the time for both male 
and female senior citizens. The growth rate of solitary residing senior citizens is 16.13 
percentof the male and 8.92 percent for the female. Therefore, we can say that solitary 
residing male senior citizens are growing faster than that of their female counterparts. 
We can infer that the average of life-cycle pension wealth of male and female senior 
citizens are respectively US$ 230678 and US$ 268333 in the 1st wave and US$ 197619 and 
US$ 228744.4 in the 2nd wave. Both the waves of data sets indicate that life-cycle pension 
wealth of male senior citizens is lower than that of the female. One of the reasons is that life 
expectancy after retirement for females is higher than that of the male resulting in life-cycle 
pension wealth being bigger in amount for female than for male. Another feature of the 
pension wealth is that it is declining both for the male and female senior citizens during the 
two waves. The reason for this type of negative growth in pension wealth might be due to the 
rise in the retirement age for both male and female citizens in most of these countries. 
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Statistics show that the real income of senior citizens declines during the time period. As a 
result, life-cycle pension wealth also declines for both the male and female senior citizens 
during this time period. 
The average of mean real income of working citizens in these countries during the 1st 
wave and the 2nd wave of data sets are respectively US$ 55427 and US$ 24893.14. We can 
infer that the average income of working citizens is declining during these two waves. The 
negative growth rate of the mean real income of working citizens is more than 55 percent 
during this period and on an average 5.5 percent per year.  Although this value of negative 
growth rate in real income of working citizens is not applicable equally to each individual 
country, we conclude that there is a huge downfall of average income of working citizens in 
this region during these two waves of the time period. 
The mean values of inflation rates (CPI) in the 1st wave of data set and the 2nd wave of 
data set is respectively 45.18 and 68.41.  We can say that the average rate of inflation during 
this time period (between the 1st wave and the 2nd wave) is 51.42 percent and on an average 
5.14 percent per year. If we combine the average negative growth rate of the mean real 
income of senior citizens and the inflation rate, we can say that the real purchasing power of 
senior citizens has decreased during this time period. 
The average values of the life expectancy after retirement for male and female senior 
citizens in the 1st wave of data set are 14.27 years and 20 years respectively, while in the 2nd 
wave of data set these values are respectively 15.66 years and 21.21 years. We can say that 
the growth rates of life expectancy after retirement are 9.74 percent and 6.05percent for both 
male and female senior citizens respectively. Since life expectancy after retirement increases 
and life-cycle pension wealth decreases, both male and female senior citizens become poorer 
during the time period. 
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The average years of schooling of male and female senior citizens in the 1st wave of 
data set are 7.168 years and 6.321 years respectively, while in the 2nd wave of data set these 
values are respectively 7.951 years and 6.86 years. On average the male senior citizens have 
higher educational qualifications than their counterpart and the average length of attending 
school has increased during the two waves for both male and female senior citizens. 
The average values of the percentage of the population believing in the Christian 
religion in the 1st wave of data set (in the year 1970) and the 2nd wave of data set (in the year 
2000) are respectively 87.80 percent and 79.64 percent. These indicate that believers are 
declining during the time period. 
 
4.4.2 Results of Panel Estimations 
The Hausman (1978) test suggests that the random effect model is preferred for male 
senior citizens and fixed effects model is preferred for female senior citizens in the general 
model(which includes all explanatory variables).  We, therefore, report the estimated results 
of the general model. The estimation results of the general model are given in Table 4.4. From 
the Table 4.4, we see that for the male senior citizens, mean real income of working citizens 
(MRIW) is highly significant at less than 1 percent level with a negative sign of the estimated 
coefficient and the percentage of people belonging to the Christian religion (CHR) is 
significant at less than 5 percent level with a negative sign of the estimated coefficient. On the 
other hand, for the female senior citizens, life-cycle pensionable wealth (LPWF), life 
expectancy after retirement (FLIFE) and the percentage of people belonging to the Christian 
religion (CHR) are significant at less than 5 percent level with a negative sign of the estimated 
coefficients. 
For the male senior citizens, solitary residing decision is affected significantly by the 
income of working citizens rather than his life-cycle pensionable wealth but for the female 
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senior citizens, the case is reversed. The sign of life-cycle pensionable wealth variable is 
negative for both male and female senior citizens. In case of the female senior citizens, it is 
significant although the magnitude is very trivial. The negative sign of the variable indicates 
that as life-cycle pensionable wealth of senior citizens increases, the percentage of solitary 
residing decreases which is contrary to the findings of Soldo, Wolf and Agree, 1990; 
Kotlikoff and Morris, 1990; Pamoel 1992 that the higher the income, the higher the 
percentage of solitary residing people. Despite the finding in our estimation opposes several 
earlier results, it is not irrational and unusual since Kramarow (1995) also found a negative 
relationship between income and solitary residing decision. One intuitive explanation of this 
relationship is that a wealthy female senior person can afford more easily to hire supporting 
people to co-reside with her than a less wealthy person. In this situation, the first choice of co-
residing supporting person for the female senior citizens is the single working daughter or son 
or some relative and if senior citizens fail to get a relative to support them, the second choice 
is to hire support from the market. Another intuitive explanation of this negative relationship 
with solitary residing and life-cycle pension wealth is that senior citizens, who usually need 
assistance in maintaining their regular livelihood, have a strong preference for co-residency 
which mitigates their preference for buying privacy via residing alone. On the other hand, 
when a working person finds that his (her) wealthy parents are looking for helping people 
from the market, the working son (daughter) takes the opportunity to earn some financial 
benefit. Moreover, there are always some forms of altruistic exchange occurring between 
senior citizen and working citizen which is difficult to measure empirically (we are not trying 
to investigate this altruism in this chapter). 
The coefficient of mean real income of the working citizen has got a negative sign for 
both male and female senior citizens although it is statistically significant in the case of males 
only. That means an increase in the mean income of working citizens lowers the percentage of 
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solitary residing senior citizens. We can give two types of interpretations of this result. One is 
that, as the income of working citizens‘ increases, they can afford more responsibility of 
senior citizens and co-reside with them. Another interpretation is that,when working citizens 
are spending more time for outside activities to earn more, they need some helping hands to 
look after their children and household activities. In any case, parents or relatives are the best 
option for co-residing. 
The coefficient of life expectancy after retirement has been found to be significant 
with a negative signin the case of female senior citizens. The magnitude is 0.849 which 
implies that one year increase in life expectancy after retirement age of the female senior 
citizens lowers 0.849 percent probability of solitary residing. The finding is similar to the 
earlier studies that the ―older old‖ citizens are more likely to co-reside. For the male senior 
citizens, the life expectancy after retirement is found to be insignificant and has positive sign. 
The coefficient of the percentage of people belonging to the Christian religion is found 
to be significant with negative sign for both male and female senior citizens. The negative 
sign indicates that with an increase in religious belief, the likelihood of solitary residing 
tendency decreases. This is an aggregate variable which is used as proxy of culture, social 
norms and values. The magnitudes of coefficients for the male and female senior citizens are 
respectively 0.143 and 0.321. These magnitudes imply that the probability of decreasing 
solitary residing attitude of female senior citizens is more than double than that of their male 
counterparts because of culture. The result is very much rational that female senior citizens of 
these countries are more influenced by religious belief in residing decision than their male 
counterpart. 
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Table 4.4: General Linear Random Effects model and corresponding Fixed Effects model for 
male and female 
 
 Male 
Random Effects 
Model 
(PMSRA) 
Male 
Random 
Effects 
Model 
(PMSRA) 
Female 
Fixed Effects 
Model 
(PFSRA) 
Female 
Fixed Effects 
Model 
(PFSRA) 
LPWM 
(S.E) 
-5.9E-06 
(4.2E-06) 
-2.3E-06 
(4.3E-06) 
  
LPWF 
(S.E) 
  -0.00016** 
(7.2E-06) 
-4.9E-06 
(8.2E06) 
MRIW 
(S.E) 
-0.0000143*** 
(3.9E-06) 
-0.000015*** 
(4.66E-06) 
-8.7E-06 
(5.6E-06) 
-0.000011 
(7.4E06) 
CPI 
(S.E) 
-0.019 
(0.031) 
0.024 
(0.027) 
-0.025 
(0.071) 
0.091 
(0.078) 
MLIFE 
(S.E) 
9.8E-06 
(0.00005) 
4.6E-06 
(0.000047) 
  
FLIFE 
(S.E) 
  -0.849** 
(0.284) 
-0.71* 
(0.37) 
MAYS 
(S.E) 
0.436 
(0.46) 
0.649 
(0.516) 
  
FAYS 
(S.E) 
  0.656 
(0.994) 
-0.052 
(1.28) 
MLFP 
(S.E) 
-0.122 
(0.13) 
-0.102 
(0.144) 
  
FLFP 
(S.E) 
  0.123 
(0.098) 
0.128 
(0.98) 
CHR 
(S.E) 
-0.143** 
(0.071) 
 -0.321** 
(0.109) 
 
Const. 
(S.E) 
36.41** 
(14.66) 
17.94 
(14.43) 
75.197*** 
(14.11) 
40.57*** 
(10.25) 
Obs.= 
Grs.= 
R-sq: 
w. 
b. 
o. 
 
32 
16 
 
0.797 
0.11 
0.155 
Wald 𝜒2 (6) = 
50.13*** 
 
 
32 
16 
 
0.73 
0.09 
0.14 
Wald 𝜒2 (6) 
=32.04*** 
32 
16 
 
0.858 
0.468 
0.484 
F-Stat. 7.77*** 
32 
16 
 
0.72 
0.39 
0.40 
F-Stat. 4.33** 
Hausman Test 
 
𝜒2 (5) = 7.92 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 =0.161 
Random Effects 
Supported 
𝜒2 (4) = 4.19 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 
=0.382 
Random 
Effects 
Supported 
𝜒2 (5) = 18.79 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 =0.0019 
Fixed Effects 
Supported 
𝜒2 (4) = 17.58 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 
=0.0015 
Fixed Effects 
Supported 
(In the parentheses, standard error of the coefficient is given. * indicates that the variable is significant 
at 10percent error level or below. ** indicates that the variable is significant at 5 per cent error level or 
below and ***indicates that the variable is significant at below 1percent error level.) 
 
 119 
 
To check the robustness of this variable, we have dropped the variable from boththe 
general models of male and female senior citizens and reported the results in Table 4.4. Incase 
of male senior citizens‘ model, when we have dropped the CHR variable, coefficient of mean 
real income of working citizens (RMIW) variable is remain significant but the overall 𝑅2– 
value of the random effects model reduces 6 percent as well as the coefficient of intercept 
term becomes insignificant. Similarly, in case of female senior citizens‘ model, the dropping 
of CHR variable makes the coefficient of  life-cycle pensionable weath (LPWF) variable 
insignificant and reduces the significance of the coefficient of life expectancy after retirement 
(FLIFE) variable. The overall 𝑅2 – value of the estimated model is also reduced more than 8 
percent after dropping the CHR variable. We therefore believe that religious culture has 
significant impact on solitary residing arrangement of senior citizens in developed European 
countries. 
The inflation rate variable is found to be insignificant for both the male and female 
senior citizens but has expected negative sign. As rent increases, the solitary residing 
tendency decreases among senior citizens and vice versa which is supported by the theoretical 
model. The insignificant result of this variable might have issued from using a weak proxy of 
the rental price of housing services. 
The variable, average year of schooling of senior citizens (MAYS and FAYS) is found 
to be insignificant for both male and female senior citizens with a positive sign. The sign is as 
expected and found in earlier research. 
The variable, labour force participation rate (MLFP and FLFP) is found to be 
insignificant for both male and female cases but has a negative sign for male senior citizens 
and a positive sign for female senior citizens. With an increase in the labour market 
participation of the male working citizens, they might like to co-reside with senior citizens so 
that senior citizens can look after household activities. On the other hand, the positive sign of 
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the variable indicates that with an increase in the labour market participation of female 
working citizens, the solitary residing attitude of female senior citizens increases. There is a 
possibility that the working female citizens might develop an attitude to reside independently 
which may continue when they become older. 
The Wald - 𝜒2 values for random effects model for male senior citizen is 50.13 which 
is highly significant and the overall 𝑅2 value is 0.155. On the other hand, F-statistic for fixed 
effects model for female senior citizen is 7.77 which is highly significant and the overall 𝑅2  
value is 0.484. 
Sequentially deleting the most insignificant variable from the general model, we have 
found the specific model for both male and female senior citizens. After choosing a specific 
random effects model for the male and a specific fixed effects model for the female, we have 
conducted the Hausman (1978) test again for the specific models.  Now Hausman (1978) tests 
support only the random effects models for both the male and female senior citizens. Both 
specific models do not change the significance of variables remarkably except the life-cycle 
pensionable wealth of the male senior citizen being negatively significant at 10 percent level. 
This new finding enhances the importance of the variable in determining the solitary residing 
pattern of senior citizens in the European region. We can now more confidently say that the 
life-cycle pensionable wealth of senior citizens negatively affects solitary residing behaviour 
of senior citizens in this region. We report the results of specific models in Table 4.5 in the 
empirical appendix of chapter four. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
The fundamental objective of this study is to find out the most reliable factors 
affecting solitary residing patterns of senior citizens of European countries. We develop a 
theoretical model including the congestion problem of co-residing that explains the co-
residing behaviour of senior citizens and also determines when a senior citizen wants to reside 
alone. We have found from the theoretical model that a relative increase of senior citizen‘s 
income to working citizen‘s income encourages a senior citizen to co-reside with working 
citizen for gaining more consumer surplus from co-residing. 
We have considered an empirical model including life-cycle pensionable wealth of 
senior citizens, mean real income of working citizens, inflation rates, life expectancy after 
retirement of senior citizens, average years of schooling of senior citizens, labour force 
participation rates of working citizens, and religious belief variables. Using gender specific, 
macro-level panel data set of two time periods, we have conducted random effects and fixed 
effects model estimation techniques. 
From the estimated results, we have found that life-cycle pension wealth of senior 
citizens is significantly and negatively related tothe solitary residing decision of senior 
citizens although the magnitude is very minor. One intuitive explanation of this negative 
relationship between solitary residing attitude and life-cycle pension wealth is that the senior 
citizen who usually needs assistance in maintaining their regular livelihood, have a strong 
preference for co-residency, which mitigates their preference for buying privacy via residing 
alone. Another intuitive explanation of the negative relationship between solitary residing 
attitude and pensionable wealth is that a wealthy female senior person can afford more easily 
to hire supporting people to co-reside with her than a less wealthy person. Religious belief in 
Christianity is also significantly and negatively related tothe solitary residing pattern of senior 
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citizens which is complementary with prior studies of cultural traits. The mean real income of 
working citizens significantly and negatively affect solitary residing patterns of the male 
senior citizens although the magnitude of coefficient is very trivial. The intuition of this 
relation of the factor says that increasing working citizens‘ income leads an increase in the 
responsibility of working citizens towards senior citizens and therefore, solitary residing 
pattern of senior citizens decreases. Life expectancy after retirement is also a significant 
variable of female senior citizens in making solitary residing decision. 
Having only two time points in our data set is the main limitation of the study but our 
empirical results are very much rational and logical that bear significant guideline for further 
research and policy makers.   
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Appendices: Chapter Four 
Mathematical Appendix 
Proposition 1: (a) 
𝜕𝐻∗
𝜕𝑌𝑊
=
𝜕
𝜕𝑌𝑊
 
  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆   𝑌𝑊 + 𝑌𝑆 
  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊  +  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆   𝑃𝑕
 
=
  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆  
  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊  +  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆   𝑃𝑕
=
𝜕𝐻∗
𝜕𝑌𝑆
∎ 
(b) 
𝜕𝐻∗
𝜕𝜃𝑊
=
𝜕
𝜕𝜃𝑊
 
  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆   𝑌𝑊 + 𝑌𝑆 
  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊  +  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆   𝑃𝑕
 
=
− 𝛼 + 𝛾 (𝑌𝑊 + 𝑌𝑆)
  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊  +  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆   2𝑃𝑕
∎ 
Proposition 2 (a):  
Proof: When senior citizen is indifferent between co-residing and residing apart, then the 
difference between equilibrium total utility from co-residing and residing apart for senior 
citizen is equal to zero. Thus, 
ln 𝑉𝑆 𝐶𝑜𝑅 ∗ − ln 𝑉𝑆 = 0 
ln 𝑉𝑆 𝐶𝑜𝑅 ∗ − ln 𝑉𝑆
= 𝛾 ln 𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 ln{(𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊) + (𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆)} +  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆  ln 𝑌𝑊 + 𝑌𝑆 
−  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆  ln  𝛼 + 𝛾 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆   − 𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥
−  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 ln 𝑃𝑕 − 𝛾 ln 𝛾 − 𝛿 ln 𝛿 −  𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝑌
𝑆 + 𝛾 ln 𝑃𝑥 + 𝛿 ln 𝑃𝑕 + (𝛾
+ 𝛿)ln⁡ (𝛾 + 𝛿) 
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⇒ ln  
𝑉𝑆 𝑐𝑜𝑟  
𝑉𝑆
 =  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 ln{(𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊) + (𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆)} − 𝛿 ln 𝛿 +  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆  ln 𝑌𝑊 + 𝑌𝑆 -
 𝛾 + 𝛿 ln 𝑌𝑆 −  𝛾 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆  ln  𝛼 + 𝛾 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆   + (𝛾 + 𝛿)ln⁡ (𝛾 + 𝛿 −
 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 ln 𝑃𝑕 + 𝛿 ln 𝑃𝑕  
⇒  𝑌𝑆 + 𝑌𝑊 
=   
 𝛼 + 𝛾 + 𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆  𝛾+𝛿−𝜃
𝑆 
 𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆  𝛿−𝜃
𝑆 
  
𝛿𝛿
 𝛾 + 𝛿  𝛾+𝛿 
  
 𝑃𝑕 
 𝛿−𝜃𝑆 
 𝑃𝑕 𝛿
  
1
(𝛾+𝛿−𝜃𝑆 )
(𝑌𝑆)
(𝛾+𝛿)
{𝛾+ 𝛿−𝜃𝑆 } 
If we assume that 𝛼 = 𝛾;  𝛽 = 𝛿;  𝛼 + 𝛽 = 𝛾 + 𝛿 = 1;  𝛽 > 𝜃𝑊   𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿 > 𝜃𝑆  
⇒  𝑌𝑆 + 𝑌𝑊 =   
 2 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  1−𝜃
𝑆 
 𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  𝛿−𝜃
𝑆 
  𝛿𝛿  
1
 𝑃𝑕 𝜃
𝑆  
1
(1−𝜃𝑆 )
(𝑌𝑆)
1
{1−𝜃𝑆 } 
⇒   
 2 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  1−𝜃
𝑆 
 𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  𝛿−𝜃
𝑆 
  𝛿𝛿  
1
 𝑃𝑕 𝜃
𝑆  
1
(1−𝜃𝑆 )
(𝑌𝑆)𝜃
𝑆
− 𝑌𝑆 = 𝑌𝑊  
⇒
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 𝛿
𝛿
(1−𝜃𝑆 )  2 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛿−𝜃𝑆 
 1−𝜃𝑆 
 
 
 
 
1
 𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑆
 1−𝜃𝑆 
   𝑌𝑆 𝜃
𝑆−1 − 1
 
 
 
 
 
𝑌𝑆 = 𝑌𝑊  
𝑌𝑆
𝑌𝑊
=
 𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛿−𝜃𝑆 
 1−𝜃𝑆  𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑆
 1−𝜃𝑆 
 𝛿
𝛿
(1−𝜃𝑆 )  2 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  𝑌𝑆 𝜃𝑆−1 −  𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛿−𝜃𝑆 
 1−𝜃𝑆  𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑆
 1−𝜃𝑆 
 
The ratio is positive iff  
 𝛿
𝛿
(1−𝜃𝑆 )  2 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  𝑌𝑆 𝜃
𝑆−1 >  𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛿−𝜃𝑆 
 1−𝜃𝑆  𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑆
 1−𝜃𝑆 ∎ 
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Proposition 2 (b):  
When working citizen is indifferent between co-residing and residing apart, then the 
difference between equilibrium total utility from co-residing and residing apart for working 
citizen is equal to zero. Thus, 
ln 𝑉𝑊 𝐶𝑜𝑅 ∗ − ln 𝑉𝑊 = 0  
⇒ ln 𝑉𝑊(𝐶𝑜𝑅)∗ − ln 𝑉𝑊
= 𝛼 ln 𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 ln{ 𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 } +  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊  ln 𝑌𝑊 + 𝑌𝑆 
−  𝛼 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊  ln   𝛼 + 𝛾 +  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 +  𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆   − 𝛼 ln𝑃𝑥
−  𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 ln𝑃𝑕 − 𝛼 ln 𝛼 − 𝛽 ln 𝛽 −  𝛼 + 𝛽 ln 𝑌
𝑊 + 𝛼 ln 𝑃𝑥 + 𝛽 ln 𝑃𝑕
+  𝛼 + 𝛽 ln(𝛼 + 𝛽) 
⇒  𝑌𝑆 + 𝑌𝑊 
=   
 𝛼 + 𝛾 + 𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛼 + 𝛽  𝛼+𝛽 
 
 𝛼+𝛽−𝜃𝑊  
 
𝛽𝛽
 𝛽 − 𝜃𝑊 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑆  𝛽−𝜃
𝑊  
  
1
 𝑃𝑕 𝜃
𝑊  
1
 𝛼+𝛽−𝜃𝑊  
 𝑌𝑊 
 𝛼+𝛽 
 𝛼+𝛽−𝜃𝑊   
If we assume that 𝛼 = 𝛾;  𝛽 = 𝛿;  𝛼 + 𝛽 = 𝛾 + 𝛿 = 1;  𝛽 > 𝜃𝑊   𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿 > 𝜃𝑆  
⇒  𝑌𝑆 + 𝑌𝑊 =  2 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  
𝛽𝛽
 𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  𝛽−𝜃
𝑊  
 
1
(1−𝜃𝑊 )
 
1
 𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑊
(1−𝜃𝑊 )
  𝑌𝑊 
1
 1−𝜃𝑊   
⇒  2 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  
𝛽𝛽
 𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  𝛽−𝜃
𝑊  
 
1
(1−𝜃𝑊 )
 
1
 𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑊
(1−𝜃𝑊 )
  𝑌𝑊 
1
 1−𝜃𝑊  − 𝑌𝑊 = 𝑌𝑆 
⇒   
𝛽
𝛽
 1−𝜃𝑊   2 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛽−𝜃𝑊  
 1−𝜃𝑊  
  
1
 𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑊
 1−𝜃𝑊 
  𝑌𝑊 𝜃
𝑊−1 − 1 𝑌𝑊 = 𝑌𝑆  
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𝑌𝑊
𝑌𝑆
=
 𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛽−𝜃𝑊 
 1−𝜃𝑊  𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑊
 1−𝜃𝑊 
𝛽
𝛽
 1−𝜃𝑊  2 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  𝑌𝑊 𝜃
𝑊−1 −  𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛽−𝜃𝑊 
 1−𝜃𝑊  𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑊
 1−𝜃𝑊 
 
The ratio is positive iff 𝛽
𝛽
 1−𝜃𝑊  2 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆  𝑌𝑊 𝜃
𝑊−1 >  𝛽 + 𝛿 − 𝜃𝑊 − 𝜃𝑆 
 𝛽−𝜃𝑊 
 1−𝜃𝑊  𝑃𝑕 
𝜃𝑊
 1−𝜃𝑊 ∎ 
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Empirical Appendix 
Table 4.1: Sargan’s Linear vs. Log-linear Test Results  
 1st Wave Data Set 2nd Wave Data Set 
𝐿𝑃𝑊𝑆 
explanatory variable 
𝐿𝑃𝑊𝑆 explanatory 
variable 
Square root of (RSS) for 
Linear Regression model 
24.0782 27.01 
Square root of (RSS) for 
Log Linear Regression 
model 
1.696 1.863 
Geometric Mean (g) 20.284 22.626 
Sargan’s criterion value 
𝑺 =  
𝝈 𝜺
𝒈𝝈 𝝑
 
𝒏
 
(0.699)32 < 1 
Linear model is preferred 
(0.648)32 < 1 
Linear model is preferred 
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Table 4.2: Major indicators of the sample countries 
Country GDP/per 
head 
US $ 
(2010) 
Public 
health 
spending 
percent 
of GDP 
(2007) 
per 
cent 
change 
in 
house 
price 
over 
last 
year 
(2010) 
Life 
expectancy 
at birth 
(2007) 
Fertility 
rate 
(Children 
per 
woman 
15 to 49 
years 
(2009) 
percent of 
Old age 
population 
(2009) 
Population 
growth 
rate (2009) 
Austria 35 389 6.8 n.a 80.1 1.4 17.5 0.3 
Belgium  32 847 7.3 5.4 79.8 1.8 17.1 0.8 
Denmark  32 241 6.5 2.8 78.4 1.8 16.1 0.6 
Finland 31 730 6.1 8.7 79.5 1.9 16.9 0.5 
France 29 661 7.5 5.2 81.0 2.0 16.7 0.5 
Germany 33 423 7.8 2.3 80.0 1.4 20.8 -0.3 
Hungary 16 958 5.7 n.a 73.3 1.3 16.5 -0.1 
Italy 27 143 6.3 -2.0 81.4(2006) 1.4 19.9 0.7 
Netherlands 37 005 6.0 -2.0 80.2 1.8 15.2 0.5 
Norway 46 908 5.7 8.2 80.6 2.0 14.8 1.3 
Poland 17 351 4.6 n.a 75.3 1.4 13.5 0.1 
Portugal 21 661 6.6 n.a 79.1 1.3 17.8 0.1 
Spain 26 940 6.1 -3.6 81.0 1.4 16.7 0.7 
Sweden 33 771  6.6 7.8 80.8 1.9 17.9 0.9 
Switzerland 37 775 5.6 4.7 81.9 1.5 16.7 1.3 
United 
Kingdom 
32 499 6.8 7.2 79.5 1.9 15.8 -0.6 
n.a = not available 
Source: Social Issues: Key table from OECD 
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Table 4.3a: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 PMSRA PFSRA LPWM 
1st wave 2nd wave 1st wave 2nd wave 1st wave 2nd wave 
European  
Region 
(N=16) 
Mean 13.14 15.26 35.76 38.95 230678 197619 
Std. Dev. 4.86 6.25 9.25 9.93 161993.1 87714.56 
J-B Val. 
(prob.) 
0.945 
(0.623) 
0.421 
(0.810) 
2.509 
(0.285) 
1.906 
(0.386) 
41.116 
(0.000) 
3.865 
(0.145) 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3b: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 LPWF MRIW CPI 
1st wave 2nd wave 1st wave 2nd wave 1st wave 2nd wave 
European  
Region 
(N=16) 
Mean 268333 228744.4 55427 24893.14 45.18 68.41 
Std. Dev. 203215.5 107079.3 103163.7 7136.282 22.65 24.62 
J-B Val. 
(prob.) 
54.80 
(0.000) 
6.563 
(0.038) 
98.197 
(0.000) 
 14.482 
 (0.000) 
1.415 
(0.493) 
9.392 
(0.009) 
 
 
Table 4.3c: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 MLIFE FLIFE CHR 
1st wave 2nd wave 1st wave 2nd wave CHR70 CHR00 
European  
Region 
(N=16) 
Mean 14.27 15.66 20.00 21.21 87.801 79.638 
Std. Dev. 1.439 2.921 2.666 3.357 7.884 11.029 
J-B Val. 
(prob.) 
0.533 
(0.766) 
12.105 
(0.002) 
1.96 
(0.375) 
0.358 
(0.836) 
1.408 
(0.495) 
1.699 
(0.428) 
 
 
Table 4.3d: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 MAYS FAYS 
1st wave 2nd wave 1st wave 2nd wave 
European  
Region 
(N=16) 
Mean 7.168 7.951 6.321 6.86 
Std. Dev. 1.666 1.514 1.687 1.606 
J-B Val. 
(prob.) 
0.466 
(0.792) 
1.405 
(0.495) 
1.553 
(0.46) 
0.824 
(0.662) 
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Table 4.5: Panel estimation results for specific models of male and female senior citizens 
 Male Female 
Random Effects 
Model 
(PMSRA) 
Fixed Effects 
Model 
(PMSRA) 
Random Effects 
Model 
(PFSRA) 
Fixed Effects 
Model 
(PFSRA) 
LPWM 
(S.E) 
-5.9E-06 
(3.5E-06)* 
-5.1E-06 
(3.8E-06) 
  
LPWF 
(S.E) 
  -0.000017 
(3.6E-06)*** 
-0.000013 
(4.02E-06)*** 
MRIW 
(S.E) 
-0.000013 
(3.97E-06)*** 
-0.000014 
(4.2E-06)*** 
-7.3E-06 
(4.8E-06) 
-7.7E-06 
(5.2E-06) 
CPI 
(S.E) 
    
MLIFE 
(S.E) 
    
FLIFE 
(S.E) 
  -0.733 
(0.229)*** 
-0.734 
(0.261)** 
MAYS 
(S.E) 
    
FAYS 
(S.E) 
    
MLFP 
(S.E) 
    
FLFP 
(S.E) 
    
CHR 
(S.E) 
-0.17 
(0.041)*** 
0.156 
(0.044)*** 
-0.391 
(0.06)*** 
-0.38 
(0.068)*** 
Const. 
(S.E) 
29.89 
(3.79)*** 
28.82 
(3.85)*** 
88.81 
(9.21)*** 
88.19 
(10.27)*** 
Obs.= 
Grs.= 
R-sq: 
w. 
b. 
o. 
 
32 
16 
 
0.755 
0.126 
0.17 
Wald 𝜒2 (3 
) = 44.43*** 
 
32 
16 
 
0.76 
0.11 
0.15 
F-Stat. 13.49*** 
32 
16 
 
0.82 
0.30 
0.32 
Wald 𝜒2 (4) = 
69.13*** 
32 
16 
 
0.821 
0.301 
0.323 
F-Stat. 13.79*** 
Hausman 
Test 
𝜒2 (2) = 0.91 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 =0.63 
Random Effects 
Supported 
 𝜒2 (2) = 0.45 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝜒2 =0.80 
Random Effects 
Supported 
 
 
(In the parentheses, standard error of the coefficient is given. * indicates that the variable is significant at 10per 
cent error level or below. ** indicates that the variable is significant at 5percent error level or below and 
***indicates that the variable is significant at below 1percent level.) 
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Data Appendix 
The percentage of senior citizens residing alone (PSRA) 
The United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs/ Population Division 
has classified the data on living arrangement of older people into six mutually exclusive 
categories19 and calculates the percentage of each category to total senior citizens. That means 
the percentage of elderly people (called as senior citizens) for each category is defined as the 
number of senior citizens of a category divided by the total number of senior citizens of a 
country in a year. In the data set, people aged 60 years and above20 are considered as senior 
citizens and we have collected data on the percentage of senior citizens (both male and 
female) residing alone (PSRA)as the dependent variablein this study. The data on this variable 
are available at different points of time (given in parentheses) for different countries to 
indicate the reporting year of the observation. For example- Poland (1978), Portugal (1979), 
Hungary, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland (1980), Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Spain and the United Kingdom (1981), France (1982), Denmark (1986), Germany (1987), and 
Finland (1990). That means the observations of different countries are scattered from the year 
1978 to the year 1990, which we have defined as the 1st wave of data set. In the 2nd wave of 
data set (as we have defined), the observations are scattered from the year 1988 to the year 
2000 like the 1st wave of data set. For example- Poland (1988), the Netherlands (1989), 
Hungary, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland (1990), Denmark, Portugal (1991),  
Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom (1994), Austria (1995), and 
Finland (2000). The discrete time difference of observation between these two waves of 
datasets for each country is at least 5 years (Denmark) and at most 14 years (Austria). The 
                                                          
19
‗The household composition of older persons in the present publication is classified into mutually exclusive categories, including living 
alone, living with spouse only, living with children/children-in-law, living with grandchildren (without children), living with other relatives 
and living with non-relatives‘(p.133). See detail in United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division Living 
Arrangements of Older Persons Around the World, Annex3. 
20
 In some countries age 65years and over is considered as senior citizens.  
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source of these two waves of data set comes from the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division Living Arrangements of Older Persons 
Around the World, Annex IV, Table A.IV.3 pp. 151-154. 
We have complied separate observations on the percentage of male senior citizens 
residing alone (PMSRA) and the percentage of female senior citizens residing alone (PFSRA) 
and symbolised these two variables respectively as 𝑃𝑀𝑆𝑅𝐴_𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝐹𝑆𝑅𝐴_𝑖𝑡 where [𝑖 =
1 𝑡𝑜 16] indicates number of countries and [𝑡 = 1𝑠𝑡, 2𝑛𝑑] indicates number of waves. Either 
of these two variables is used as the dependent variable in the study. 
Since we have separate data for the percentage of solitary residing male and female 
senior citizens, all explanatory variables such as – life-cycle pensionable wealth of senior 
male (LPWM) and life-cycle pensionable wealth of senior female (LPWF), life expectancy 
after retirement for senior male (MLIFE) and life expectancy after retirement for senior 
female (FLIFE), average years of schooling of senior male (MAYS) and average years of 
schooling of senior female (FAYS), and labour force participation rate of male working citizen 
(MLFP) and labour force participation rate of female working citizens (FLFP) are gender 
specific except mean real income of working citizen (MRIW), inflation rates (CPI), and the 
percentage of people belonging to Christian  religion (CHR) which are in macro measures  
and are commonly used for both male and female cases during the estimation process. 
 
Life-cycle pensionable wealth of senior citizens (LPWS) 
We have used the life-cycle pensionable wealth of male and female senior citizens as a 
proxy of mean real income of senior citizens. This variable is symbolised as 𝐿𝑃𝑊𝑀_𝑖𝑡 and 
𝐿𝑃𝑊𝐹_𝑖𝑡 for male and female respectively. The observations of this variable for each country 
are collected according to the year of the dependent variable. The source of data is OECD 
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(2011), Pensions at a Glance 2011: Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries, 
OECD Publishing.The web address is: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2011-en 
Mean real income of working citizens (MRIW)  
We have used the mean real income of working citizens as an explanatory variable, 
symbolised as 𝑀𝑅𝐼𝑊_𝑖𝑡. The observations of this variable for each country are collected 
according to the year of the dependent variable. The source of data is OECD (2011), Pensions 
at a Glance 2011: Retirement-income Systems in OECD and G20 Countries, OECD 
Publishing.The web address is: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2011-en 
 Inflation rate (CPI) 
The data on rent of housing are hardly available for the sample countries and these are 
too sporadic for different points of time for every country used in this study. We have used 
inflation rates (CPI) as a proxy of rent of housing in our analysis although according to the 
international Monetary Fund (IMF),  the calculation of inflation rate (CPI) does not include 
the rental expenditure in the household consumption bundle. The variable is symbolised as 
𝐶𝑃𝐼_𝑖𝑡.The data on this variable is collected from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 Life expectancy after retirement (LIFE) 
We have used life expectancy after retirement of male and female senior citizens as an 
explanatory variable in this study. The variable is symbolised by 𝑀𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸_𝑖𝑡 and 
𝐹𝐿𝐼𝐹𝐸_𝑖𝑡respectively for male and female. The observations of this variable are collected 
from OECD (2011), Pensions at a Glance 2011: Retirement-income Systems in OECD and 
G20 Countries, OECD Publishing.The web address 
is:http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/pension_glance-2011-en pp. 29-30 
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Average years of schooling of senior citizens (AYS) 
We have used the average years of schooling of the senior male and female citizens as 
an explanatory variable in this study. The variable is symbolised by 𝑀𝐴𝑌𝑆_𝑖𝑡  and 𝐹𝐴𝑌𝑆_𝑖𝑡 
for male and female respectively. The observations of this variable are collected from the 
website of Baro and Lee educational attainment data sets. 
Labour force participation rates of working aged citizens (LFP) 
We have incorporated the variable called labour force participation rate of working 
aged male and female citizens and are symbolised as respectively 𝑀𝐿𝐹𝑃_𝑖𝑡  and 𝐹𝐿𝐹𝑃_𝑖𝑡 .   
The data of this variable are collected from the OECD website for both male and female and 
also for different times. http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LFS_SEXAGE_I_R. 
Religion (CHR) 
We believe that religion is a good proxy of culture, norms and values of a society. We, 
therefore, have used the percentage of the population belonging to the Christian religion 
because more than 70 percent of the total population belongs to the Christian religion in these 
countries. This variable is used to capture the effect of religious culture (if any) on residing 
decision and is symbolised by 𝐶𝐻𝑅_𝑖𝑡. The data on religion are collected from the website of 
Robert Barro and Rachel McCleary who have compiled a cross-country data set on the share 
of religious people in the population. ‗Adherence fractions of population are shown for 10 
religion groups and non-religion (incl. atheists) in 1970, 2000, and 1900 (from Barrett).‘ 
Throughout the text, we have omitted the subscripts of all variables for ease of reading. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Impact of public education expenditure on income inequality 
Abstract 
Public education expenditure has an important role in human capital accumulation of a 
society but it can increase or reduce income inequality of the society. In this chapter, we are 
going to investigate the impact of public education expenditure on income inequality. We 
have developed models that can explain both situations - increasing public education 
expenditure can increase income inequality and can also reduce income inequality but in any 
case, it is a Pareto improvement under some conditions. We have also empirically examined 
the theoretical models. Using the panel data set of 62 countries started from 1980 to 1995 for 
explanatory variables and 1995 to 2005 for explained variable, we first replicate cross-country 
analysis according to Sylwester‘s (2002) estimation method and partially refute Sylwester‘s 
(2002) result that public education expenditure reduces income inequality. We have found 
that Sylwester‘s (2002) claim – public education expenditure reduces income inequality is 
true only for the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) region but 
increasing public education expenditure increases income inequality for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAAM) region, developing Africa, Asia and east Europe (DAAE) region, and 
the least developed Africa and Asian (LAA) region.  We have also conducted panel analysis 
and found the same conclusion that the development status of a country determines the 
positive or negative impact of increasing public education expenditure on income inequality. 
The gross domestic product (GDP), political stability, average year of schooling and 
corruption perception index- all these factors also have influence to determine income 
inequality of a country. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Human capital, at present, is considered as an essential factor of production which 
needs to be developed for achieving rapid economic growth. Education and training are the 
basic input of acquiring human capital. Human capital accumulation, whether it is private or 
public education, is a major conduit through persistent or cross-dynastic income change that 
may be reduced inequality. Studies (Saha and Sensarma 2011; Saha and Sarkar 1999) show 
that schooling and job related training significantly increases earnings of industrial workers. 
But acquiring education is costly for a citizen that cannot be equally affordable by every 
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citizen of a country; as a result, inequality may be sharpened in the society. Access to 
education for all is therefore treated as aprimary condition of accruing human capital which 
helps to favourably change inequality of a society. Glomm and Ravikumar (2003 p.289) 
quotes the emphasis placed on access to education by the U.S. Supreme Court stating that ―in 
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity where the state has undertaken to 
provide, it is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms‖. Proper education of 
all citizens enhances socio-economic development of a nation. Education and training helps to 
change the income distribution of a society. In Stiglitz (1973) words, education is a process of 
involving the acquisition of skills which increases individual‘s productivity. Since income is 
related to productivity, the more education an individual has, the higher will be his income.  
Similarly, an individual having tertiary education is likely to receive a considerably higher 
income than the one who does not (Dutta et.al., 2001) and education or training plays 
signalling role into different jobs; the more highly educated individuals obtain the better jobs 
(Spence, 1973). As regards inequality, human capital (via education) may be considered as a 
substitute endowment for the rich, but as a complement of talent for the poor. Thus, higher 
education opportunities could potentially reduce inequality. 
Studies (Glomm and Ravikumar, 2003; Barro, 1999) have claimed that the public 
education system ensures the equality of opportunity and equal access to the inputs of 
learning technology across all pupils; as a result, incomes converge that means income 
inequality declines in the society. The study (Chiu, 1998) argues that public education 
expenditure can improve economic growth while promoting equality. Schultz (1963) 
mentions that increasing human capital is one way to lower income inequality and increased 
support for public education might be one way to accomplish this. Glomm and Ravikumar 
(1992) develop a model where agents can choose between a private and public education 
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system and they show that income inequality unambiguously declines under a public 
education system. A continued support for public education lowers the level of income 
inequality over time (Saint-Paul and Verdier, 1992; Eckstein and Zilcha, 1994; and Zhang, 
1996). The provision of universal public education was instrumental in the rapid formation of 
human capital and was therefore a catalyst, and possibly evens a necessary condition, for the 
demise of the class society (Galor and Moav 2006). All these studies support the notion that 
the higher the public education opportunity that implies increases in the public education 
expenditure, the lower the income inequality in an economy. 
An alternative viewpoint in the education and income inequality literature shows that 
the role of expanding public education by increasing public education expenditure makes 
more unequal income distribution in a society. Galor and Moav (2000) states that if 
technological progress would increase the return to education without affecting the return to 
ability, wage inequality among educated would rise but wage inequality among the 
uneducated would decline. It infers that in a country with rapid technological progress, 
making education more affordable can lead to higher income inequality (Hendel et. al.,2005). 
The view is also supported by the finding of Gould et. al. (2001) that in many developing 
countries public education provision has expanded; as a result, marginal product of labour has 
increased during the last few decades but wage inequality or income inequality has widened 
significantly. This finding has also been observed in many advanced countries at the same 
time. One of the reasons for the positive relationship between income inequality and 
expanding public education is that households with higher income and brighter children 
contribute less in tuition fees towards the cost of the education system than households with 
lower income and less bright children (Fraja, 2002). Thus the educational system has been 
criticized as one of the major institutions by which inequality has been perpetuated, especially 
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in less developed countries (Stiglitz, 1973). All these studies are arguing that the increasing 
public education expenditure widens income inequality especially in the developing society. 
Another school of thought views that expanding public education is not the cause of 
changing income distribution of a society rather income distribution of a society causes the 
change in public education expenditure. Although Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) agree with 
the most standard models predicted that public education provision reduces income 
inequality, they show income inequality determines the public education expenditure over 
time. They develop a model in which education is only partially publicly provided and 
individuals vote over the extent to which it is subsidized.  Their model shows several results 
that are: the majority voting equilibrium consists of a positive subsidy to education but with 
only the rich and middle class obtaining an education while the poor subsidize the education; 
the efficiency consequences of subsidization with excludability may be positive for a poor 
economy, but never for a wealthy economy; economies with more unequal income 
distributions are more likely to perpetuate this inequality over time; and finally, there are 
instances in which wealthier individuals would profit from making education more costly 
since this affects their ability to exclude others and extract resources from them.The most 
distinct finding of Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) is that income inequality determines the 
public education expenditure over time while most of the literature argues reverse 
causation.We have considered this reverse causality issue in this chapter, therefore, have done 
endogenity test. 
Although there are several points of view that suggest some causal relationship 
between income inequality and public education expenditure, studies discussed above seems 
to provide a reasonable flavour of the diversity in various views, and relatively ambiguous 
position regarding the direction of causal relationship between income inequality and public 
education expenditure. The ambiguity in predictions regarding such important policy issues of 
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public allocation of education expenditure and of income inequality need to be studied 
rigorously (Ram, 1989; Sylwester 2002). We would like to follow the view that public 
education expenditure causes to change income inequality in a society like Sylwester (2000, 
2002), Jimenez (1986), Fields (1980) and others. In this chapter focus has been given to find 
the answers to the questions that whether public education expenditure reduces income 
inequality that infers public education expenditure inversely affects income inequality of a 
society. The same question has been studied by Sylwester (2002) and has found that public 
education expenditure reduces income inequality for some countries but not all sample 
countries in his study. We, therefore, highlight on the second issue that whether the difference 
in the sign (directly or inversely)of this relationship depends on the level of development of a 
country or not. To answer the first question, we replicate the Sylwester‘s (2002) estimation 
method using a different data set of 66 countries. The answer of the first question may help us 
to remove the ambiguity of Sylwester‘s (2002) findings. To answer the second question we 
have developed the theoretical model first and then empirical analysis using the same data set 
of 62 countries (4 countries are removed due to insufficient data). The answer of the second 
question sheds light both on the sign of (i.e. positively or negatively) the relationship that 
means income inequality is directly or inversely affected by the public education expenditure 
and other variables; and whether different countries have different signs because of their 
development status. The results may help us to take policy measures regarding public 
education expenditure and managing inequality of a society according to the level of 
development of the society. 
Sylwester (2002) addresses a similar question. However, this chapter differs from 
Sylwester‘s (2002) at least in three points of view. Firstly, my study focuses on both 
theoretical and empirical analysis to answer these questions. Secondly, the data set we have 
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used in our study is different from that of Sylwester (2002). We took public education 
expenditure data from the year 1980 to 1995 while Sylwester (2002) took 1960 to 1969 and 
the difference in income inequality between 2005 and 1995 that in Sylwester (2002) was 
between 1990 and 1970. Why do we choose these specific points of time 1980 to 1995 for the 
average value of GDP and 1995 to 2005 for income inequality are discussed later in the 
empirical analysis section of the chapter. Thirdly, although this chapter begins with the 
replication of Sylwester‘s (2002) method using a different data set, we have extended 
empirical analysis of this chapter with panel estimation method. We therefore can say that the 
chapter is an extension of Sylwester (2002). 
We have developed theoretical models: (i) for the countries where the total population 
is divided into skilled and unskilled categories and public education expenditure is spent on 
unskilled population to make them skilled. We call these countries as developed countries 
because unskilled population already have some level of education and additional public 
education expenditure is spent for making them as skilled labour force; (ii) for the countries 
where total population is divided into literate and illiterate categories and public education 
expenditure is spent for literate people because illiterate population do not enter into the 
public education system; hence illiterate population cannot enjoy the benefit of public 
education expenditure. We call these countries as developing countries because the majority 
of the population of these countries is out of the benefit of public education expenditure. An 
important result that emerges from these theoretical models is that increasing public education 
expenditure under conditions is Pareto-improving regardless of the development status of a 
country. In these regards, we believe that this chapter is a significant contribution to the 
existing literature. 
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5.2 Related Literature 
The famous literature of Kuznets (1955) is considered as a foundation of the 
relationship between income inequality and economic growth. Literature shows that human 
resource development via education is affecting economic growth. Therefore, income 
distribution of a society has been change due to change in public education expenditure for 
changing human resource development. We therefore, like to review the work of Kuznets 
(1955) at first.  Kuznets (1955) tries to empirically find the answers of two questions – ―does 
inequality in the distribution of income increase or decrease in the course of a country's 
economic growth? What factors determine the secular level and trends of income 
inequalities?‖ (p.1). Each country is considered as a unit  in the sample countries and data for 
each unit is around 25 year national income and different percentiles of income distribution 
has been calculated. Due to data limitations, Kuznets (1955) uses the ratio of income share of 
the richest 20 percent of the population to that of the poorest 60 percent of the population as a 
measure of inequality. The comparison are carried out between a small set of developing 
countries and a small set of developed countries. Moreover, inequality in different sectors of 
production within a country is investigated. Author concludes that the trend in income 
inequality in two sectors of a country is determined on the per capita income differential or 
income distribution or both between the sectors. There is a direct relationship between 
inequality and sectoral growth. On the other hand, for cross-country comparison, Kuznets 
(1955) suggests a broad hypothesis of development that economic progress, defined as per 
capita income, is initially increases income inequality, but this disparity ultimately go away as 
the benifits of development permeate more widely. This hypothesis suggests inverted-U 
relationship when we plot per capita income in one axis and income inequality in other axis.  
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The empirical work regarding the relationship between income inequality and public 
education expenditure in this chapter is based on Sylwester (2002). In Sylwester (2002), the 
author empirically examines the relationship between ‗Gini‘ value and public education 
expenditure using a cross section of 50 countries around the world. The change in income 
inequality valuing from 1970 to 1990 is a dependent variable, which is regressed on the 
average of the ratio of public education expenditure to GDP from 1960 to 1969. The other 
explanatory variables used in this regression equation are - the natural log of GDP per capita 
in 1970, the average number of years of schooling within the adult population in 1970, a 
dummy for whether or not a country was a member of the OECD in 1970, and regional 
dummy variables for East Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Using the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) estimation technique, findings of the paper say that the public education expenditure 
reduces income inequality of a country. The author mentions that ―the results appear to be 
stronger in the OECD countries although there is some evidence, albeit weaker, that public 
education expenditures slowly lessen income inequality in less developed countries‖ 
(Sylwester, 2002 p.49) but the author does not take any measure to show the effects separately 
for the OECD countries and the less developed countries because of small sample size. Since 
Sylwester (2002) includes 4 dummies as additive form not as a multiplicative form with any 
of the explanatory variable, the above results do not actually reflect the rates of change in 
income inequality due to public education expenditure for different regions.In this chapter, we 
have replicated Sylwester‘s (2002) method with the data sets of 64 countries starting from 
1980 to 2005. We then extend our analysis to find a specific model by sequentially 
eliminating the most insignificant variable from the general model – where both additive and 
multipricative forms of all regional dummies are considered. We also have conducted panel 
analysis for all the sample countries and separately for the groups of (i) Organisation of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, (ii) Latin America and 
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Caribbean countries and (iii) Asia and African countries. We do believe that the chapter is 
significant extension of Sylwester (2002). 
Biggs and Dutta (1999) have worked on the distributional effects of education 
expenditure to evaluate the change in long run income distribution by reductions in public 
education expenditure of the United Kingdom. In a dual education system, where public and 
private education systems coexist, they have derived a dynamic model of the earning 
distribution which is determined by an individual‘s quality of education and ability. Using the 
simulation technique, they have shown that an increase in public education expenditure 
increases the income of future generations and the dispersion of income falls; and in the other 
direction, a decrease in public expenditure reduces the participation rate which leads to higher 
earning differential. They have also argued that the participation response in public education 
in a dual education system can induce a U-shaped relation between education and average 
income. A dual education system may generate substantially higher inequality than a fully 
private education system. As demonstrated later, this chapter differs from their paper 
regarding the data set, estimation methods as well as results. 
Glomm and Ravikumar (2003) have constructed an overlapping generation model 
where each individual‘s human capital investment depends on the quality of schools. They 
have shown that the income gap between the rich and the poor may widen when the quality of 
public education is the same for all individuals. This implies public education expenditure 
does not have any impact on changing the income distribution. Moreover they have found that 
the tax effect on income inequality is also ambiguous. 
5.3 The Model 
Mincer (1974) concludes theoretically that ―the percentage increments in earnings are 
strictly proportional to the absolute differences in the time spent at school, with the rate of 
return as the coefficient of proportionality‖ (p.11). We have developed our model on the basis 
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of the reduced form of Mincer (1974) equation that says that individual‘s earnings is directly 
proportional to the year of schooling. Also assume that education is supply driven only. We 
assume that there is a competitive market for the supply of education and thus the supply of 
education is elastic. 
Education demand is a derived demand in the model. High level of education leads to 
high level of income for an individual. Thus the earning function of an individual is generated 
from the demand for education. 
5.3.1 Case A: Developed countries  
Consider a society with two types of people – one is called unskilled with a basic level 
of education, symbolised by 𝑅 and the other one is called skilled with higher levels of 
education, symbolised by 𝑆. We call these countries developed countries because the 
unskilled population already has some basic level of education and additional public 
education expenditure is spent in making them as a skilled labor force. Suppose that the wage 
of unskilled people is 
𝑊𝑅 = 𝑊(𝑏𝑒)                                                                                                                      (5.1) 
This is a minimum wage but not constant, where, 𝑏𝑒 is the quantity of basic education 
achieved. The wage of skilled people depends on the quantity of education they achieved 
which is written as follows. 
𝑊𝑆 = 𝑊 𝑕𝑒                                                                                                                        (5.2) 
where, 𝑕𝑒 is the quantity of higher education received. So it is obvious that the wage 
of skilled people is strictly greater than that of unskilled people. 
𝑕𝑒 > 𝑏𝑒 ⟹ 𝑊𝑆 > 𝑊𝑅                                                                                                       (5.3) 
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Now assume that there are 𝜆, a fraction of the total population, who are skilled and 
(1 − 𝜆) is unskilled and the total populationis 𝑁. All (1 − 𝜆), and 𝑁 are constant over time. 
Suppose public education expenditure for a unit of additional basic education for one person 
costs 𝑞; so, the total government spending on public education is 
𝑄 = 𝑞(𝑏𝑒) 1 − 𝜆 𝑁                                                                                                            (5.4) 
where, 𝑄 is total public education expenditure, 𝑞 is per unit cost of basic education,  
(𝑏𝑒) is the number of units of basic education and  1 − 𝜆 𝑁 is the fraction of the population 
achieving basic education. 
Assumption I: The expenditure on enhancing education comes from foreign aid. Thus the 
expenditure does not have any impact on government‘s budget. 
Assumption II: The expenditure  on enhancing education comes from the tax revenue 
collected from the beneficiary of the additional education supplied by the government. Thus 
government has to optimise tax revenue that makes balanced budget for the government.   
According to the assumption I: Now assume that the government receives Δ amount of 
foreign aid in the form of cash and incurs this expenditure on enhancing the basic education 
of unskilled workers. 
Thus, in the new outcome 
(𝑏𝑒)∗ = (𝑏𝑒) +
Δ
(1−𝜆)𝑞𝑁
                                                                                                       (5.5) 
and wages for the skilled are 𝑊𝑆 = 𝑊 𝑕𝑒 ,  this remains unchanged because no amount of 
foreign aid is spent on higher education. Thus, the new wage for unskilled people is 
𝑊𝑅
∗ = 𝑊(𝑏𝑒)∗ > 𝑊𝑅 = 𝑊(𝑏𝑒)                                                                                          (5.6) 
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Obviously this distribution Pareto dominates the initial distribution because  (1 − 𝜆)  fraction 
of the population is strictly better off without worsening the 𝜆 fraction of the population. At 
the same time, 
(𝑊𝑆 − 𝑊𝑅) = 𝑊 𝑕𝑒 − 𝑊(𝑏𝑒) > 𝑊𝑆 − 𝑊𝑅
∗ = 𝑊 𝑕𝑒 − 𝑊(𝑏𝑒)∗                                   (5.7) 
while the average income of unskilled people goes up without affecting the average 
income of skilled people. Hence, inequality must decrease because the variance of income 
distribution decreases. So, according to assumption I,  increasing public expenditure on basic 
level of education decreases income inequality but it is a ―Pareto improvement‖ for the 
society. We have considered that wage income is the measuring criterion of welfare of the 
population living in the society. The result shows that wage income of (1 − 𝜆)set of 
population is better-off without affecting the wage income of 𝜆 set of population of the 
economy. Thus a ―Pareto improvement‖  has occurred due to change in public education 
expenditure.  
 We, therefore, have concluded that any increase in public education expenditure spent 
to raise productivity of a constant fraction of unskilled workers, the average wage rate of 
unskilled workers increases and the variance of income distribution decreases for the 
countries. It implies that public education expenditure decreases income equality inthe 
countries that use additional expenditure for developing the quantity of basic education by 
investing on the unskilled fraction of the population and it is Pareto-improvement under some 
conditions. 
According to the assumption II: Now assume that public education expenditure is financed 
by the tax collected from the (1 − 𝜆)  proportion of the population who have enjoyed basic 
education facility, that means, an increase in 𝑄 is financed by taxing the higher wage rate 𝑊𝑅  
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of unskilled labour. The formal way of education financing is that the government initially 
borrows education expenditure and later pays back by taxing the benefitted population. For 
simplicity, assume that the interest rate of government borrowing is zero. Assume that the tax 
rate is 𝜏 which is imposed on unskilled population according to their wage premium due to 
improving the basic level of education. Thus, the tax-financing formula for total education 
expenditure is – 
𝑄 = 𝜏[𝑊 𝑏𝑒 ∗ − 𝑊 𝑏𝑒 ] 1 − 𝜆 𝑁                                                                                   (5.8) 
The take-home wage of unskilled population is 
𝑊𝑅 =  1 − 𝜏  𝑊 𝑏𝑒 
∗ − 𝑊 𝑏𝑒   1 − 𝜆 𝑁                                                                      (5.9) 
The government balanced budget is 
𝜏 𝑊 𝑏𝑒 ∗ − 𝑊 𝑏𝑒   1 − 𝜆 𝑁 = 𝑄 = 𝑞 𝑏𝑒 ∗ 1 − 𝜆 𝑁                                                  (5.10) 
Assume the wage of unskilled population follows the following functional relation 
𝑊(𝑏𝑒)∗ = 𝑊 𝑏𝑒 + (𝑏𝑒∗)𝛾  𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝛾                                                                      (5.11) 
Here, we assume that the marginal rate of return from education is greater than zero. 
The equilibrium level of basic education is now - 
𝜏 𝑊 𝑏𝑒 ∗ − 𝑊 𝑏𝑒   1 − 𝜆 𝑁 = 𝑄 = 𝑞 𝑏𝑒 ∗ 1 − 𝜆 𝑁                                                (5.12) 
(𝑏𝑒)∗ =  
𝜏
𝑞
 
1
(1−𝛾 )                                                                                                               (5.13) 
By varying tax, we can get the distributional implication of equilibrium education. 
 The wage of unskilled population becomes 
 148 
 
𝑊𝑅 𝜏 = 𝑊 𝑏𝑒 +  
𝜏
𝑞
 
1
(1−𝛾)                                                                                            (5.14) 
And the take- home wage of an unskilled worker is now 
𝑊𝑅 𝜏 =  𝑊 𝑏𝑒 +  1 − 𝜏  
𝜏
𝑞
 
1
 1−𝛾 
   
       =  𝑊 𝑏𝑒 + 𝜂(𝑞) 1 − 𝜏 𝜏
𝛾
(1−𝛾 ) 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜂 𝑞 =
(1−𝜏)
(
1
𝑞
)
1
(1−𝛾 )
                                         (5.15) 
The objective of the government is to optimise tax rate that makes balanced budget. 
The government imposes tax on wage earnings of unskilled workers according to the rate that 
optimises their take-home wage and balances government budget.Thus optimisation problem 
of the government becomes as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝜏  𝑊 𝑏𝑒 + 𝜂(𝑞) 1 − 𝜏 𝜏
𝛾
(1−𝛾)                                                                                  (5.16) 
The equilibrium tax rate imposed on unskilled population who enjoy additional basic 
education is  
𝜏∗ = 𝛾                                                                                                                               (5.17) 
The optimum condition of imposing tax is that the tax on unskilled people must be 
equal to the marginal rate of return from education. It is a Pareto-improving as long as the 
following condition holds. 
𝛾 ≥ 𝜏∗ the unskilled fraction of the population is better-off without worsening the wage of the 
skilled fraction of population and income inequality would be reduced. 
The following two conditions also affect income distribution of the economy although they 
are not Pareto improvement. 
 149 
 
𝜏∗ > 𝛾 the unskilled fraction of the population will be worse-off and income inequality would 
be widened.  
𝜏∗ < 𝛾 and additional education expenditure is financed by imposing additional taxes on a 
skilled fraction of the population, the unskilled fraction of the population will be better-off but 
the skilled fraction of the population would be worse-off although the distribution of income 
may be changed in favour of the unskilled fraction of the population but not a Pareto 
improvement. 
Proposition-1: Increasing public education expenditure to increase the basic education of 
unskilled workers is a Pareto improvement if the tax rate imposed on unskilled workers for 
financing additional basic education expenditure follows some conditions. 
Proof: see the derivation of 5.3.1. 
 
5.3.2 Case B: Developing and less developed countries  
Consider a society with two types of people – one is called illiterate and symbolised 
by 𝐿 and the other one is called educated and symbolised by 𝐻. We call these countries as 
developing countries because the majority of the population of these countries is out of the 
benefit of public education expenditure.  Suppose that the minimum wage of illiterate people 
is 
𝑊𝐿 = 𝑊                                                                                                                             (5.18) 
The wage of educated people depends on the quality of education they received which is 
written as 
𝑊𝐻 = 𝑊 𝑒                                                                                                                        (5.19) 
where, 𝑒 is the quality of education received. So it is obvious that 𝑒 > 0 implies  
𝑊𝐻 > 𝑊𝐿. 
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Now assume that there are 𝜆, a fraction of the total population, who are educated and 
(1 − 𝜆) is illiterate and the total populationis 𝑁. Suppose that public education expenditure 
for a unit of education for one person costs 𝑞, so the government total spending on public 
education is  
𝑄 = 𝑞𝑒𝜆𝑁                                                                                                                          (5.20) 
According to the assumption I: Now assume that the government receives Δ amount of 
foreign aid in the form of cash and incurs this expenditure on enhancing educational quality. 
Thus, in the new outcome 
𝑒∗ = 𝑒 +
∆
𝜆𝑞𝑁
                                                                                                                      (5.21) 
For the illiterate population, wages remain𝑊  but for the educated population wage becomes 
as follows 
𝑊𝐻
∗ = 𝑊 𝑒∗ > 𝑊𝐻 = 𝑊 𝑒                                                                                             (5.22) 
Obviously this distribution Pareto dominates the initial distribution because  𝜆  fraction of the 
population is strictly better off without worsening the (1 − 𝜆) fraction of the population. At 
the same time, 
𝑊𝐻
∗ > 𝑊𝐻 ⟹ 𝑊𝐻
∗ − 𝑊 > 𝑊𝐻 − 𝑊                                                                                  (5.23) 
So while the average income of educated people goes up without affecting the average 
income of illiterate people, inequality must increase because the variance of income 
distribution increases. So the core model shows that increasing public expenditure on 
education increases income inequality but it is a ‗Pareto-improvement‘ for the society. 
According to the assumption II: Now assume that public education expenditure is financed 
by the tax collected from the 𝜆  proportion of the population who have enjoyed education 
facility that means an increase in 𝑄 is financed by taxing the higher wage rate 𝑊𝐻. For 
simplicity, assume that the interest rate of government borrowing is zero. Assume that the tax 
 151 
 
rate is 𝜏 , which is imposed on an educated population according to their wage premium due 
to education. Thus the tax-financing formula of the government for total education 
expenditure is as follows. 
𝑄 = 𝜏 𝑊 𝑒 − 𝑊  𝜆𝑁                                                                                                        (5.24) 
The take-home wage of an educated person is 
𝑊𝐻 =  𝑊 +  1 − 𝜏 𝑊 𝑒                                                                                                  (5.25) 
The government balanced budget is 
𝜏 𝑊 𝑒 − 𝑊  𝜆𝑁 = 𝑄 = 𝑞𝑒𝜆𝑁                                                                                          (5.26) 
Assume the wage of the educated population follows the following functional relation  
𝑊 𝑒 = 𝑊 + 𝑒𝛾𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒 0 < 𝛾                                                                                           (5.27) 
That means, we assume that the marginal rate of return from education is greater than zero. 
The equilibrium level of education is  
𝜏 𝑊 𝑒 − 𝑊  𝜆𝑁 = 𝑄 = 𝑞𝑒𝜆𝑁 ⇒ 𝑒 = (
𝜏
𝑞
)
1
(1−𝛾)                                                                 (5.28) 
By varying tax, we can get the distributional implication of equilibrium education. The wage 
of an educated person is  
𝑊𝐻 𝜏 = 𝑊 + (
𝜏
𝑞
)
1
(1−𝛾)                                                                                                        (5.29) 
And the take- home wage is  
𝑊𝐻 𝜏 =  𝑊 +  1 − 𝜏  
𝜏
𝑞
 
1
 1−𝛾 
   
=  𝑊 + 𝜂(𝑞) 1 − 𝜏 𝜏
𝛾
(1−𝛾 ) 𝑤𝑕𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝜂 𝑞 =
(1−𝜏)
(
1
𝑞
)
1
(1−𝛾 )
                                                            (5.30) 
 
The objective of the government is to optimise tax rate that makes balanced budget. 
The government imposes tax on wage earnings of unskilled workers according to the rate that 
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optimises their take-home wage and balances government budget.Thus optimisation problem 
of the government becomes as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝜏  𝑊 + 𝜂(𝑞) 1 − 𝜏 𝜏
𝛾
(1−𝛾)                                                                                       (5.31) 
The equilibrium tax rate is  
𝜏∗ = 𝛾                                                                                                                              (5.32) 
The tax on educated people must be equal to the marginal rate of return from 
education. It is a Pareto-improving as long asfollowing conditions hold. 
 𝛾 ≥ 𝜏∗ equilibrium tax rate is equal to the marginal benefit of education. It is a Pareto-
improving because the educated fraction of the population is better-off without worsening the 
illiterate fraction of the population.  
When the marginal rate of return of educated people is very much higher than the tax 
rate imposed on them to finance the additional cost of education, the situation is also a Pareto-
improving but widens income inequality in the society.  
𝛾 < 𝜏∗ if the tax rate is lower than the marginal rate of return from education, 
educated population will be worse-off but income inequality may be reduced.  
Proposition-2: Increasing public education expenditure of the educated population of a 
society widens income inequality but it is Pareto-improving under certain assumptions. 
Proof: see the derivation and discussion of 5.3.2. 
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5.4 Methodology and Data 
5.4.1 Estimation methods 
5.4.1.1. Replication of Sylwester’s (2002) estimation method 
To answer the first research question of this chapter, we have replicated Sylwester‘s 
(2002) estimation method using our data sets. We discussed Sylwester (2002) estimation 
method briefly in background literature section; Sylwester (2002) conducts a cross-country 
analysis by regressing the difference in income inequality between 1990 and 1970 on the 
average value of the percentage of public education expenditure from 1960 to 1969, log of 
GDP, average years of schooling in 1970, log value of the population in 1970 and countries 
dummies through OLS estimation technique. We are going to replicate the same cross-country 
analysis using our data set using Sylwester‘s (2002) method of estimation. Doing this allows 
us to compare our results with Sylwester‘s and to make comments on the consistency of 
Sylwester‘s findings with a different set of data. Then, we pursue a model specification 
strategy by eliminating sequentially the most insignificant variable from the general model. 
Before going to the empirical model, we will explain the definitions and symbols of our 
dependent and independent variables. 
The difference in income inequality between 2005 and 1995 (∆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄) is the 
dependent variable21, regressed on the average value of public education expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP  𝑃𝐸𝐸95𝑖  from 1980 to 1995. The first reason for choosing 15 years 
average value of public education expenditure is that a child needs at least 15 years of 
education (12 years in high school plus 3 years in a job-related specialisation) before entering 
the job market as a skilled worker. Thus, a child, who started school in 1980, and continued 
until 1995 means that he enjoyed the full benefit of public education expenditure before 
                                                          
21 The italic letters in parenthesis indicates symbol that is used for representing the variable in the model.  
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coming to the job market. Therefore, we obtain a reflection of the impact of public 
expenditure on his income. However, the income of a person who entered into the job market 
15 years earlier than the child then the income of the person reflects an income without the 
benefit of public education expenditure. We will establish a causal relationship on the 
difference in income distribution between a person enjoying the benefit of public education 
expenditure and a person who does not. Thus, we choose 15 years average values of public 
education expenditure as independent variable. 
Another reason for choosing 1980 as the beginning year is the availability of public 
education expenditure data. The United Nations Education Science and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) is the most reliable source of cross country and time series data on education (this 
is because the organisation mostly compiles data from the original census or survey of each 
country). The cross country and time series data on public education expenditure are reported 
from 1970 to 2010 on UNESCO‘s website. Unfortunately, no data are available for the most 
of our sample countries from 1970 to 1979 and from 2005 to 2010. We, therefore, choose the 
average of public education expenditure as the percentage of GDP during 1980 to 1995 in this 
chapter as per Sylwester‘s (2002) method. 
Another advantage of taking 15 years‘ average is that some countries do not have all 
15 observations of the corresponding 15 years, so we then take an average of the available 
observations. As a result, our empirical estimation does not miss any country‘s information 
and our total number of countries is 66 throughout the cross-country analysis. 
We have taken the difference in income inequality between 2005 and 1995 while in 
Sylwester (2002), it was between 1990 and 1970.  We wanted to take the difference in income 
inequality of 15 years from 1995 to 2010 so that we could evaluate the difference between the 
income distribution of a person enjoying the benefit of public expenditure and that of a person 
without it in order to consider the impact of public education expenditure on income 
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distribution. However, we could not due to the limitation of income inequality data. We have 
cross-country data on income inequality at best until 2006, which is collected from the World 
Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER). We still believe that the difference 
of income inequality between 2005 and 1995 does not change our empirical results 
significantly. The average years of schooling of the adult population is  𝐴𝑌𝑆95𝑖 , natural log 
of GDP is  𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃95𝑖 , natural log of total population is (𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖); regional dummy for OECD 
countries is  𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖 , for Latin America and the Caribbean countries is  𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖 , for Asia 
and east European countries is (𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖) and for African countries is (𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖). The regional 
dummy (𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖) is considered as base region in the cross-country regression analysis. The 
three dummies are included as an additive form only as Sylwester (2002) and the following 
specification of the model is estimated by the OLS technique after Sylwester (2002). 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝐸𝐸95𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐴𝑌𝑆95𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃95𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃95𝑖 + 𝛼5𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛼6𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖 + 𝛼7𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  ; 𝑖 = 66                                                              (5.33) 
 
After replicating Sylwester (2002), we specify the general model including all 
explanatory variables mentioned in equation (5.33) and dummy variables as well as public 
defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP  𝑃𝐷𝐸95𝑖  and political stability  𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋95𝑖  for 
getting the most significant determinants of explaining income inequality of a country. All 
dummies are included both as additive and multiplicative form with all explanatory variables.  
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The general model is as follows. 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝐸95𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑌𝑆95𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃95𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃95𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝐷𝐸95𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋95𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽9𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽10𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛽11𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽13𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽14𝐴𝑌𝑆𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖
+ 𝛽15𝐴𝑌𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽16𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽17𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽18𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖
+ 𝛽19𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽20𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽21𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽22𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖
+ 𝛽23𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽24𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽25𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽26𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖
+ 𝛽27𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖                                                                                     (5.34) 
 
where, 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖  is the average of public education expenditure multiplied by the 
dummy variable 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷. 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖  is the average of public education expenditure multiplied by the dummy variable 
𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀. 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖  is the average of public education expenditure multiplied by the dummy variable 
𝐴𝐴𝐸. 
𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖  is the average years of schooling multiplied by the dummy variable 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷. 
𝐴𝑌𝑆𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖  is the average years of schooling multiplied by the dummy variable 𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀. 
𝐴𝑌𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖  is the average years of schooling multiplied by the dummy variable 𝐴𝐴𝐸. 
𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖  is the log value of GDP multiplied by the dummy variable 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷. 
𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖  is the log value of GDP multiplied by the dummy variable 𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀. 
𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑂𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖  is the log value of GDP multiplied by the dummy variable 𝐴𝐴𝐸. 
𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖  is the log value of population multiplied by the dummy variable 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷. 
𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖  is the log value of population multiplied by the dummy variable 𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀. 
𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖  is the log value of population multiplied by the dummy variable 𝐴𝐴𝐸. 
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𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖  is the public defence expenditure multiplied by the dummy variable 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷. 
𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖  is the public defence expenditure multiplied by the dummy variable 𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀. 
𝑃𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖  is the public defence expenditure multiplied by the dummy variable 𝐴𝐴𝐸. 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑖  is the political stability multiplied by the dummy variable 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷. 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖  is the political stability multiplied by the dummy variable 𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀. 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖  is the political stability multiplied by the dummy variable 𝐴𝐴𝐸. 
𝐴𝐹𝑅𝑖  is considered as base region. 
𝜗𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜗
2)is the disturbance term with zero mean and constant variance. 
 
5.4.1.2 Estimation method of cross-country analysis 
As Sylwester (2002) uses the OLS estimation method, we also have adopted the same 
technique for all the estimation process in the cross-country analysis. The OLS method is the 
best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) since the specified functional form of general equation 
is both linear in parameters and variables. The OLS estimate is the best if it satisfies classical 
assumptions of normality, homoscadasticity and is without serial correlation of error 
distribution. 
5.4.2 Endogeneity Test 
The specified functional form might suffer endogeneity problem due to omitted 
variables, measurement errors or simultaneous system of equation. We, therefore, have 
performed endogeneity test before applying the OLS estimation technique. We have chosen 
four instrumental variables for the variable PEE95 (public education expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP). The study (Fernandez and Roserson, 1995) argues income inequality 
causes change in public education expenditure; so, we choose two income inequality 
measures as instruments of public education expenditure. These two instrumental variables 
are: Gini coefficient of the year 1990 (Gini 90)and Gini coefficient of the year 1995 (Gini 95). 
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Another two instrumental variables are: natural log of value of the total number of student 
enrolment in 1995 (laerm95) and the gross enrolment ratio of a country in 1995 (gerr95). 
These two instruments have been chosen because of the strong correlation (though not 
statistically significant at 5 percent level) of these two variables with public education 
expenditure but weak correlation with difference in income inequality between 2005 and 1995 
(∆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄).   
Table 5.3: Result of Hausman (1978) Endogeneity Test 
Dependent Variable: (∆𝑰𝑵𝑬) 
Method: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
 
Variable Coefficients 
b(IV) 
Coefficients 
B(OLS) 
Differences S. E. of 
Difference 
PEE95 .0368696 .0031894 .0336802 .0228897 
AYS95 -1.552104 -.6786428        -.8734611 1.868572 
LGDP95 -11.02915 -6.636018 -4.39313 6.019791 
PDE95 -1.745352 -.8356885 -.9096634 1.663456 
POLX95 1.328829 .6029799 .7258489         .9186493 
LPOP95 -.2416163 -1.522791 1.281175         2.378609 
OECD 22.00184 12.45444 9.547399         15.01295 
LAAM 9.749583 7.146572 2.603011         10.46078 
AAE -1.389285 7.042761    -8.432046         7.367 
 b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from OLS regress 
Null Hypothesis, Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(9) = 2.17 
Prob>chi2 =      0.9886 
 
We are estimating the model given in equation (5.33) including public defence 
expenditure (𝑃𝐷𝐸95) variable with instrumental variable (IV) and OLS estimation technique. 
Estimated results are given respectively in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 in the appendix. We then 
test the difference of estimated coefficients between these two estimates. If the difference of 
estimated coefficients is not systematic, the model does not suffer endogeneity problem. This 
testing method is usually known as Hausman (1978) endogeneity test. The endogeneity test 
result is given in Table 5.3.The following estimated results show that the specified model 
does not suffer endogeneity problem anymore. 
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5.4.3 The panel analysis 
In panel analysis, since we have huge missing observations in our dependent (Gini 
coefficient as a measure of income inequality) and independent variable (public education 
expenditure as percentage of GDP), we have taken three time points (t=3) of the dependent 
variable which is every five years point 1995, 2000 and 2005. If a country does not have an 
observation in any specific time point, we have considered the nearest one. The independent 
variable, public education expenditure as percentage of GDP is five years average value that 
means the average value of 1981 to 1985 is considered as the observation of 1985, average 
value of 1986 to 1990 is considered as the observation of 1990 and the average value of 1991 
to 1995 is considered as the observation of 1995. The reason of taking only 3 (three) points of 
time in panel estimation is the unavailability of panel data for almost all the variables used in 
this study. Most of the countries in our sample do not have complete time series data of public 
education expenditure variable except some OECD countries. Although OECD countries also 
have some missing observations, other countries have more than 50 percent missing 
observation of this variable. That means out of 15 observations (1981 to 1995), we only have 
on average 6 to 7 observations for a country and they are scattered from 1981 to 1995. For 
example - Argentina has 2 observations from 1981 to1985, 3 observations from 1986 to 1990 
and 3 observations from 1991 to 1995. Similarly, Brazil has only 3 observations- 1 
observation in 1981, 1 observation in 1989 and 1 observation in 1994. We, therefore, have 
taken 3 values which are average of 1981 to1985, 1986 to 1990 and 1991 to 1995. As a result, 
we can manage at least 3 observations of this variable for each country in our panel 
estimation. Moreover, the variable, average years of schooling, has five years panel data in 
―the Baro-Lee Educational Attainment Data set‖ which is another important explanatory 
variable in our panel analysis. Thus, we have taken 3 observations of all other independent 
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variables using the same procedure. Two exceptions are: for public defence expenditure 
(PDE) variable, which is considered at 1987, 1990 and 1995 points of time; and for 
corruption perception index (CORP) variable, which covers 1995, 2000 and 2005 points of 
time due to data limitations. The two advantages of taking lagged explanatory variables are- 
firstly, allow enough time to feel the complete effect of change in explanatory variables on the 
dependent variable. Secondly, it is less likely that estimated results suffer any reverse 
causality problem because it is very much likely in logical point of view that current values of 
all explanatory variables (public education expenditure, GDP per capita, years of schooling, 
defence expenditure, political stability) affect future values of income inequality but is 
unlikely that current values of all explanatory variables (public education expenditure, GDP 
per capita, years of schooling, defence expenditure, political stability) affect past values of 
income inequality. We, therefore, can say that our panel data set is not perfectly balanced. 
There are several attractive features of panel analysis if one has the panel data set.  
Firstly, panel data analysis is very helpful to deal with the heterogeneity in the micro unit, in 
my case it is individual country. The heterogeneity means that all these countries are different 
from one another in a fundamental unmeasured way. Therefore, using cross-section analysis 
one cannot include all relevant variables which are appropriate for each country. As a result, 
cross-section analysis might produce biased results while panel data analysis helps to correct 
this problem. One might ask why we have conducted the cross-section analysis in this chapter 
before doing panel analysis. The reason for doing this is to answer the first research question 
which is the same as Sylwester (2002); thus, we think it would be better to replicate 
Sylwester‘s (2002) method using a different data set. Secondly, panel analysis uses more 
variability by combining variation across the country and over time which helps to alleviate 
the multicollinearity problem. We know the multicollinearity problem can be reduced by 
adding more observations. Since we are adding more information in panel analysis, such as- 
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time series data for each variable and each country, it helps to alleviate the multicollinearity 
problem.  Thirdly, panel analysis can address the turnover question, that means one can repeat 
the same question to same unit every time in the data set because the data track a common 
sample of country over different years. Finally, it helps to get a dynamic adjustment which 
cross-section data analysis does not. There is hardly any work using panel estimation 
technique to find causal relationships between income inequality and public education 
expenditure. We, therefore, do believe that the study obviously gives some insights into the 
area of income inequality literature. 
 
5.4.3.1 The fixed effects model 
The general functional form of income inequality (𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄) regressed on public 
education expenditure is (PEE), average years of schooling is (AYS), natural log of GDP is 
(LGDP), natural log of population is (LPOP), public defence expenditure is (PDE), political 
stability is (POLX) and corruption perception index is (CORP). No dummy variable is 
included in the specified general model because we have separated 62 countries into four 
regional groups- the (OECD) which covers 25 OECD member countries; the (LAAM) which 
covers 16 Latin American and the Caribbean countries (including Chile and Mexico two 
OECD member countries); the (DAAE) which includes 8 developing countries of Africa, Asia 
and East Europe and the (LAA) which includes 13 least developed African and Asian 
countries. We know, in the fixed effects estimation method, every individual entity has been 
assigned a dummy to separate from another entity. The specified general function is written as 
follows. 
 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝐸95𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑌𝑆95𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃95𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃95𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝐷𝐸95𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋95𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡  𝑖 = 1 … 62 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 1,2,3               (5.35) 
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where, 𝜗𝑖~𝑁 0, 𝜎𝜗
2 is an identically and independently distributed (iid) distribution, 
for each country.We are estimating the difference from the mean of the equation (35) by OLS 
method which gives us the fixed effects estimate. 
 
 5.4.3.2 The random effects model 
Instead of treating 𝛽𝑖  as a fixed constant, this specification assumes that 𝛽𝑖  is drawn 
from an identically and independently distributed (iid) distribution, 𝛽𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇
2)  and is 
uncorrelated both with the 𝜗𝑖and with the independent variables. The specification then 
becomes as follows. 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝐸95𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑌𝑆95𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃95𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃95𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝐷𝐸95𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋95𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖                                                            (5.36) 
 
where, 𝛽 is the mean of the random intercepts 𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖   and the errors 𝜇𝑖and 𝜗𝑖  in 
the composite error term with variances 𝜎𝜇
2 and 𝜎𝜗
2respectively. Using the generalized least 
squares (GLS), equation (5.36) gives us the random effects estimate. 
 
5.4.4 Specifications tests: Fixed Effects vs Random Effects methods 
―Econometric analysis becomes much more than estimation and inference in the 
context of a given model‖ (Kennedy 1979, p. 71) and ―specification tests form one of the 
most important areas for research in econometrics‖ (Hausman 1978, p.1251). That is why, 
econometric specification analysis plays an important role in finding the corresponding facts 
of a research work, thereby, defining a correctly specified model is the first task of conducting 
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an empirical research. We have used Hausman (1978)22 test for choosing one specific 
estimation method between fixed effects and random effects. 
Table 5.4: Empirical results of Hausman(1978) for Fixed vs Random Effects tests 
 All 
countries 
OECD 
countries 
LAAM 
countries  
DAAE 
countries 
AAE 
countries 
Hausman test 
statistic, 𝝌𝑲
𝟐  
𝜒7
2= 8.18  
 
𝜒7
2= 11.47  
 
𝜒7
2= 0.99 𝜒7
2= 10.95 𝜒7
2= 5.03 
Probability value 
>𝝌𝑲
𝟐  
0.317 0.089 0.995 0.141 0.657 
Decision rule Cannot 
reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
Cannot reject 
the null 
hypothesis 
Cannot reject 
the null 
hypothesis 
Cannot 
reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
Cannot reject 
the null 
hypothesis 
Preferred method The 
random 
effects 
model is 
preferred 
The random 
effects model 
is preferred 
The random 
effects model 
is preferred 
The 
random 
effects 
model is 
preferred 
The random 
effects model 
is preferred 
Note: 𝐾  represents degree of freedom of 𝜒2- distribution. 
We conduct Hausman (1978) test for all the countries first and then redo for all four 
groups of countries (the (OECD), the (LAAM), the (DAAE), and the (LAA) countries) 
separately. 
According to Hausman‘s (1978) test results, given in Table 5.4, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of ―no systematic difference between the estimated coefficients between fixed 
effects and random effects‖. That means random effects method is preferred to fixed effects 
method. We, therefore, have conducted random effects estimation technique for all groups of 
countries. 
5.4.5 Data  
 The study covers 64 countries23 around the world in case of cross-country analysis. 
Among these countries, 27 are OECD member countries, 16 countries are from Latin America 
                                                          
22 See detail about Hausman (1978) for testing process. 
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and the Caribbean (LAAM) except countries those are members of OECD (Chile, Mexico), 8 
newly developing countries are from Africa, Asia and East Europe (DAAE) and 13 least 
developed countries are from Africa and Asia (LAA)except countries those are members of 
OECD (Japan, Israel, and Turkey). 
In case of panel analysis, 62 countries are included. Four countries (Slovenia, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, and Lithuania) are excluded from it because of unavailability of 
observations on the dependent variable for these countries. Chile and Mexico are considered 
in both the OECD and the LAAM groups because these two countries‘ per capita GDP is far 
below than the other members of OECD, but they are very similar to the members of LAAM. 
We do not include Japan, Turkey and Israel in either of the DAAE group or the LAA group 
because of the enormous difference in per capita GDP with other members of these groups. 
These categorisations help us to compare the estimated results among the OECD, LAAM, 
DAAE and LAA groups of countries assuming that the OECD group is considered as highly 
developed countries, the LAAM group is considered as developing countries, the DAAE group 
is considered as newly developing countries and the LAA group is considered as the least 
developing countries around the world. Comparing the results among these groups will help 
us to answer the second research question of this chapter which is - whether the impact of 
education expenditure on income inequality varies according to the development status of a 
country or not. 
Gini coefficients – an income inequality measure (INEQ) 
We use Gini coefficients to measure the degree of income inequality as Sylwester 
(2002) does. The data of Gini value are taken from the WIDER (The World Institute for 
Development Economics Research). The advantage of using the Gini coefficient is the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
23 List of countries is given in appendix of chapter five 
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availability of panel data and the widespread use of the Gini coefficient as a measure of 
income inequality (Sylwester, 2002). In cross-section analysis, we take the difference of Gini 
values between 2005 and 1995 as dependent variable – the change in income inequality. The 
variable is symbolised as ∆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖  where ′𝑖′  stands for country in cross-country analysis and 
is symbolised as ∆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡  in panel analysis, where ′𝑖′ and ′𝑡′represent country and time 
respectively. 
In panel analysis, we have taken every 5th year observation of Gini value for each 
country starting from the year 1995 to the year 2005. We, therefore, have taken 3 observations 
of Gini value for each country (Year 1995, 2000 and 2005). However, if a country does not 
have Gini value in the particular sample year, we have taken the observation of the nearest 
next year or the earlier year. Due to the unavailability of data, we are not able to take all the 
observations of 15 years; and about this the study (Sylwester, 2002 p. 45) asserts that ―it is 
doubtful that the level of income inequality greatly changes over 1 or 2 years‖. 
Public education expenditure as percentage of GDP (PEE) 
The public education expenditure as a percentage of GDP is the fundamental 
explanatory variable used in this study. The data for this variable are taken from the UNESCO 
during the period 1980 to 1995. In cross-country analysis, we have taken the average of 15 
years‘ public education expenditure as percentage of GDP.  The variable is symbolised as 
𝑃𝐸𝐸95𝑖 . 
In panel analysis, we have considered every 5 years‘ average of public education 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP at a time point. We have taken 3 time points for the 
variable at 1985 (average of 1981 to 1985), 1990 (average of 1986 to 1990) and 1995 
(average of 1991 to 1995). We have chosen lagged public education expenditure because the 
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impact of these expenditures on income distribution takes years to be felt completely 
(Sylwester, 2002). The variable is symbolised as 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑡 . 
If any country does have some missing observations during the 15 years, the average 
is calculated on the basis of available years of observations. If only one observation is 
available in any five year segment for a country, we have considered that observation as an 
average of those five years. Using the average of public education expenditure as percentage 
of GDP is a good instrument for comparison among countries as it reflects how much 
importance is given by the government on education sector relative to other sectors during the 
last 15 years, and also because the percentage is a non-scale measure. 
Natural log of gross domestic product (LGDP) 
The natural log of GDP per capita in the year 1995 is taken as an explanatory variable 
to capture an initial level of the development of a country and so does Sylwester (2002). It is 
assumed that ―higher income countries might be better equipped to narrow income inequality 
than are poorer nations‖ (Sylwester, 2002 p.45). The variable is symbolised as 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃95𝑖  in 
cross-country analysis. 
In panel analysis, we have taken data on the natural log of GDP per capita as an 
explanatory variable. The values of the natural log of GDP in the year 1985, 1990 and 1995 
are considered as three time points of the panel data set. Per capita GDP is measured in 
current international dollar unit and the source is the IMF (International Monetary Fund, 
World Economic Outlook Database, October 2009).The variable is symbolised as  𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 . 
Average years of schooling of adult population (AYS) 
As a proxy measure of human capital, the average years of schooling of the adult 
populationare included in the study ―to control for existing human capital when trying to 
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ascertain any effects from additional expenditures‖ (Sylwester, 2002 p. 45). Fields (1980) 
points out a partial positive relationship between mean schooling level and earnings inequality 
and a positive relationship between schooling inequality and earning inequality, while the 
model predicts a reduction in earnings inequality if schooling inequality is reduced. The data 
for this variable is taken from the Barro and Lee (1994). In case of cross-country analysis, we 
have used the data on average years of schooling of the adult population in the year 1995. The 
variable is symbolised as 𝐴𝑌𝑆95𝑖 . 
For panel analysis, the data on this variable have been taken for the year 1985, 1990 
and 1995; because in our panel data, we have considered those three time points for our other 
two independent variables. Five year panel data around the world are available in this data 
source and the variable is symbolised as 𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑖𝑡 . 
Although Sylwester (2002) uses the log of the total population, public defence 
expenditure, political stability, black market premium and a few other variables to cheque the 
robustness and the reverse causality of estimated initial regression of the change in income 
inequality on public education expenditure , log of GDP, average years of schooling and 4 
(four) regional dummies (OECD, East Asia, Latin America and Africa); we have included 
these variables as explanatory variables in the general regression model. From this general 
model, we have sequentially eliminated the most insignificant variable to develop a specific 
model where most of the variables are significant and have good prediction power. 
Natural log of total population (LPOP) 
Sylwester (2002) uses the natural log of the total population of a country to control the 
size of the country and also to check the robustness of the baseline estimation. We have 
included this variable as an explanatory variable in the general model. Morley (1981) reports 
that population growth rate is directly related to the degree of income inequality. That means 
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the higher the total population, the higher the income inequality and vice versa if other things 
are controlled. The data on this variable are taken from Barro and Lee (1994). Here, the unit 
of measure of this variable is million and we have transferred this level form value into a 
natural log form. In cross-country analysis, the natural log of total population in the year 1995 
is considered and the variable is symbolised as 𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃95𝑖 . 
In panel analysis, we have taken the data for the year 1985, 1990 and 1995 because of 
choosing three time points. The variable is symbolised as 𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑖𝑡 . 
Political stability (POLX) 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) say that political instability enhances income inequality 
that means countries having more income inequality are more likely to have prolonged 
political instability. We have taken democracy minus autocracy as proxy of the political 
stability of a country. Although democracy is considered as a good political system and 
autocracy is bad, in both cases the political movement can strongly affect the economic 
activity of a country. That is why we have chosen democracy minus autocracy as an indicator 
of the political stability of a country. Both democracy and autocracy are measured in 0-10 
scale along with these three values -66, -77 and -88. These three values are defined as -66 for 
interruption, -77 for interregnum and -88 for transition. We have considered these 3 irregular 
codes as the highest level of autocracy and have assigned a value of 10 in autocracy index. 
Both the scales are ascending in order that means 0 is the lowest level of democracy or 
autocracy and 10 is the highest level. The data for this variable is compiled from the website 
of Paul Hensel‘s International Economic Data website. In cross-country analysis, we have 
used 15 years‘ (1980 to 1995) average of this variable and is symbolised as 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋95𝑖 . 
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In panel analysis, we have chosen every 5 years‘ average of 3 time points (1985, 1990, 
and 1995). The variable is symbolised as 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝑋𝑖𝑡  . 
Public defence expenditure (PDE) 
The empirical estimates of Abell (1994) reveal that military spending is associated 
with increasing income inequality, after controlling for macro-economic variables such as 
taxes, economic growth, interest rates, inflation and non-military spending. We, therefore, 
have included this as an independent variable in the specification of the general model. 
Military spending as percentage of GDP as we have called public defence expenditure (PDE) 
data are taken from the World Bank. The source covers the data from 1987 to 2007. We have 
taken the average of military spending as percentage of GDP from the year 1987 to 1995 in 
cross-country analysis and the variable is symbolised as 𝑃𝐷𝐸95𝑖 . 
In panel analysis, the observation of 1987 is considered as the observation of time 
point 1985, and the average of 1988 to 1990 is considered as time point 1990. The average of 
1991 to 1995 is considered as the observation of 1995. The variable is symbolised as 𝑃𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡  . 
 
Corruption perception index (CORP) 
Gupta et. al. (1998) reports that high and rising corruption increases income inequality 
and poverty by reducing economic growth. We, therefore, have included corruption 
perception index (CORP) as an explanatory variable only in panel analysis. The corruption 
perception index developed by the Transparency International covers a wide range of 
corruption measures. Since the Transparency International has started preparing the CORP 
index since 1995 for developed countries and later on it covers nearly 139 countries around 
the world, the data are available from the year 1995 and later on. We, therefore, have used this 
variable in panel analysis only. We have chosen the observation of 1995 as the observation 
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for the time point 1985, the average of 1996 to 2000 as the observation for the time point 
1990 and the average of 2001 to 2005 is considered as the observation for the time point 
1995. Although all the other independent variables are lagged values, the data on CORP 
variable is at the same time points of dependent variable due to the unavailability of data 
earlier. The variable is symbolised as 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 . 
 
5.5 Empirical Results 
5.5.1 Descriptive Analysis 
 In this study, we have conducted cross-country estimation of 66 countries and 
a panel estimation of 62 countries. As mentioned earlier, we have dropped four countries in 
panel analysis due to the unavailability of data for all variables. In cross-country analysis, 
three regional dummies- the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAAM) and Asia and East Europe (AAE) are 
included; and Africa is considered as base region. All these dummies are included both as 
additive forms and multiplicative forms with each explanatory variable in the cross-country 
analysis. Including regional dummies helps us to evaluate the consequences of public 
education expenditure on income inequality in these regions and to distinguish the 
consequences among the regions. However, five separate panel estimations have been done 
deliberately; such as - for all countries (62 countries), for the highly developed OECD (25 
countries), for the developing LAAM (16 countries), for the newly developing Africa, Asia 
and East European countries (DAAE) (8 countries) and for the least developed Africa and 
Asian countries (LAA) (13 countries); to avoid prospective heterogeneity problem and for 
distinguishing estimated results from all countries to four different regions. These separate 
estimation results facilitate us to answer the second research question of this chapter- whether 
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the development status of a country determines the impact of public education expenditure on 
income inequality. 
The following descriptive statistics are based on the panel data sets for all four 
regions. Therefore, income inequality (Gini) variable covers time points 1995, 2000 and 2005; 
and independent variables- public education expenditure as percentage of GDP (PEE), per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP), average years of schooling of adult population (AYS) 
and political stability measure (POLX) wrap three lag time points 1985, 1990 and 1995; but 
the public defence expenditure (PDE) covers 1987, 1990 and 1995; and corruption perception 
index (CORP) covers 1995, 2000 and 2005 time points. Table 5.5 shows the descriptive 
statistics of all the variables. 
The statistics indicate that on average income inequality is the highest in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (LAAM) region compared to the other three regions- the OECD, 
the DAAE and the LAA. The highly developed OECD countries have the lowest average 
income inequality followed by the DAAE and the LAA. The standard deviation of the income 
inequality distribution is the lowest in the LAAM region among these four regions which 
implies that the individual value is closer to the average value. We, therefore, infer that 
income inequality is more severe in the LAAM region than that of the other regions. 
On average 4.7 percent public education expenditure as percentage of GDP is 
allocated in the OECD countries, which is the highest among these regions, followed by the 
DAAE and the LAAM; and the lowest allocation is in the LAA region. Naturally the average 
GDP per capita is the highest in the OECD region, which is; nearly double than the DAAE 
region, three times larger than the LAAM region and fifteen times bigger than the LAA region. 
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Table 5.5: Descriptive Statistics 
Var. OECD countries 
Obs. Mean 
 
Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini 75 34.73 7.98 23.00 61.40 
PEE 75 4.70 1.44 1.47 8.00 
GDP 75 10872.34 4529.28 2756.20 24724.92 
AYS 75 8.68 1.98 3.55 12.23 
PDE 75 2.86 2.58 0.50 15.40 
POLX 75 8.11 4.57 -7.00 10.00 
POP 75 34.29 50.16 0.36 245.13 
CORP 75 7.17 1.95 2.99 10.00 
Var. LAAM countries 
Obs. Mean 
 
Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini 48 52.55 5.76 37.90 62.15 
PEE 48 3.39 1.59 1.15 7.35 
GDP 48 3384.54 1386.39 1638.64 6578.11 
AYS 48 5.79 1.47 2.77 8.40 
PDE 48 1.80 1.04 0.50 4.90 
POLX 48 -2.06 22.45 -10.00 10.00 
POP 48 20.65 33.65 1.96 141.26 
CORP 48 3.67 1.43 2.10 7.55 
Var. DAAE countries 
Obs. Mean 
 
Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini 24 39.75 11.27 23.10 59.00 
PEE 24 4.35 1.11 2.45 6.72 
GDP 24 5108.85 3073.13 1089.43 13275.17 
AYS 24 7.12 1.94 4.40 10.81 
PDE 24 2.94 1.34 0.20 4.60 
POLX 24 3.13 6.05 -7.00 10.00 
POP 24 16.36 16.01 0.97 54.70 
CORP 24 4.99 1.78 2.79 9.40 
Var. LAA countries 
Obs. Mean 
 
Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini 39 43.71 9.52 28.97 62.50 
PEE 39 3.06 1.69 0.83 7.08 
GDP 39 730.77 372.55 251.12 1532.88 
AYS 39 4.09 2.05 0.62 8.92 
PDE 39 2.36 1.61 0.40 7.00 
POLX 39 -4.97 5.34 -10.00 8.00 
POP 39 118.11 274.64 5.74 1109.74 
CORP 39 2.63 0.61 1.70 4.10 
 
Having a higher average of GDP and allocating higher percentage on education 
expenditure might help to keep a low level of income inequality. The mean value of the 
average years of schooling of the adult population is 8.68 years for the OECD region followed 
by the DAAE region (7.12 year), while the average year of education for the LAAM region is 
5.79 years and for the LAA region is 4.09 years.  The average allocation on public defence 
expenditure is the highest in the DAAE region (2.94 percent of GDP) followed by the OECD 
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(2.86 percent of GDP). The least developed LAA region has higher defence expenditure (2.36 
percent of GDP) than that of the developing LAAM region (1.80 percent). However, the LAA 
region is politically the most instable among the other three regions. The OECD region is the 
most politically stable followed by the DAAE region. The average population is the highest in 
the LAA region (118.11 million) followed by the OECD (34.29 million), the LAAM region 
(20.65 million); and the poorest in the AAE region compared to the OECD region (34.29 
million), the LAAM region (20.65 million) and the DAAE region (16.36 million). The LAA 
region is considered as the most corrupted region among all these regions. 
 
5.5.2 Replication of Sylwester (2002) method using different sample countries and data set 
 
The following result is found by using Sylwester‘s (2002) estimation method with 66 
sample countries (different from Sylwester, 2002) and time series data set started from 1980 
to 1995 for explanatory variables and from 1995 to 2005 for explained variable. The result 
helps us to verify the consistency of Sylwester‘s (2002) finding and for answering the first 
question of this chapter. We have replicated the following equation of Sylwester (2002, p.46). 
 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝐸𝐸95𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃95𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑌𝑆95𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷95𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐿𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑖
+ 𝛽6𝐴𝐴𝐸𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖                                                                                                     (5.53) 
The estimated results are shown in equation (5.54). Unlike Sylwester (2002), we have 
found the public education expenditure to be statistically strongly significant at less than 1% 
level with a positive sign of the coefficient and log of GDP is significant at less than 10% 
level with a negative sign. None of the regional dummies are statistically significant. 
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ΔINEQ9505 = 33.25*       + 0.003 PEE8095*** – 4.27LGDP95* + 0.077 AYS95  
                        (19.997)  (0.0008)   (2.369)    (0.728)                 (5.54) 
                        + 7.85 OECD95 + 6.56 LAAM + 3.52 AAE 
     (6.71)        (7.48)       (5.997) 
where, Adjusted 𝑅2 = 0.015 and F-statistic = 1.169. 
 
The results imply that public education expenditure directly affects income inequality 
as the opposite of the Sylwester‘s (2002) result although the coefficient is very small in 
magnitude. Sylwester (2002) has found that the average years of schooling of adult population 
is highly significant with negative sign but we have found the opposite result in this case 
having a positive sign which is statistically insignificant. One reason of getting the opposite 
result might be the difference in sample country. We have not included 11 sample countries, 
those Sylwester (2002) has considered in his sample of 50 countries, but as we have a sample 
of 66 countries in total; so, we have 39 common countries and 27 different countries. 
Sylwester (2002) does not include a multiplicative form of dummy variables to check the 
difference in slope among these regions which may be another reason of getting opposite 
result. That is why we have included all multiplicative forms of dummy variables with each 
explanatory variable in our general cross-country model which is given in equation (5.34) and 
have reported the results in Table 5.6. The estimated coefficients of multiplicative forms of 
dummies reflect whether the slopes of explanatory variables differ due to dummies while the 
additive forms of dummies only show intercept difference. However, the important issue that 
is needed to be mentioned is that although the sample countries and time period of data set are 
different, notably opposite results indicate that public education expenditure cannot always 
reduce income inequality; moreover, it can increase income inequality of a country. We, 
therefore, need to research the relationship more meticulously that we have done in the next 
section by cross-country analysis as well as panel analysis. 
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5.5.3 Cross-country analysis 
 After getting an opposite conclusion replicating Sylwester (2002), we have chosen a 
general model given in equation (5.34) -which includes all explanatory variables except 
corruption perception index (CORP) and three regional dummy variables both as additive and 
multiplicative with all explanatory variables where African region is considered as base 
region inthe cross-country regression analysis. The specific model is derived after 
sequentially eliminating the insignificant variable from the general model with the help of 𝑡-
score, 𝑅2- value, Jarque-Bera normality test score. The results of the estimated general model 
and specific model are given in Table 5.6. The estimated model does not suffer normality 
problem and serial correlation problem of error term but does suffer heteroscadasticity 
problem. 
The estimated results of the general model show that public education expenditure as 
percentage of GDP (PEE95), average of the log value of per capita GDP of 1995 (LGDP95), 
average political stability index (POLX95) and dummy variable of the OECD countries 
(OECD 95), Asia and East European countries (AAE) and the intercept term is statistically 
significant, that means the base region - African countries. 
Among the multiplicative forms of dummies with all explanatory variables, such as 
public education expenditure (PEE) multiplied by the dummy OECD, called PEEOECD, so 
as LGDPOECD, POLXOECD, PEEAAE, LGDPAAE and POLXAAE are statistically 
significant. These estimated results imply that both the intercept and partial slope of the 
OECD region, the AAE region and the base region -African countries are statistically different 
for PEE95, LGDP95 and POLX95 variables. Similarly, public education expenditure (PEE) 
times the dummy LAAM is called PEELAAM. Although PEELAAM variable has been found 
to be statistically significant, the additive term of the LAAM variable is not significant. The 
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estimated partial slope coefficient of PEE95 variable is positive (16.602) for base region - 
African countries. The cross product of this variable with OECD countries is (-15.216) and 
with the AAE region is (-16.601). We, therefore, can infer that the signs of partial slope for 
PEE95 variable for the OECD region and the AAE countries are both positive and 
magnitudes are 1.39 and 0.001 respectively. We can predict that with a one percent increase 
in public education expenditure, 1.39 percent income inequality increases for the OECD 
region and 0.001 percent for the AAE region. The estimated partial slope coefficient of 
LGDP95 variable is negative for both the OECD region and the AAE region although the 
magnitude is higher for the OECD region than that of the AAE region. The estimated partial 
slope coefficient of POLX 95 variable is positive for the OECD region and negative for the 
AAE region although the magnitude is higher for the OECD region than that of the AAE 
region. Using the model specification methodology mentioned earlier, the specific model is 
chosen. 
The estimated results given in Table 5.6 show that specific model does not suffer non-
normality problem and serial correlation problem of error term but does suffer 
heteroscadasticity problem. We, therefore, have estimated the specific model with White-
heteroscadasticity adjusted OLS estimation method. This technique does not change the 
values of estimated coefficient but adjust the standard error of the estimated coefficient. 
Therefore, prediction based on this technique is more reliable than the simple OLS in case of 
heteroscadasticity problem. Besides this, we also know that in presence heteroscadasticity 
problem in estimation, OLS estimates remain unbiased but lose precision of the estimated 
parameters. Thus, we at least can predict that our estimates are unbiased. 
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Table 5.6: Cross- country regression results for General and Specific models 
 
 General Model Specific Model 
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
C 175.37*** 50.51 186.81*** 12.23 
PEE95 16.60*** 5.13 17.30*** 4.02 
LGDP95 -27.74*** 9.68 -29.92*** 2.94 
AYS95 -0.71 3.23   
PDE95 -7.67 5.66 -7.55 5.29 
POLX95 3.23*** 0.59 3.31*** 0.67 
LPOP95 -9.09 7.31 -10.10*** 3.80 
OECD95 -130.82** 64.60 -142.50*** 39.62 
LAAM -18.96 128.93 -27.45 112.81 
AAE -159.64*** 57.75 -163.14*** 24.07 
PEEOECD -15.22*** 5.29 -16.00*** 4.18 
LGDPOECD 22.65** 10.69 24.72*** 5.13 
AYSOECD 0.567 3.37   
PDEOECD 6.97 5.68 6.86 5.31 
POLXOECD -3.02*** 0.71 -3.08*** 0.77 
LPOPOECD 8.86 7.39 9.93*** 3.91 
PEELAAM -17.45*** 6.02 -18.24*** 5.11 
LGDPLAAM 9.07 18.82 10.60 13.92 
AYSLAAM 0.39 5.98   
PDELAAM 9.54 7.18 9.32 6.90 
POLXLAAM -1.80 1.96 -1.83 1.91 
LPOPLAAM 8.882 8.236 10.101*** 4.090 
PEEAAE -16.601*** 5.130 -17.297*** 4.022 
LGDPAAE 27.587*** 10.051 29.854*** 3.940 
AYSAAE 1.616 3.681   
PDEAAE 6.193 5.820 5.772 5.400 
POLXAAE -4.629*** 0.878 -4.654*** 0.921 
LPOPAAE 6.069 7.573 6.569 4.074 
N 
Adjusted - 𝑹𝟐 
F-Sta.(Prob.) 
J-B Stat.(Prob.) 
White (Prob.) 
LM Stat.(Prob.) 
66 
0.21 
1.60* (0.097) 
2.486 (0.288) 
3.375***(0.0005) 
0.00008 (0.99) 
66 
0.29 
2.05**(0.025) 
2.74 (0.254) 
4.44***(0.00) 
0.0044 (0.947) 
(Std.Err. represents standard error of the coefficient is given. *, **, and *** indicate that the variable is 
significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. J-B Stat. indicates Jarque-Bera normality test statistic, White 
represents White heteroscadasticity test statistic and LM Stat. indicates Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test 
statistics (Prob.) indicates probability of corresponding statistic)  
 
The estimated results of the specific model show that the variables (PEE95), 
(LGDP95), (POLX95), log of population at 1995 (LPOP95), dummy (OECD 95), dummy 
(AAE) and the intercept term are statistically significant. Among the multiplicative forms of 
dummies with all explanatory variables, PEEOECD, LGDPOECD, POLXOECD, 
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LPOPOECD, PEELAAM, LPOPLAAM, PEEAAE, LGDPAAE and POLXAAE are statistically 
significant. The estimated coefficient of the variable (PEE95) is positive and statistically 
significant at less than 1percent level with a magnitude of (17.30).  It implies that for African 
region - withone percent increase in public education expenditure, 17.30 percent income 
inequality increases and vice versa if other things remain unchanged.The cross products of 
this PEE95 variable with regional dummies OECD95, LAAM and AAE are respectively (-
16.00), (-18.24) and (-17.30). We, therefore, can infer that the propensity to change in income 
inequality with respect to public education expenditure is positive for the African region, the 
OECD region and the AAE region but negative for the LAAM region. The magnitude of 
propensity to change in income inequality is not statistically different from African region to 
OECD region and the LAAM region but the AAE region (results are not reported). So we can 
infer that the propensity to change in income inequality due to changes in public education 
expenditure is positive with a magnitude of (0.001) for the AAE region but is (17.30) for the 
OECD and LAAM. The estimated coefficient of the variable (LGDP95) is negative and 
statistically significant at less than 1percent level with a magnitude of (-29.97).  It implies that 
for African region, one percent increase in log value of per capita GDP lowers 29.97 percent 
income inequality and vice versa if other things remain unchanged. The cross products of this 
LGDP95 variable with regional dummies OECD95, LAAM and AAE are respectively (24.72), 
(10.6) and (29.90) where the coefficient of the LAAM region is not statistically significant. 
We, therefore, can infer that the propensity to change in income inequality with respect to 
GDP per capita is negative for both the OECD region and the AAE region. That means 
changes in GDP per capita inversely changes income inequality if other things are held 
constant. 
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The estimated coefficient of the variable (POLX95) is positive and statistically 
significant at less than 1percent level with a magnitude of (3.305).  It implies that in African 
region, one index point increase in political stability increases 3.31 point income inequality 
and vice versa if other things remain unchanged. The cross products of this (POLX95) 
variable with regional dummies (OECD95) and (AAE) are respectively (-3.08), and (-4.654). 
We, therefore, can infer that the propensity to change in income inequality with respect to 
political stability index is positive for both the OECD region and negative for the AAE region. 
That means the effect of political stability on change in income inequality has difference in 
sign and magnitude for these four regions. An improvement in political stability reduces 
income inequality in the AAE region while it increases in the OECD and the AFR regions. 
The estimated coefficient of the variable (LPOP95) is positive and statistically 
significant at less than 1percent level with a magnitude of (-10.10).  It implies that for the 
African region, with a unit increase in average log value of the total population, (10.10) point 
income inequality decreases and vice versa if other things remain unchanged. The cross 
products of this (LPOP95) variable with regional dummies the OECD and the AAE are 
respectively (9.93), and (6.57) which are not statistically significant. We, therefore, can infer 
that the propensity to change in income inequality with respect to the total population is 
negative for the OECD region. That means a unit increase in population, reduces income 
inequality in the OECD region and vice versa if other things remain constant. 
Although public defence expenditure variable (PDE95) and its cross terms with 
dummies are not found as significant variables, we cannot accept the null hypothesis of this 
variable and its cross terms with dummies are as redundant variables jointly. That is why, we 
keep this insignificant variable in our specific model. 
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The adjusted-𝑅2 is 0.29 and the F-statistics is statistically significant. Moreover, both 
the specific model and the general model do not suffer either normality problem or auto 
correlation problem; we, therefore, can rely on our predictions. From cross-country analysis, 
we have concluded that increasing public education expenditure cannot always reduce income 
inequality of a country which is refuted by Sylwester‘s (2002) finding. Since we have found 
in cross-country analysis that slope coefficients of public education expenditure have got 
different values for different regions, we study this difference with more details in panel 
analysis which is given below. 
5.5.4 Panel Analysis 
The general model specified in equation (5.55) is estimated both by fixed effects 
model and random effects model and then have conducted Hausman (1978) test. Hausman 
(1978) supports conducting random effects model for all four regions (OECD, LAAM, DAAE 
and LAA) and that is why, we have utilised random effects estimation technique throughout 
for getting a specific model separately for all these regions. The estimation results are given in 
Table 5.7. 
All these estimated equations fit very well because in every case Wald 𝜒2 value is 
statistically significant at below 1percent level and the overall 𝑅2 values of each general 
model are 0.28, 0.49, 0.45, 0.88 and 0.49 respectively for the All Countries, the OECD region, 
the LAAM region, the DAAE region and the LAA region. The overall 𝑅2 values for each 
specific model are not lower than that of the general model for any region. Here, we see that 
the overall 𝑅2 values for regional estimated equations are also higher than that of the All 
Countries model. It implies that our regional estimated equations are better fitted than the All 
Countries‟ estimated equation. In all cases, random effects models are preferred estimation 
method to fixed effects method. 
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In case of estimated model for the All Countries model, public education expenditure 
as percentage of GDP (PEE) variable has got positive sign with a magnitude of 0.37 though 
not statistically significant. The positive sign of the estimated coefficient of this variable 
implies that one percent increase in public education expenditure increases 0.37 percent 
income inequality and vice versa when other things remain constant. The positive sign has 
been found in the LAAM region, the DAAE region and the LAA region with a magnitude of 
0.30, 1.86 and 1.51 respectively. The estimated coefficient is significant at below 10 percent 
for the DAAE region only. In specific models, the estimated coefficients of the PEE variable 
of the LAAM, the DAAE and the LAA also have got positive sign. The estimated coefficient of 
this variable in specific model is statistically significant at below 10 percent level for the LAA 
region and 1 percent level for the DAAE region but insignificant for the LAAM region. 
The magnitude of the estimated coefficient for the DAAE and the LAA regions are very 
large compared to that of the LAAM region and the All Countries. Since the specific models of 
all these three regions predict the positive sign for the coefficient of this variable; we, 
therefore, conclude that public education expenditure positively affects income inequality of 
the developing regions. The impact is strong for the least developed countries. However, the 
estimated coefficient for public education expenditure in the OECD region has got a negative 
sign with a magnitude of 0.31 and 0.12 respectively in general model and specific model 
though not statistically significant. The negative sign indicates that a unit increase in public 
education expenditure, reduces income inequality and vice versa if other things remain the 
same. We, therefore, predict that increasing public education expenditure can reduce income 
inequality of the highly developed OECD region. 
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Table 5.7: Results of panel estimations for countries categorised on Regions 
 All Countries Developed OECD 
Countries (OECD) 
Developing countries in 
Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAAM) 
Developing countries in 
Africa, Asia and East 
Europe (DAAE) 
Least developed  
countries in Africa and 
Asia (LAA) 
General Specific General Specific General Specific General Specific General Specific 
PEE 
(S.E) 
0.37 
(0.51) 
0.42 
(0.50) 
-0.31 
(0.67) 
-0.12 
(0.66) 
0.30 
(0.57) 
0.27 
(0.53) 
1.86* 
(1.05) 
2.23*** 
(0.92) 
1.51 
(1.22) 
1.74* 
(1.06) 
LGDP 
(S.E) 
-0.43 
(1.52) 
 -4.50** 
(1.98) 
-4.53** 
(1.94) 
-10.68*** 
(3.66) 
-11.0*** 
(3.13) 
8.48 
(6.65) 
 2.17 
(3.99) 
 
PDE 
(S.E) 
-0.11 
(0.57) 
 0.36 
(0.44) 
 0.30 
(1.32) 
 2.13 
(2.04) 
4.42*** 
(0.96) 
-0.07 
(1.21) 
 
POLX 
(S.E) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.22 
(0.15) 
-0.20 
(0.15) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
0.33 
(0.29) 
0.60*** 
(0.21) 
-0.23*** 
(0.09) 
-0.23*** 
(0.09) 
AYS 
(S.E) 
-0.49 
(0.62) 
-0.64 
(0.48) 
1.16* 
(0.68) 
1.21* 
(0.68) 
1.13 
(0.95) 
1.07 
(0.77) 
-7.13*** 
(1.72) 
-5.20*** 
(0.50) 
1.08 
(1.21) 
1.45* 
(0.85) 
CORP 
(S.E) 
-1.31** 
(0.61) 
-1.29*** 
(0.53) 
-0.93 
(0.61) 
-1.03* 
(0.61) 
-0.34 
(1.05) 
 -1.56 
(1.73) 
 3.99 
(2.96) 
3.27 
(2.73) 
LPOP 
(S.E) 
-0.76 
(0.84) 
 1.30 
(0.86) 
1.31 
(0.89) 
3.21*** 
(1.11) 
3.28*** 
(0.98) 
1.13 
(1.44) 
 -1.85 
(1.66) 
-1.94 
(1.45) 
Cons. 
(S.E) 
56.24*** 
(9.91) 
51.2*** 
(3.23) 
71.49*** 
(15.74) 
71.83*** 
(15.39) 
124.68*** 
(25.37) 
126.9*** 
(21.86) 
9.58 
(33.31) 
52.24*** 
(5.73) 
15.1 
(26.7) 
28.89*** 
(11.55) 
Obs. 
Groups 
𝑅2 -value 
w. 
b. 
o. 
F-stas. 
Prob>F-stas 
Wald 𝜒2(𝑘) 
Prob>𝜒2(𝑘) 
186 
62 
 
0.064 
0.304 
0.278 
 
 
31.20 (7) 
0.0001 
186 
62 
 
0.06 
0.30 
0.27 
 
 
31.12 (4) 
0.0000 
 
 
75 
25 
 
0.048 
0.533 
0.491 
 
 
23.74 (7) 
0.001 
75 
25 
 
0.06 
0.49 
0.45 
 
 
21.55 (6) 
0.001 
48 
16 
 
0.191 
0.579 
0.445 
 
 
20.38 (7) 
0.0048 
48 
16 
 
0.19 
0.57 
0.44 
 
 
22.41 (5) 
0.000 
24 
8 
 
0.10 
0.96 
0.88 
 
 
118.3 (7) 
0.000 
24 
8 
 
0.14 
0.96 
0.86 
 
 
121.2 (4) 
0.000 
39 
13 
 
0.25 
0.62 
0.49 
 
 
18.01(7) 
0.01 
39 
13 
 
0.23 
0.63 
0.49 
 
 
21.05 (5) 
0.000 
Hausman
𝜒2(𝑘) 
Prob>𝜒2(𝑘) 
8.18 (7) 
0.31 
 11.47 (7) 
0.089 
 0.99 (7) 
0.99 
 10.95 
0.14 
 5.03 (7) 
0.66 
 
Decision Random effects model 
supported 
Random effects model 
supported 
Random effects model 
supported 
Random effects model 
supported 
Random effects model 
supported 
(In the parenthesis standard error of the coefficient is given. *, **, and *** indicate that the variable is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. w. b. and o. indicates 𝑅2 -value within, between and overall respectively. 𝑘 indicates degree of freedom of 𝜒2-statistic) 
 
To check the robustness of this finding, we have grouped all these countries into three 
regions according to the GDP of each country in the year 2009 which is outside value of our 
data set.  The highly developed region is defined as a country having GDP more than 20000 
US Dollar. All OECD countries except Chile, Mexico and Turkey but Singapore are being the 
highly developed region. The developing region is defined as a country having GDP between 
5000 and 20000 US Dollar. Most of Latin America and the Caribbean countries except 
Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua; some Asian countries China, Malaysia, 
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Thailand, Turkey; some East European countries- Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Hungary; 
and two African countries – South Africa and Mauritius are developing region. Finally, the 
least developed region is defined as a country having a GDP less than 5000 US Dollar. 
Mostly the African and Asian countries including Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Nicaragua are in this region. We have estimated the same general and specific models with 
random effects method and have found that the sign of the coefficient of the public education 
expenditure variable is negative for the highly developed countries and the developing 
countries but positive for the least developed countries. The results are given in Table 5.8 in 
the Appendix. We, therefore, confirm that the development status of a country helps to 
determine the impact of public education expenditure on income inequality of a country. The 
impact is negative that means increasing public education expenditure reduces income 
inequality and vice versa for the highly developed countries only, but the opposite is true for 
the least developing countries and some developing countries also. Some other factors may 
also have an impact on income inequality which is discussed below. 
 The log value of GDP is found statistically significant for the OECD and the LAAM 
regions with negative sign but the variable is found to be insignificant in the estimated models 
for the All Countries, for the DAAE and the LAA regions. The sign of the coefficient is 
negative in estimated models for All Countries but is positive for the DAAE and the LAA 
regions. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficient for the OECD region and the LAAM 
region are respectively 4.5 and 10.68 in estimated general models. That means one percent 
increase in GDP reduces 4.5 percent income inequality in the OECD region and around 11 
percent for the LAAM region and vice versa when other things remain constant. That means a 
country having a high GDP implies a low income inequality. 
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 The variable, political stability index (POLX) is found statistically significant for all 
estimated models except the OECD region. The variable has got a negative sign for all 
regions except the DAAE region although the magnitudes are different for different regions. 
The negative sign of the estimated coefficient indicates that an improvement in the political 
stability index of a country reduces income inequality of the country and vice versa. The 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient of this variable is the biggest in the LAA region among 
the OECD region, the LAAM region and the All Countries. This result indicates that political 
stability is a more important factor in determining income inequality in the least developed 
region compared to the other three regions. This prediction follows the finding of Alesina and 
Perotti (1996) where they mention that political instability enhances income inequality. The 
positive sign of this variable for the DAAE region is not as we expect but the coefficient is not 
significant in the estimated general model but highly significant in specific model. 
 The average year of schooling (AYS) is highly and negatively significant for the DAAE 
region. That means an increase in average year of schooling reduces income inequality for 
this region. The estimated coefficient of this variable is positively and weakly significant for 
the OECD region both in general and specific models, while the variable is positively and 
weakly significant for the LAA region in specific model only.  The positive sign indicates a 
direct relationship between average year of schooling and income inequality which is not 
unexpected. Because the model for developing countries results that the higher average year 
of schooling, the higher the income inequality- is not unlikely when only a specific fraction of 
the population has access to school. The result also supports the finding of Hendel et al., 
(2005) in where public education expenditure increases income inequality. 
 The variable corruption perception index (CORP) is found to be negatively and 
statistically significant both in the estimated general and specific models for the All Countries, 
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weakly significant for the OECD region in the estimated specific model and insignificant for 
the LAAM region and the DAAE region. Since, the higher value of corruption perception index 
(CORP) indicates less corruption, the negative sign implies that an improvement of this index 
reduces income inequality as we expected and support the finding of Gupta et. al.(1998). 
However, the coefficient of this variable has got a positive sign though not statistically 
significant for the LAA region. Our intuition behind this unexpected result is that corruption is 
so severe in this region that relatively less corrupted country in this region has also got more 
income inequality. That means, other factors are more important to determine the income 
inequality in this region. 
 The log value of total population (LPOP) is found to be positively and strongly 
significant determinant of income inequality in the LAAM region only. One percent increase 
in total population increases more than 3 percent income inequality in this region. This 
prediction supports the finding of Morley (1981). So, we can forecast that the higher the total 
population, the higher the income inequality in the LAAM region. 
 Public defence expenditure (PDE) is not found to be a significant variable in any 
estimated model except the specific model of the DAAE region with a positive sign. That 
means increase in public defence expenditure increases income inequality and vice versa if 
other things remain constant for the region. This prediction is also what we expected because 
Abell (1994) reveals that military spending is associated with increasing income inequality. 
Finally, we want to emphasise the relationship between public education expenditure 
and income inequality according to the development status of countries to answer our second 
research question in this chapter.  The public education expenditure as percentage of GDP 
(PEE) is found to have negative sign but is statistically insignificant for the OECD region. 
The variable PEE has a negative sign for the highly developed and the developing regions 
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during robustness check which is done by grouping these regions according to GDP. The 
consistency of sign between these two estimations indicates that public education expenditure 
reduces income inequality and vices versa if other things are held constant in the OECD 
region or high income countries only. This finding supports the conclusion of Sylwester 
(2002) as well as the theoretical derivation for the developed countries where additional 
public education expenditure is utilised for improving the quality of education system. On the 
other hand, the variable PEE has positive sign and is statistically significant for the DAAE 
region, the LAA region and is insignificant for the LAAM region. It is also found during the 
robustness check that the variable is positively and significantly related to the income 
inequality in the least developed region. The consistency of sign among these estimates 
indicates that an increase in public education expenditure increases income inequality and 
vices versa if other things are held constant for the DAAE and the LAA regions, in another 
way, the least developed countries. This finding refutes the conclusion of Sylwester (2002) 
but supports the theoretical model derived in this study for the developing countries, where 
additional public education expenditure is used for increasing the quantity of education. The 
results are therefore sufficient to answer the second question of this chapter that the 
development status of a country helps to determine the impact of public education expenditure 
on income inequality. 
5.6 Conclusions 
The fundamental objectives of this study are to solve the ambiguities that the public 
education expenditure affects income inequality, the sign or direction of this effect, the 
difference of this effect between the highly developed countries, the developing countries and 
the least developed countries. Keeping these objectives in mind, our theoretical model shows 
that public education expenditure reduces income inequality for the highly developed 
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countries where additional education expenditure is utilised for improving basic skill of 
workers in a society consisting of skilled and unskilled workers. On the other hand, public 
education expenditure increases income inequality for developing countries where additional 
education expenditure is utilised for improving the quantity of educated workers in a society 
consisting of literate and illiterate workers. Theory shows that in both types of society, 
additional public education expenditure is a„Pareto improvement‟ as long as the tax rates 
imposed on the beneficiary of education expenditure is less than or equal to the marginal rate 
of return from education. We, therefore, believe that the theoretical model solves these three 
ambiguities that public education expenditure affects income inequality and the direction of 
this effect is opposite for the highly developed countries and is direct for the developing or the 
least developed countries. 
The empirical findings also support the theoretical findings that public educational 
expenditure causes changing income inequality through the endogeneity test of empirical 
model. Public education expenditure reduces income inequality of the highly developed 
OECD region and increases income inequality of the developing LAAM, the DAAE and the 
least developed LAA regions. 
Not only public education expenditure but also per capita GDP, corruption perception 
index, political stability affect income inequality of the highly developed OECD countries; 
and per capita GDP, average years of schooling of adult population, total population of and 
country and political stability affect income inequality of the developing LAAM, the DAAE 
and the least developed LAA regions.       
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Appendix : Chapter Five 
Table 5.1: Result of Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation method 
Dependent Variable: ineq 
Method: Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression 
No. of observation (adjusted): 61 
Instrumented:  pee8095 
Instruments:   ays95 lgdp95 pde8795 polx8095 lpop95 oecd95 laam AAE 
gini95 gini90 laerm95 gerr95 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
pee8095 .0368696 .0230319 1.60 0.116 
ays95 -1.552104 2.101835 -0.74 0.464 
lgdp95 -11.02915 6.661237 -1.66 0.104 
pde8795 -1.745352 1.863363 -0.94 0.353 
polx8095 1.328829 1.011581 1.31 0.195 
lpop95 -.2416163 2.665692 -0.09 0.928 
oecd95 22.00184 16.72519 1.32 0.194 
laam 9.749583 11.86083 0.82 0.415 
AAE -1.389285 12.89705 -0.11 0.915 
_cons 94.10015 48.23741 1.95 0.057 
R-squared  MS square of Regression -2035.81 
Adjusted R-squared  MS square of Residuals 501.31 
F(  9,    51) 0.56   
Prob> F 0.8191    
 
Table 5.2: Result of Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation method 
Dependent Variable: ineq 
Method: Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
No. of observation (adjusted): 61 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
pee8095 .0031894 .0025556 1.25 0.218 
ays95 -.6786428 .9623665 -0.71 0.484 
lgdp95 -6.636018 2.852051 -2.33 0.024 
pde8795 -.8356885 .8396653 -1.00 0.324 
polx8095 .6029799 .4235318 1.42 0.161 
lpop95 -1.522791 1.203384 -1.27 0.211 
oecd95 12.45444 7.371794 1.69 0.097 
laam 7.146572 5.590297 1.28 0.207 
AAE 7.042761 5.533284 1.27 0.209 
_cons 59.59762 20.21502 2.95 0.005 
R-squared 0.1990 MS square of Regression 160.17 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0576 MS square of Residuals 113.78 
F(  9,    51) 1.41   
Prob> F 0.2097    
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Table 5.8: Results of panel estimations for countries categorised on GDP 
 All Countries  Highly Developed 
Countries 
Medium Developed 
Countries 
Least Developed 
Countries 
General Specific General Specific General Specific General Specific 
PEE 
(S.E) 
0.36 
(0.53) 
0.36 
(0.51) 
-0.25 
(0.70) 
-0.46 
(0.64) 
-0.62 
(0.79) 
-0.59 
(0.76) 
0.64 
(1.00) 
0.72 
(0.87) 
LGDP 
(S.E) 
-0.23 
(1.52) 
 -1.98 
(1.91) 
-2.66 
(1.75) 
3.48 
(2.80) 
3.47 
(2.71) 
1.27 
(2.79) 
 
PDE 
(S.E) 
-0.10 
(0.56) 
 0.68* 
(0.37) 
0.71** 
(0.36) 
0.12 
(1.67) 
 0.07 
(1.01) 
 
POLX 
(S.E) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
-0.08*** 
(0.03) 
-0.16 
(0.21) 
 0.08 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.12) 
-0.10** 
(0.05) 
-0.11*** 
(0.04) 
AYS 
(S.E) 
-0.52 
(0.62) 
-0.59 
(0.48) 
0.56 
(0.60) 
0.47 
(0.60) 
-3.47*** 
(1.09) 
-3.43*** 
(1.03) 
1.28 
(0.95) 
1.45** 
(0.66) 
CORP 
(S.E) 
-1.46*** 
(0.61) 
-1.51*** 
(0.55) 
-0.41 
(0.56) 
 0.77 
(1.54) 
0.91 
(1.39) 
0.02 
(3.35) 
 
LPOP 
(S.E) 
-0.91 
(0.82) 
-0.93 
(0.80) 
0.57 
(0.72) 
0.73 
(0.69) 
-0.47 
(1.31) 
 -4.28** 
(2.00) 
-4.36*** 
(1.31) 
Cons. 
(S.E) 
55.51*** 
(9.81) 
54.12*** 
(4.08) 
48.78*** 
(15.61) 
52.08*** 
(15.02) 
40.42** 
(20.27) 
38.53** 
(18.81) 
41.02 
(25.98) 
49.05*** 
(6.57) 
Obs. 
Groups 
𝑅2 -value 
w. 
b. 
o. 
Wald 𝜒2(𝑘) 
Prob>𝜒2(𝑘) 
180 
60 
 
0.06 
0.34 
0.31 
33.38 (7) 
0.000 
180 
60 
 
0.06 
0.35 
0.31 
34.23 (7) 
0.000 
69 
23 
 
0.10 
0.33 
0.28 
9.37 (7) 
0.23 
69 
23 
 
0.002 
0.33 
0.28 
8.04 (5) 
0.15 
63 
21 
 
0.05 
0.40 
0.36 
11.13 (7) 
0.13 
63 
21 
 
0.05 
0.39 
0.35 
11.55 (5) 
0.04 
48 
16 
 
0.15 
0.71 
0.54 
27.56 
0.000 
48 
16 
 
0.15 
0.70 
0.54 
33.12 
0.000 
Hausman𝜒2(𝑘) 
Prob>𝜒2(𝑘) 
7.52 (7) 
0.38 
 13.05 (7) 
0.07 
 5.47 (7) 
0.60 
 6.77 (7) 
0.45 
 
Decision Random 
Effects 
model 
supported  
 Random 
Effects 
model 
supported 
 Random 
Effects 
model 
supported 
 Random 
Effects 
model 
supported 
 
(In the parenthesis standard error of the coefficient is given. *, **, and *** indicate that the variable is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. w. b. and o. indicates 𝑅2 -value within, between and overall respectively.(𝑘)indicates degree of freedom of 𝜒2-statistic) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 190 
 
Table 5.9: List of sample countries 
The  
OECD countries 
The  
LAAM countries 
The DAAE  
countries 
The LAA  
countries 
Australia Argentina Bulgaria Bangladesh 
Austria Bolivia Czech Republic China 
Belgium Brazil Latvia Cote d‘Ivoire 
Canada Chile Lithuania Ghana 
Chile Colombia Hungary Indonesia 
Finland Costa Rica Malaysia Kenya 
France Dominican Republic Mauritius Kyrgyz Republic 
Greece Guatemala Singapore Malawi 
Ireland Honduras South Africa Mali 
Israel Jamaica Thailand Pakistan 
Italy Mexico  Philippines 
Japan Nicaragua  Sri Lanka 
Luxembourg Panama  Uganda 
Mexico Paraguay  Zambia 
Netherlands Uruguay   
New Zealand Venezuela   
Norway    
Poland    
Portugal    
Spain    
Sweden    
Switzerland    
Turkey    
United Kingdom    
United States    
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Chapter Six 
Effects of two Education Policies on Educational Development in Bangladesh 
Abstract 
This chapter consists of two parts. Part one deals with evaluating the success of the 
―(Obligation to) Primary Education Act – 1990‖ (PEA 1990) – a significant education policy 
introduced by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) in 1993. We have developed a 
theoretical model of the demand for compulsory education for both parts of the chapter. The 
theory shows that equilibrium demand for schooling decision depends on the opportunity cost 
of education, preference for education, and parent‘s income. Using annual time series data 
from 1980 to 2005 (the PEA 1990 has been implemented in 1993) we have analysed both 
demand and supply sides factors of school attendance. Using ―Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ADL)‖ estimation model, we have used ―Impulse Indicator Saturation (IIS)‖ technique to 
evaluate the success of the PEA 1990 policy measure. The estimated result illustrates that the 
PEA 1990 policy has not achieved to target. Part two analyses the combined impact of two 
educational policies – the PEA 1990 and the ―Female Secondary School Stipend -1994 (FSSS 
1994)‖, on school attendance of population aged between 5 year and 24 year and on the 
literacy rate of the population aged 5 years and above. Using district level panel data of 62 
districts (out of 64 districts in Bangladesh) for two time points 1991 and 2001, we have 
conducted fixed effects estimation method on the two indicators (number of school attendance 
and literacy rate) of educational development. The estimated results demonstrate that 
combined policies have an enormous effect on both the indicators as do some other 
development factors, for instance- family size, annual growth rate, possession of agricultural 
land of the district. 
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PART ONE 
An analysis of the “(Obligation to) Primary Education Act – 1990” in Bangladesh: 
theory and empirics 
6.1.1 Introduction 
Education has several significant impacts on the development of a society. Studies 
(Schultz 1963; Becker 1993) view that education builds human capital that directly enhances 
productivity. They mention that investing human capital via education yields a return like 
investing in physical capital and the role of education is considered as an engine of growth. 
Adelman and Morris (1967) and Putnam (1993) focus that education creates social capital by 
instilling patriotic values, developing a sense of community, inhibiting criminal and other 
antisocial behaviour, providing a common language and cultural norms that improve the 
efficiency of communication and economic transaction. Considering the significance 
education the ―Universal Declaration of Human Rights‖ makes education a basic need for an 
individual. At present, it is no more an elitist need in any society. Considering the importance 
of education, all developed countries around the world have made up to a certain level of 
education free and compulsory for all of their residents at a  very early stage of their 
development such as Japan, the most developed country in Asia, had high levels of education 
before they advanced towards industrial development (Sen. 1999). There are many developing 
countries that are far behind to introduce free and compulsory education up to a basic level. 
The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has introduced compulsory, universal primary 
education by ―(Obligation to) The Primary Education Act, 1990‖ (The Bangladesh Gazette, Act 
No. 27 of 1990) (the PEA 1990 hereafter)which was piloted partially in 1992 and has been 
implemented fully from 1993. But still the country is struggling to achieve universal primary 
education for all of her primary school going age children. In part one of this chapter, we 
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would like to study the question- why the government of Bangladesh is struggling to 
implement universal primary education successfully for all of its primary school aged 
children after nineteen years of the policy inception. 
6.1.2 A brief scenario of primary and secondary education in Bangladesh 
Bangladesh has achieved independence in 1971 after nine months of liberation war. The 
Bangladesh Constitution, Part II dealing with ―Fundamental Principles of State Policy‖ requires 
the State to secure to its citizens the provision of basic necessities of life including food, 
clothing, shelter, education and medical care (Article 15) and Article 17 as quoted in paragraph 
eight above speaks of ―establishing universal system of education and extending free and 
compulsory education to all children ... and removing illiteracy.‖  The two Articles of the 
Constitution are taken to recognise education as a basic right of every citizen. In the year 1990, 
the parliament of the country has passed the PEA 1990 and the Act has been implemented since 
1993. So, the country has observed more than 18 years of compulsory primary education 
regime. From Table 6.8 (in appendix) we see that the first, second and third five year plans of 
the BoG, targeting universal primary education and reducing dropout rate are two vital targets 
but none is achieved in any plan. 
Figure 6.1 shows the enrolment in primary and secondary levels as a percentage of total 
corresponding school- aged children during the1973-74 to 2003-04 time periods.  From the 
figure, we see that in the year 1999-00 and after, the percentage of enrolment at the primary 
level is more than 100 percent.These data imply that the government reports on the enrolment 
data are over estimated. Study (Ardt, K. et.al. 2005) shows that net enrolment in primary level 
education in Bangladesh during the time is nearly 80 percent of total school- aged children. 
The overestimated statistics onenrolment might be considered as measurement error. The 
reasons for this kind of measurement error might be that children may enrol in different 
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schools in an academic year or may migrate from rural to urban areas without cancelling their 
registration in the school in rural areas. Another important fact to be mentioned is that the 
percentage of enrolment in secondary level of education every year is less than 60 percent. 
From these empirics, we can infer that after completing primary education, the majority of 
children are not going to secondary school. That means the drop-out rate from primary to 
secondary level is nearly 50 percent. We also can predict that children enrolled in the first 
grade of primary level do not complete full five years of primary education. The overall 
increasing trend of enrolment in both primary and secondary levels indicates that overall 
attendance in school has improved during the last thirty years. 
Figure 6.1: Enrolment as percentage of corresponding level school aged children 
 
 
Figure 6.2 shows the teacher-student ratio in primary and secondary levels of 
education. It is assumed that the standard teacher-student ratio is 1:35 that means one teacher 
teaches thirty five students to maintain quality of education at the basic level (primary and 
secondary) of education. In primary school, teacher-student ratio is always higher than that of 
the standard measurement during the last 30 years. So, we can infer that there is a student 
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congestion problem in the primary level of education. In secondary school, the teacher-
student ratio is the highest in the year 2000-01 where one teacher guides approximately forty 
students. Thus the congestion in primary school might reduce the quality of primary education 
in Bangladesh. 
Figure 6.2: Student-teacher ratio in primary and secondary Level 
 
 
Figure 6.3 shows the average number of students in a primary and a secondary school. 
In the years 1973-74, both primary and secondary school have nearly 200 students per school 
on average. During this 30 years‘ time period, the number of students in secondary school 
becomes double; but in primary school, the average number is nearly stable. The stability in 
the number of students in primary school is observed during the period because every 
government puts emphasis on primary and mass education and establishes new primary 
schools (although not enough if we consider teacher-student ratio) over the period but does 
not establish enough secondary schools. 
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Figure 6.3: Average number of students per School in primary and secondary level 
 
Figure 6.4 shows primary and secondary education expenditure per student. In the 
years 1973-74, public education expenditure per student both in primary and secondary levels 
of education was Taka 50 (US$ 0.60 in July 2006 conversion rate) and Taka 57 respectively. 
In the years 1994-95, one year after implementing the compulsory primary education act, 
public expenditure per student becomes Taka 560 in primary level and Taka 134 in secondary 
level. These empirical findings indicate that the government is putting maximum effort for 
ensuring compulsory and universal primary education but is assigning minimum effort for 
secondary education.The following two figures also help to draw nearly the similar 
conclusion. 
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Figure 6.4: Public expenditure per student in primary and secondary level 
 
Figure 6.5 shows the public educational expenditure at primary and secondary levels 
as percentage of GDP. In the years 1973-74, primary education expenditure was around 0.62 
per cent of GDP while secondary education expenditure was 0.14 percent of GDP. Only in the 
year 1978-79 and the year 1979-80, government allocated more resource in secondary level 
than primary level and for the remaining years, government‘s allocation for secondary 
education was continuously declining; while it was rising for primary and mass education. 
These empirical findings indicate that the government is putting maximum effort for ensuring 
compulsory and universal primary education but is assigning minimum effort for secondary 
education. 
Figure 6.5: Public education expenditure as percentage of GDP 
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Figure 6.6 shows the public expenditure at primary and secondary levels as percentage 
of total public education expenditure. These data imply that the budget allocation for primary 
level is more or less stable during the sample period but it is declining very rapidly for 
secondary level.  We see that allocation for the secondary level of education was only 1.82 
percent of total public education expenditure while for primary sector it was 23.80 percent in 
the year 1994-95. 
Figure 6.6: Public education expenditure as percentage of total education expenditure 
 
Summarising all empirical and graphical results, we see thatfirstly, the GoB has 
considered primary education as the basic element of human right and therefore, introduced 
compulsory and universal primary education for all population of the age group of 6-10 years 
by law.  
Secondly, on an average, one third of the total education budget has been allocated for 
primary education during the last fifteen years to implement the PEA 1990.  
Thirdly, the student-teacher ratio is too high compared to what educationists 
considered to be ideal.Thus ―academicians and researchers think that to reach universal 
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primary education target, the government will have to recruit 700000 (seven hundred 
thousand) new teachers - preferably trained - and build 30,000 (thirty thousands) new schools 
and 60,000 (sixty thousands) new classrooms in existing schools within the next two years‖ 
(The Daily Star, 2009). 
Fourthly, the cohort dropout rates seem to persist at around 50 percent. It was 47.2 
percent in 2005, 50.5 percent in 2007 and has come down somewhat to 49.3 percent in 2008. 
To reduce drop-out rate, the government has introduced Primary School Stipend Programme 
which covers 4.8 million or 40 percent of the enrolled children of rural poor families to enable 
them to enrol and maintain attendance in school (Dhaka, Bangladesh Country Report, 2009). 
That means 60 percent of rural primary students is still out of stipend coverage. Thus, the 
opportunity cost of attending school for this 60 percent rural student induces them to drop-out 
from the compulsory primary level of education. 
Finally, the government‘s contribution in secondary level of education is significantly 
declining. There are 317 Government managed secondary schools and 18,453 private High 
Schools, which receive teachers‘ salary from the Government (Bangladesh Country Report, 
2009). From Figure 5, we see that the primary education expenditure as percentage of GDP is 
increasing but public secondary education expenditure is decreasing dramatically. As a result, 
the enrolment rate between primary and secondary level falls more than 50 percent. The 
demand for secondary level of education is continuously becoming a privately financed good 
and going beyond the reach of poor rural household.  Since, almost all pupils in secondary 
level are taught by different private schools, the quality of secondary education differs 
significantly among the pupils. The GoB has therefore implemented the ―Female Secondary 
School Stipend (FSSS) program 1994‖ all over the country in 1994 to encourage attendance 
of female pupils in secondary level of education. 
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6.1.3 The Model: demand for attending school 
Assume that the state provides universal basic education up to 𝑇 years without any 
tuition fees by a law but every family decides to send its children into education system 
according to its preference function. There is no pecuniary punishment in the family for 
noncompliance of the state law. Also assume that a family consists of a parent and a child. 
Both parent and child can go to work for income. Thus, family income is the sum of parent‘s 
income and a child‘s income. Alternatively, the parent goes to work and child goes to school. 
In this case, the child loses income, which is called opportunity cost of attending school and is 
symbolised as, 𝑄𝑂 per year. A family derives utility from the consumption of material goods 
and services, 𝐶 and attending the school of child, 𝐸. The utility from education arises because 
it creases future income stream and therefore future consumption. The utility function of a 
family is ‗Cobb-Douglas‘ form. The utility function is continuous, twice differentiable and 
concave in both these two arguments and the family is maximising the total utility in both of 
these two arguments. The log-linear utility function for the family is as follows. 
ln 𝑈 =  1 − 𝜃 𝑙𝑛𝐶 + 𝜃 ln 𝐸 ; 0 < 𝜃 < 1                                                                            (6.1) 
Although the state has introduced compulsory basic education act (without 
punishment of noncompliance) for every child 𝑇 years, it is assumed that every family 
decides whether or not to send its child for basic education for the maximum of  𝑇 years 
depending on family‘s income and preference. Since income consists of parent‘s wage 
earning and child‘s wage earning, and every child in the economy has to enrol into a school at 
least at the first year of the maximum, 𝑇years by the state law; thus, every family loses child‘s 
income for the period when the child is attending school.The income of a family is, therefore, 
the sum of wage earning of the parent 𝑊 plus child‘s opportunity cost of attending school 𝑄𝑂. 
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Since a child can attend a maximum of 𝑇 years of time in basic education and the opportunity 
cost of per year of attending school is 𝑄𝑂, the family income 𝑌 can be written as follows. 
𝑌 = 𝑊 +  𝑇 − 𝐸 𝑄𝑂                                                                                                        (6.2) 
The equation (6.2) says that if the child attends maximum 𝑇 years in school, family 
loses child‘s income for all these 𝑇 years and the family income contains only parent‘s 
income, 𝑊; while if the child attend school 𝐸  years of the maximum 𝑇 years, the family 
income consists of both the parent‘s income, 𝑊 and child‘s  income,  𝑇 − 𝐸 𝑄𝑂 . 
The budget constraint for the family is  
𝑊 +  𝑇 − 𝐸 𝑄𝑂 = 𝑃𝐶𝐶                                                                                                    (6.3) 
where, 𝑃𝐶  is the price of material goods and services. Since there is no tuition fees for 
attending school, no direct cost for attending school of the child is inserted into the budget 
equation. 
Demand for basic Education: Every family maximises utility function subject to a budget 
constraint. The demand for attending school for the child of a family is as follows. 
𝐸∗ =
𝜃𝑊
𝑄𝑂
+ 𝜃𝑇                                                                                                                       (6.4) 
The demand for attending school by the child of a family is a function of parent‘s 
income 𝑊, family‘s preference of child‘s education 𝜃, maximum years of schooling 𝑇  and 
the opportunity cost of attending school 𝑄𝑂.  An increase in the opportunity cost of education 
decreases  
𝜃𝑊
 𝑄𝑂 2
  years of a child‘s education and vice versa if other things remain constant. A 
unit increase in a parent‘s income increases  
𝜃
𝑄𝑂
  years of education and vice versa if other 
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things remain constant. A unit increase in family‘s preference for child‘s education increases 
 𝑇 +
𝑊
𝑄𝑂
  years of a child‘s education and vice versa if other things remain constant. A rise in 
maximum years of education by state law increases only 𝜃 amount of demand for attending 
school by the child of a family and vice versa holding other things in control. 
The demand for attending school after introducing a compulsory education act is less 
than the maximum years of education, 𝑇. This result implies that introducing ―Compulsory 
Education Act‖without any pecuniary penalty for noncompliance of the law,does not ensure 
that every child completes the maximum 𝑇 years of education. The opportunity cost of 
attending school is a basic factor that determines equilibrium years of education along with 
the family preference for education and family income. 
Demand for basic Education (with punishment): Now assume that the government has 
imposed a certain amount of pecuniary punishment, "𝑃"per year for a family which is not 
sending a child into school.Thus the new budget equation of the family becomes as follows. 
𝑊 +  𝑇 − 𝐸 (𝑄𝑂 − 𝑃) = 𝑃𝐶𝐶                                                                                             (6.5) 
where, 𝑃𝐶  is the price of material goods and services.Since there is no tuition fees for 
attending school, no direct cost for attending school of the child is inserted into the budget 
equation. (𝑄𝑂 − 𝑃) is the net opportunity cost of attending school per year for a child. 
 𝑇 − 𝐸  is the number of years a child is absent from the basic school attendance law. 𝑊 is 
parent‘s income. Assuming utility function, government law except punishment clause, and 
preference parameters remain same, the equilibrium demand for education is as follows. 
𝐸∗ =
𝜃𝑊
(𝜃0 − 𝑃)
+ 𝜃𝑇                                                                                                                           (6.6) 
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In the presence of pecuniary punishment in basic education law, the equilibrium year 
of basic schooling demand for a child is positively depends on the parent‘s income, maximum 
year of basic education by law, relative preference for education, and pecuniary punishment 
for noncompliance of the government law while negatively depends on the opportunity cost of 
attending school. An increase in the opportunity cost of education decreases  
𝜃𝑊
 𝑄𝑂−𝑃 2
  years of 
a child‘s education and vice versa if other things remain constant but a unit increase in 
pecuniary punishment imposed by the government increases  
𝜃𝑊
 𝑄𝑂−𝑃 2
  years of education and 
vice versa if other things remain constant. Therefore, we can say the rate of change in demand 
for school attendance is the same either for opportunity cost or for punishment but in the 
opposite direction. 
The maximum years of basic education will be attended by every child if, pecuniary 
punishment is as follows. 
𝑃 = 𝑄𝑂 +
𝜃𝑊
 1−𝜃 𝑇
                                                                                                                    (6.7) 
 Since the term 
𝜃𝑊
 1−𝜃 𝑇
 is positive definite, government needs to impose pecuniary 
punishment higher than the opportunity cost of attending school. Otherwise, no obligatory 
education act will ensure maximum years of school attendance by every child. 
We, therefore, hypothesise that (i)attending school directly depends on the parent‟s 
income, and (ii) inversely depends on the opportunity cost of attending school. 
These hypotheses are going to be tested empirically along with some relevant 
explanatory variables in the following sections of the chapter. The part one of the empirical 
section deals with an analysisof the “(Obligation to) Primary Education – 1990” in 
Bangladesh and the part two covers impact of education policies on overall educational 
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development in Bangladesh. In part one- we consider country level annual time series data for 
investigating the functional relationship between the number of student enrolment in primary 
level as dependent variable and per capita GDP, the percentage of primary education 
expenditure in GDP, number of primary schools, number of primary school teacher, and the 
PEA 1990 dummy variable as independent variables. In Part two- we use district level panel 
data for 1991 and 2001 to evaluate the combined impact of the PEA 1990 and the FSSS 1994 
policies separately on number of school attendance and literacy rate as dependent variables; 
and geographical area, total population, family size, annual growth rate, tap-water, sanitary-
toilet, electricity, agricultural land and religion of a district as independent variables. 
6.1.4 Empirical analysis for part one 
6.1.4.1 Estimation method 
 Theoretically, we have found that demand for education depends on parent‘s income 
and opportunity cost of education. We therefore have hypothesised that the total number of 
students‘ enrolment as a proxy of demand for education depends on the per capita GDP as a 
proxy of parent‘s income, public education expenditure for primary education as a proxy of 
the opportunity cost, total number of school aged children, number of primary schools, 
number of teachers in primary school and the PEA 1990is also considered as a proxy of the 
opportunity cost of education. 
 Total number of students enrolled in primary level of education (ERMT): The total 
number of students enrolled for primary level of education in a year is considered as the 
dependent variable. In the model, we have found that the demand for schooling depends on 
parent‘s income and opportunity cost of attending school. We, therefore, believe that the total 
number of enrolment in the primary level of education is the best proxy variable for the 
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demand for schooling. We have collected annual data for this variable from the year 1980 to 
the year 2005. We, therefore, have 26 observations in total. The data are collected from 
several issues of the ‗Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh‘ (1980, 1984, 1990, 1995, 2000, 
2005 and 2008 publications). The unit of measurement is thousand students and we have 
taken the natural log of each number. The variable is symbolised as 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡 ; 𝑡 =
1980 … 2005 where, 𝑡 is the year. 
Per capita gross domestic product (GDP): Per capita domestic product is one of the 
independent variables used in empirical analysis. Since theory suggests that parent‘s income 
directly determines the demand for attending school of the child, we have included per capita 
GDP as a proxy measure of parent‘s income. The data on per capita GDP at current price is 
measured in local currency and are collected from the World Data Bank country indicators. 
The unit of measurement is thousand Taka (Taka is name of local currency) and we have 
taken the natural log of each number. The variable is symbolised as 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 . 
Total government primary education expenditure (PEE): Total government primary 
education expenditure is another independent variable used in empirical estimation. It is 
considered as supply-side variable of attending school. As government primary education 
expenditure increases by introducing stipend, free educational materials and free food for 
attending school can be considered as reducing opportunity cost of attending school.Since the 
opportunity cost of attending school reduces demand for school attendance increases and vice 
versa when other things remain constant. We have used annual data for this variable from the 
year 1980 to the year 2005. The data are collected from several issues of the ‗Statistical Year 
Book of Bangladesh‘ (1980, 1984, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2008 publications). In the 
Statistical Year Book of 2000 and after, public education expenditure for primary, secondary 
or tertiary levels of education are not reported separately; we, therefore, have collected public 
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education expenditure data for primary level from the working paper of Rahman, et.al. (2005). 
The unit of measurement of this variable is thousand Taka and we have taken the natural log 
of each number. The variable is symbolised as 𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡 . 
Total number of school aged children (SAC): Total number of primary school aged 
children is another explanatory variable used in empirical estimation. It is considered as 
demand-side variable of attending school. As the number of school aged children increases, 
the demand for attending primary school increases and vice versa if other things remain 
constant. The data about age specific population are collected from Population Division of the 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World 
Population Prospects. The unit of measurement is thousand persons and the natural log of 
each number is considered. The variable is symbolised as 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡 . 
Total number of primary school (NSC): Total number of primary school is another 
independent variable. It is considered as supply-side variable of attending school. As number 
of primary school increases, facilities of primary level education increases; as a result, indirect 
cost of attending school such as travelling cost reduces, thus the demand for attending school 
increases and vice versa if other things remain constant. We have collected annual data for 
this variable from the year 1980 to the year 2005 from several issues of the ‗Statistical Year 
Book of Bangladesh‘. The unit of measurement is thousand schools and we have taken the 
natural log of each number. The variable is symbolised as 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡 . 
Total number of primary school teacher (NPT): Total number of primary school 
teacher is another independent variable. It is considered as supply-side variable of attending 
school. We expect that as the number of primary school teacher increases, the supply of 
primary level education increases; therefore, demand for attending primary school increases 
and vice versa if other things remain constant. Annual data are collected from several issues 
 207 
 
of the ‗Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh‘. The unit of measurement is thousand persons 
and the natural log of each number has been taken. The variable is symbolised as 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡 . 
The compulsory primary education act (PEA): The government of Bangladesh has 
implemented compulsory primary education act in the year 1993 (completely) and introduced 
limited amount of stipend (in cash and kinds) for attending primary school for the very poor 
family in the country. We think that introducing stipend is a proxy of the opportunity cost of 
attending school. We, therefore, have constructed a dummy variable before and after 
introducing the act. The variable is symbolised as 𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡 . The variable takes zero value from 
the year 1980 to 1992 and one value from the year 1993 to 2005. 
6.1.4.2 Descriptive analysis 
In the data set, all series of variables are measured in thousand units; for example- the 
number of students enrolled in primary level is measured in thousand students, per capita 
GDP is measured in thousand Taka in current year local currency, the government education 
expenditure at primary level is measured in thousand Taka in local currency, number of 
primary school teacher is measured in thousand teachers and the total number of primary 
schools is measured in thousand schools. There are 26 observations for each variable and the 
time period covers from the year 1980 to 2005. 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. value Max. value No. of 
Observations 
𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡  13566.77 3848.16 7733.00 19612 26 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  12.67 2.41 10.03 18.01 26 
𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡  11584838 11651735 811400 41040000 26 
𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡  16183.88 1367.64 12988 17386 26 
𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡  231.20 59.59 172.78 367.57 26 
𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡  55.86 14.28 42.44 82.87 26 
Note: ―Std.Dev.‖ represents standard deviation. ―Min. Value‖ and ―Max. Value‖ represent 
minimum and maximum value of each data series respectively. 
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Figure 6.7: Line graphs of all data series 
 
The average number of enrolment in the primary level of education is approximately 
13567 thousand students. The maximum number of students enrolled in the year 2000 and the 
minimum number of students enrolled in the year 1980. The number of enrolment of students 
has positive time trend. The average per capita GDP of population during the time period is 
approximately Taka 12.67 thousand per year. The highest nominal per capita GDP is in the 
year 2005 and the lowest is in the year 1980. The data indicate positive trend in nominal 
value. On average, the government education expenditure at primary level every year is 
approximately Taka 11. 58 billion (current year‘s nominal value). During the time period, the 
highest spending is allocated in 2002 and the lowest is in 1980. The data indicate positive 
trend in nominal value. 
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The average number of primary level school aged children is approximately 16184 
thousand students. The maximum number of children is found in the year 2005 and the 
minimum in the year 1980. The average enrolment is lower than that of the average school 
aged children during the time period. So, we can say on average all children are not enrolled 
into school during the period. The average number of primary school teacher is 231 thousand 
and the maximum number of teachers is working in the year 2005 and the minimum number 
in the year 1980. The average number of primary schools is approximately 55.86 thousand. 
The maximum number of primary schools is found in the year 2005 and the minimum number 
in the year 1980. The total number of primary school also has positive time trend. We can 
conclude from the descriptive statistics that all series of data have a positive trend during the 
period. 
From the Figure 6.7, we see that all series of variables have positive trend. The 
variable 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  has clear positive trend. The reason is the current value of per capita GDP 
measured in local currency, so over the time value is rising because of the rising price level. 
The variable 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡   also has rising trend, although in the year 1998, the number of 
enrolment jumps for a year but falls again in the year 2001. But still the value of enrolment in 
the year 2001 is higher than that of the year 1998. So, we can say that the series has a trend 
and after the year 2001, the variable does not have trend but the values are still higher in the 
following year. The variable 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡   has clear exponential trend which is natural for 
population data. Variables 𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡 , 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡   and 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡   are all rising throughout the time 
period with ups and downs in different years but follow some kind of trend. We, therefore, are 
convinced that the data of all variables follow some trend with an intercept. 
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6.1.4.3 Unit root tests 
At the beginning of empirical analysis, we have chosen the ordinary least square 
(OLS) estimation technique. The OLS estimation technique gives the best linear unbiased 
estimation of parameters under some classical regression assumptions, for instance- error 
distributions are normally distributed (normality assumption), every error distribution has 
constant variance (homoscadastic assumption), no serial correlation between error terms (no 
autocorrelation assumption) and functional form is correct etc. In case of time series data 
analysis ―non-stationary‖ is considered as another important estimation problem. Although 
earlier econometricians assume that ―non-stationary‖ time series economic data does not 
affect empirical analysis, but now they realise that ―running regression on non-stationary time 
series data can give rise to spurious values of 𝑅2, Durbin-Watson statistic, and 𝑡-statistic, 
causing economists erroneously to conclude that a meaningful relationship among the 
regression varies‖ (Kennedy, 1979; p.296). From the statement we can infer that checking the 
stationary of time series data sets becomes an essential part of empirical estimation for 
removing spurious result. From the descriptive statistics and the figure 6.7, we have seen that 
each variable in our data set has a trend and therefore may suffer non-stationary problem. We 
have therefore conducted the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test which is ―seems to be the 
most popular unit root test (for stationary of a data series) because of its simplicity and 
perform well‖ (Kennedy, 1979; p.324) to check ―non-stationary‖ issue of data series. We, 
therefore, conduct the ADF test for the level form of each series including both intercept (𝑐) 
and trend (𝑡𝑟) for all series. The ADF test results are given in Table 6.2. The ADF results 
show that the natural log values of all variables suffer non-stationary problem. 
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Table 6.2: Results of ADF tests for six data series 
ADF Test 𝑯𝟎: Has Unit Root (Non-Stationary) 
Dependent 
Variable,  
𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶 
𝒕-ADF 
statistic 
-0.35 (c, tr) -0.074 (c, tr) -2.62 (c, tr) -3.23 (c, tr) -1.26 (c, tr) -2.43 ( c, tr) 
Prob. 
Value 
5%= -3.60 
1%= -4.40 
5%= -3.60 
1%= -4.40 
5%= -3.60 
1%= -4.40 
5%= -3.60 
1%= -4.40 
5%= -3.60 
1%= -4.40 
5%= -3.60 
1%= -4.40 
Decision Accept 𝑯𝟎 
Series is 
non-
stationary  
Accept 𝑯𝟎 
Series is non-
stationary 
Accept 𝑯𝟎 
Series is 
non-
stationary 
Accept 𝑯𝟎 
Series is 
non-
stationary 
Reject 𝑯𝟎 
Series is 
non-
stationary 
Accept 𝑯𝟎 
Series is non-
stationary 
 
6.1.4.4 Cointegration analysis 
The remedial measure of dealing with non-stationary data series is to check whether or not the 
series is cointegrated. 
Table 6.3: Results of Cointegration test 
 
Dependent variable: 𝑳𝑬𝑹𝑴𝑻𝒕 
Method of estimation: Least square 
Sample: 1980-2005 
 Co-eff. St. Error 𝑡-value 𝑡-Prob. 
Conts. -3.29006 3.002 -1.10 0.2867 
𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕 0.260876 0.5611 0.465 0.6473 
𝑳𝑷𝑬𝑬𝒕 0.0963316 0.05194 1.85 0.0792 
𝑳𝑺𝑨𝑪𝒕 1.13870 0.3336 3.41 0.0029 
𝑳𝑵𝑷𝑻𝒕 -0.235643 0.4603 -0.512 0.6146 
𝑳𝑵𝑺𝑪𝒕 0.195191 0.2869 0.680 0.5045 
𝑷𝑬𝑨𝒕 0.119152 0.04513 2.64 0.0161 
Estimated Residuals 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑅𝑇𝑡 − 𝐿𝐸𝑀𝑅𝑇 𝑡  
ADF test for estimated residuals 𝐻0: Has unit root (Non-stationary) 
Dependent variable, max. lag =4 Estimated Residuals 
𝒕-ADF statistic D-lag 0 D-lag 1 D-lag 2 D-lag 3 D-lag 4 
-3.39 -3.28 -2.19 -1.93 -2.78 
Probability Value 5%= -3.01   and   1%= -3.79 
Decision Reject null hypothesis with no lag and one lag. The estimated 
residuals are stationary. Thus all series are cointegrated. 
 
Formally, the term cointegration is defined as if two series (there could be more series 
than just two); where, suppose 𝑋𝑡and 𝑌𝑡  are non-stationary; then if their linear combination is 
stationary, 𝑋𝑡  and 𝑌𝑡   are said to be cointegrated. We, therefore, have conducted the 
cointegration analysis for all series of variables in our data set and found that the estimated 
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residuals are stationary. The result of cointegration analysis has been given in the Table 6.3. 
The test results show that the non-stationary variables are cointegrated. 
 
6.1.4.5 Autoregressive distributed lags (ADL) estimation model 
Since the variables are cointegrated, we have considered an “Autoregressive 
distributed lags (ADL)” model with two periods of lag of each variable as our general form of 
empirical model. We have taken two lags of each series because ―economic variables are 
seldom integrated of order greater than two‖ (Kennedy, 1979; p.302) so that our chosen 
model covers the full effect of each variable in the long run. Using the ―general-to-specific‖ 
model specification technique of Hendry (1987) with the help of “OxMetrics Software”, we 
have tried to find a functional relationship between the number of enrolment in the primary 
level of education and the independent variables during the time period. 
The general model which we have chosen covers the lag effects of every variable 
which is more frequent in time series data set. In the general model, a dummy variable is also 
included for covering the impact of introducing the PEA 1990 in Bangladesh. The general 
ADL model with two-period lags is given in the following equation. We have assigned 
different Greek letters- "𝛼"are for the coefficients of autoregressive dependent variables and 
"𝛽"  are for the coefficients of the independent variables. 
𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡−2 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡−2 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡−2
+ 𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−2
+ 𝛽13𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−2 + 𝛽17𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                           (6.8)   
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where, 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡  is the natural log of the total number of students enrolled in the 
primary level of education in the year, 𝑡 and 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡−1 and 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡−2 are respectively the 
1st lag and 2nd lag of this variable. 
𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡  is the natural log of the total per capita gross domestic product (GDP) in the 
year, 𝑡 and 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1and 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2 are respectively the 1
st lag and 2nd lag of this variable. 
𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡  is the natural log of the total primary education expenditure in the year, 𝑡 and 
𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡−1 and 𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡−2 are respectively the 1
st and 2nd lags. 
𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡  is the natural log of the total number of primary school aged population in the 
year, 𝑡. 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡−1 and 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡−2 are respectively the 1
st and 2nd lags. 
𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡  is the natural log of the total number of primary school teachers in the year, 
𝑡.𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−1 and 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−2 are respective lags. 
𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡  is the natural log of the total number of primary schools in the year, 𝑡. 
𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 and 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−2 are respective lags. 
𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡  is the dummy variable for covering the impact of the PEA 1990. 𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡has zero 
value from 1980 to 1992 and one value from 1993 to 2005. 
With the help of ―Autometric‖ program of model specification (fixing the dummy 
variable) which is developed in the ―OxMetrics Software‖, we have got the following specific 
model24. 
                                                          
24See detail methodology in the OxMetrics software. All estimation results have been given in the 
results and discussion section. 
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𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡−2 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−2
+ 𝛽13𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽14𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−2 + 𝛽17𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡
+ 𝜀 𝑡                                                                                                                                        (6.9) 
From this specific ADL model with two periods of lag, we have solved the static long 
run equilibrium correction factor for the number of enrolment in the primary level of 
education in Bangladesh. 
6.1.4.6 Impulse Indicator Saturation (IIS) or Dummy saturation estimation method 
Since the estimated results of the specific model show that the dummy variable has an 
insignificant positive effect on the number of enrolments, we have conducted ―dummy 
saturation‖ method of estimation for checking the robustness of the result related to the 
dummy variable. The estimated results25 of ―Impulse Indicator Saturation (IIS)‖ or the 
―dummy saturation‖ method identify the following years 1984, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1996, 
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2005 to be significantly different from the other years. 
From the unit root test, we have found that all data series are stationary at first except 
the number of the school aged population. To check the robustness of the results of my 
specific model with the one from two-period lags ADL model, we have chosen an ADL 
model with one period lag of each variable as another general model which is given in the 
following equation. 
𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡−1
+ 𝛽5𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽9𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                            (6.10) 
                                                          
25The results have been given in results and discussion section. 
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We do not include the dummy variable (compulsory primary education act 1990) 
𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡  because we have estimated the above general model with ―dummy saturation‖ method 
and have found the following specific model (specified year dummies are not included). 
𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡
+ 𝜀 𝑡                                                                                                                             (6.11) 
 The specific ADL model with one period lag does produce nearly similar significant 
variables of the specific ADL model with two period lags.    
6.1.4.7 Data  
The data used in this study cover the period from 1980 to 2005. Most of the education 
related data such as the number of student enrolment in the primary level, the number of 
teachers at primary level, the number of primary schools, and the expenditure on different 
levels of education are collected from the Statistical Year Book of Bangladesh 1980, 1984, 
1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2008 publications. The data about age specific population are 
collected from the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of 
the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects.The data for GDP in local 
currency are collected from the World Data Bank. The information about educational 
objectives and achievement is collected from the different Five Year Plans by the Government 
of People‘s Republic of Bangladesh, such as 1st Five Year Plan – Chapter XIV, 2nd Five Year 
Plan – Chapter XVI, 3rd Five Year Plan – Chapter XIV, 4th Five Year Plan – Chapter XV and 
5th Five Year Plan – Chapter XX. 
6.1.5 Results and discussions 
The estimation results of the general and specific ADL model with two-period lags, 
and general and specific ADL model with a one-period lag are given in Table 6.4.The 
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estimated general ADL model with two-period lags of each variable shows that the number of 
primary school teacher and the number of primary school of last year (one period lag) are 
significant at 1 percent level with negative and positive sign respectively. The adjusted 𝑅2  is 
0.995 but the estimated model suffers from serial correlation problem. The estimated specific 
ADL with two-period lags, which is preferred estimated model in this study, shows that 
𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2, 𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡  , 𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡−2, 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡−1, 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−1, 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−2, 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 and 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−2 are 
statistically significant at 1 percent level. The adjusted 𝑅2 is 0.997 which implies that more 
than 99 percent of variation in dependent variable is explained by the explanatory variables. 
The estimated model does not suffer from any problem of non-normality, heteroscadasticity 
and autocorrelation. If we look at the ―actual-fitted-residual‖ graph in Figure 6.8 of the 
estimated model, the fitted line nearly perfectly represents the actual line and none of residual 
exceeds the absolute value of 1.2. That means there is no data outlier for the estimated model. 
We, therefore, confidently make comments on estimated parameters. 
The estimated coefficient of 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2 has got a positive sign with a magnitude of 1.5 
which implies that one percentage increase in two years back per capita income of parent 
increases 1.5 percent propensity to enrolment of a child and vice versa when other variables 
remain constant. The result intuitively makes sense. A rise in a parent‘s income this year will 
motivate him to send his child to school after two years.The estimated coefficient of 𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡   
and 𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡−2 have got a positive and negative sign respectively. The magnitude of the current 
year primary education expenditure is 0.057, which implies that 1 percent increase in 
government primary education expenditure increases 0.057 percent of propensity to enrolment 
in primary level of education and vice versa when other things remain constant; while, a 1 
percent increase in the government primary education expenditure two years before reduces 
0.07 percent propensity to children‘s enrolment if other things remain constant. 
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Table  6.4: Estimation results: ADL general and specific models with two and one period 
lags  
Dependent variable 
𝑳𝑬𝑹𝑴𝑻𝒕 
ADL General 
model with two 
periods lags 
ADL Specific model 
with two periods lags 
ADL general 
model with one 
period lag 
ADL specific 
model with one 
period lag 
Independent 
variables 
OLS method OLS method OLS method OLS method 
𝑳𝑬𝑹𝑴𝑻𝒕−𝟏 
(Std. err.) 
0.22 
(0.36) 
 0.47*** 
(0.13) 
0.99***     
(0.03) 
𝑳𝑬𝑹𝑴𝑻𝒕−𝟐 
(Std.err.) 
0.15 
(0.28) 
   
𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕 
(Std. err.) 
1.01 
(0.95) 
 0.46      
(0.90) 
 
𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕−𝟏 
(Std. err.) 
-1.99 
(1.66) 
 0.59       
(1.11) 
 
𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕−𝟐 
(Std. err.) 
2.55 
(1.45) 
1.50*** 
(0.37) 
  
𝑳𝑷𝑬𝑬𝒕 
(Std. err.) 
0.03 
(0.07) 
0.057*** 
(0.02) 
0.0067     
(0.03) 
 
𝑳𝑷𝑬𝑬𝒕−𝟏 
(Std. err.) 
-0.035 
(0.075) 
 -0.043    
 (0.03) 
 
𝑳𝑷𝑬𝑬𝒕−𝟐 
(Std. err.) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.07** 
(0.027) 
  
𝑳𝑺𝑨𝑪𝒕 
(Std. err.) 
-1.48 
(2.72) 
 -1.91      
 (1.77) 
 
𝑳𝑺𝑨𝑪𝒕−𝟏 
(Std. err.) 
5.67 
(6.038) 
2.07*** 
(0.02) 
2.94*       
(1.67) 
0.13***     
(0.026) 
𝑳𝑺𝑨𝑪𝒕−𝟐 
(Std. err.) 
-2.43 
(4.61) 
   
𝑳𝑵𝑷𝑻𝒕 
(Std. err.) 
0.11 
(0.76) 
 -0.20     
 (0.26) 
0.39***    
 (0.08) 
𝑳𝑵𝑷𝑻𝒕−𝟏 
(Std. err.) 
-1.60*** 
(0.27) 
-1.63*** 
(0.02) 
-1.18      
(0.23) 
-0.85***      
(0.11) 
𝑳𝑵𝑷𝑻𝒕−𝟐 
(Std. err.) 
-0.34 
(0.75) 
-0.62*** 
(0.19) 
  
𝑳𝑵𝑺𝑪𝒕 
(Std. err.) 
0.052 
(0.27) 
0.19 
(0.08) 
0.14      
(0.16) 
 
𝑳𝑵𝑺𝑪𝒕−𝟏 
(Std. err.) 
0.89*** 
(0.17) 
0.99*** 
(0.11) 
0.81***      
(0.14) 
0.34***     
(0.08) 
𝑳𝑵𝑺𝑪𝒕−𝟐 
(Std. err.) 
0.30 
(0.45) 
0.598*** 
(0.11) 
  
𝑷𝑬𝑨𝒕 
(Std. err.) 
0.019 
(0.057) 
0.0049 
(0.018) 
-0.02     
(0.03) 
 
Cont. 
(Std. err.) 
-8.81** 
(3.17) 
-8.80*** 
(1.78) 
-3.26       
(2.12) 
 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐-value 0.995 0.997 0.994    
𝑭-value(Prob. Val) 259***  
(0.000) 
639.4*** 
(0.00) 
350*** 
(0.00) 
 
Normality test 
𝝌𝟐-value (Prob. val) 
0.052 (0.9741) 1.72(0.42) 
 
0.48(0.79) 1.07(0.58) 
Heteroscadasticity 
test 
𝝌𝟐-value (Prob. val) 
Not enough 
observations 
2.87 (0.16) Not enough 
observations 
Not enough 
observations 
Serial 
autocorrelation test 
𝑭-value (Prob. val) 
10.79 (0.03)* 1.17 (0.23) 2.34(0.15)   0.40(0.67) 
Note: *, ** and *** represent that the co-efficient is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ―Std.err.‖ represents 
standard error of the coefficient. ―Cont.‖ indicates the constant term of the estimated regression model. ―(Prob. Vale)‖ 
indicates the probability value of the corresponding term. 
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Figure 6.8: Actual fitted and residual graph of specific model 
 
When we look at the recursive estimate of these two parameters, both are very close to 
zero value throughout the sample period and there isa clear indication of structural break in 
1994, 1995, 1999 and 2001. We cannot definitely comment on the impact of primary 
education expenditure on the number of enrolment of children. 
The estimated coefficient of 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡−1 has got a positive sign with a magnitude of 
2.07.We, therefore, can say that 1 percent increase in the number of school aged children in 
last year raises 2.07 percent demand for the enrolment in primary level school in the current 
year and vice versa if other things remain constant. The recursive estimate of this parameter 
indicates that this parameter value strongly differs from zero. So, we can rely on the impact of 
the last period‘s number of school aged children on the current period enrolment of pupils. 
The result is intuitively sensible. As the last year‘s number of school aged children rises, this 
year‘s enrolment of students also rises. The variable is also found positively significant from 
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the specific ADL model with one period lag though the magnitude is very small and almost 
zero (please see the recursive estimates of parameters). The results indicate the robustness of 
the results of the specific ADL model with two-period lag. 
The estimated coefficient of both the variable 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−1 and 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−2 have got a 
negative sign with a magnitude of 1.63 and 0.62 respectively. A 1 percent increase in the 
number of primary school teacher of the last year reduces 1.63 percent enrolment in the 
current year; and similarly, 1 percent fall in the number of primary school teachers two years 
before increases 0.62 percent of enrolment in the current year and vice versa if other things 
remain constant. One intuitional reason for this unexpected finding might be that increasing 
school teacher means spending more public education expenditure for the salary of teachers 
rather than for the students, which might discourage students‘ enrolment in primary level. 
The estimated coefficient of 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 and 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−2 both have got positive sign with a 
magnitude of 0.99 and 0.6 respectively. We, therefore, can say that 1 percent increase in the 
last year‘s number of primary schools raises 0.99 percent demand for the current year‘s 
enrolment and vice versa if other things remain constant; similarly, a 1 percent rise in the 
number of primary schools two years before rises 0.6 per cent demand for the current year‘s 
enrolment and vice versa if other things remain constant. Looking at the recursive estimates of 
these two parameters, we can conclude that last year‘s estimated value more steadily differs 
from zero than that of the parameter of the variable of two-period before. The sign is as 
expected and the intuition is that as the number of primary school increases, students can find 
a closer one which reduces travelling cost of the students. Therefore, parents might feel 
interested to send his child into the school. 
The intuition behind the limited significance of  LGDP  is that the aggregate per capita 
income may not perfectly reflect the parents‘ income of a family. The intuition behind the 
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negative sign of  𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−1 and 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−2  is that increasing school teacher means spending 
more public education expenditure for the salary of teachers rather than for the students, 
which might discourage students‘ enrolment in primary level. The insignificance of PEA 
indicates that public education expenditure does not have enough impact on students‘ 
enrolment in primary level because a significant proportion of public education expenditure is 
used for infructural development rather than increasing incentive to attending school in 
primary level. 
The estimated results of ―Impulse Indicator Saturation (IIS)‖ or the ―dummy 
saturation‖ method identify the following years 1984, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2000, 
2001, 2002, and 2005 to be significantly different from the other years. We, therefore, 
conclude that before the PEA 1990 being implemented in the country, there are 1984, 1985, 
1990 and 1992 time points when the number of enrolment significantly changed; and after the 
PEA 1990 being implemented, there are 1993, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2005 time points 
when the number of enrolment in the primary level of education significantly differs from the 
other year. That is why, we believe that the PEA 1990 has not been successfully implemented 
yet; and thus, it becomes difficult to achieve the universal primary education by 2015. 
To check the robustness of our two-period lags ADL model, we have estimated the 
one-period lag ADL model also. The estimated results of the specific ADL model with one 
period lag of every variable show that 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡−1 , 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶𝑡−1, 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡 , 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−1and 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 
are statistically significant with two year dummies of 1990 and 2001. We, therefore, believe 
that the specific ADL model with two-period lags gives us the best prediction about the 
demand for enrolment in the primary level of education in Bangladesh. 
The long run error correction factor (ECF) for the estimated model is given as follows.  
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𝐸𝐶𝑀 = 𝐿𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇 + 8.80 − 1.50 ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 0.01 ∗ 𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸 − 2.07 ∗ 𝐿𝑆𝐴𝐶 + 2.26 ∗ 𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇
− 1.72 ∗ 𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶 − 0.005 ∗ 𝑃𝐸𝐴  
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑟𝑢𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎, 𝜎 = 0.016                                                                                                    (6.12) 
 
 The ECF reflects that any deviation of steady state value in the long-run will be 
corrected. All these variables are statistically significant except the dummy (primary 
education act). The result indicates that the policy does not have a significant impact on 
enrolment in the long-run. 
 To check the consistency of our results we have specified following regression model 
with ―autoregressive distributed lags models‖ with two periods and one period lag. The 
dependent variable in the following model is the ratio of log number of enrolment and log 
number of primary school aged children. Thus the dependent variable represents the growth 
of enrolment in primary level education and symbolised as (𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡). The explanatory 
variables are PEA 1990 (𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡), log of GDP (𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡), log of government primary education 
expenditure as percentage of GDP (𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡), log of number of primary school teachers 
(𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡), and log of number of primary school (𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡). 
The two periods lag auto regressive distributed lags model is given in equation  (6.13) 
𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛼2𝐺𝐸𝑅𝑀𝑇𝑡−2 + 𝛽1𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2
+ 𝛽
4
𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝐿𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑡−2 + 𝛽7𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−1
+ 𝛽9𝐿𝑁𝑃𝑇𝑡−2 + 𝛽10𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝛽12𝐿𝑁𝑆𝐶𝑡−2
+ 𝛽13𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                             (6.13) 
The estimated results for both one period and two periods lag ADL model is given in 
Table 6.5 in appendix of Chapter Six. The estimated results of growth of enrolment do not 
differ significantly from the results we have found our original ADL estimation. In this 
 222 
 
alternative estimation results, the coefficient of the compulsory primary education act, 𝑃𝐸𝐴𝑡  
is found insignificant. Thus we can conclude that compulsory primary education act does not 
change primary school enrolment significantly.  
6.1.6 Conclusions for part one 
 The main objective of the part one of this Chapter is to evaluate the success of 
implementing the ―(Obligation to) primary education act 1990‖. Keeping the objective in 
mind, we have evaluated the existing situation of primary and secondary education system in 
Bangladesh. We have found that approximately one third of the total education budget has 
been allocated for primary education during the last fifteen years to implement the PEA 1990 
successfully but more than 20 percent of the school aged children are out of the programme 
till now. At the same time, putting more emphasis on primary education, the GoB is depriving 
secondary education and making secondary education system almost completely a private 
choice. Therefore, there is a massive drop-out rate from primary level to secondary level 
which is unexpected for a sound human resource development. 
 We have developed a model of demand for education based on family utility 
maximisation behaviour and have found that a family‘s demand for schooling positively 
depends on parent‘s income and negatively depends on the opportunity cost of child‘s 
attending school. In a market economy, any compulsory education act does not always ensure 
that all school aged children attend and complete the maximum years of compulsory 
education. The choice of maximum year of schooling depends on the family income, 
preference parameters and the maximum year limit of attending school. 
 In the empirical analysis, we have used Hendry (1987) ―general-to-specific‖ model 
specification strategy with the help of ―OxMetrics‖ software for finding the best factors that 
determine the demand for primary education and for evaluating the success of the PEA 1990. 
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Using annual data from the period 1980 to 2005, we have chosen ―Autoregressive distributed 
lags (ADL)‖ model with two-period lag of each variable. The specific estimated model which 
is reported in the text shows that per capita income two years before, current period primary 
education expenditure, school aged children one year before, and all current and lag years 
number of primary school positively and significantly determine the number of enrolment in 
the primary level of education. The estimated result shows that the two-period lag of per 
capita income significantly and positively partially determines the number of enrolment in 
primary school which is supported by the theoretical model and it is a rational behaviour of a 
family. The public primary education expenditure of the current year significantly and 
positively partially determines the number of enrolment in primary school which is also 
predicted by the model. An increase in public primary education expenditure (via stipend for 
children) means a decrease in the opportunity cost of attending school, resulting in increasing 
enrolment in school. The two-period lag of the public primary education expenditure 
significantly negatively determines the number of enrolment which is intuitively sensible. The 
intuition behind this result is that a reduction in the current year primary education 
expenditure (such as stipend) compared to that of the two-year before discourages current 
period enrolment of student. The number of primary school significantly and positively 
partially determines students‘ enrolment in primary level.  The result is as expected and it 
makes sense also - as the availability of primary school increases, a family has more options 
to choose the nearest school for reducing travelling cost or opportunity cost of attending 
school. The one and two period lag of the number of teacher in primary school significantly 
and negatively determines the current period enrolment of students which is not expected. 
One reason of this unexpected relation might be that increasing the number of teachers may 
divert the resource of public education expenditure from spending for student to spending for 
teacher‘s salary; therefore, the enrolment of student may fall.    
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The most important objective of the empirical study is to evaluate the success of 
―(obligation to) Primary Education Act 1990‖. For this purpose, a policy dummy has been 
included in the empirical model and kept fixed throughout the model specification method 
done by ―Automatic‖ programme of the ―OxMetrics‖ software. The result of the specific 
model shows that the policy dummy does not have significant impact on the enrolment 
although the coefficient has got positive sign. To check the robustness of this finding, we 
have conducted ―Impulse Indicator Saturation (IIS)‖ estimation method and have found that 
not only the year 1993 is significantly different from other years but also the years 1984, 
1985, 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2005 are significantly different from the other 
years. This result implies that the ―(Obligation to) Primary Education Act 1990‖ has not made 
any significant change in the number of enrolment in primary education. This result suggests 
us to conclude that the ―(Obligation to) Primary Education Act 1990‖ has not been 
successfully implemented in Bangladesh since its inception.   
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PART TWO 
Impact of education policies on overall educational development in Bangladesh: An 
empirical analysis  
6.2.1 Introduction 
The Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has invested nearly 4 percent of her gross 
domestic product (GDP) on education every year. Several policies have been attempted to 
increase the returns to those investments. Among those, two policies are directly related to 
improve school attendance. These are: the ―(obligation to) Primary Education Act (PEA) 
1990‖ to eradicate illiteracy from primary school aged (6 years to 10 years) children from the 
country, to enrol all primary aged children into schools and to ensure universal primary 
education for all the children of the country. According to the Act 27, it is an obligation to the 
guardians (parents or career) of a child to send their primary school aged children into school 
unless there are any reasonable causes (such as illness or unavoidable reasons).  Failure to 
follow this Act will cause a punishment of Taka 200 (US$ 3 only in July 2006 conversion 
rate) for a child. Similarly, the ―Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSS) program 1994‖ has 
been implemented all over the country to increase the attendanceof secondary level female 
students in existing schools,  aimed to reduce the gap between male and female school 
attendance. The Female Stipend Program (FSP) was created as a pilot project in 1982 in 
Bangladesh and was implemented initially in six villages only to increase the enrolment and 
retention of girls in secondary schools.These yielded positive results: girls‘ secondary 
enrolments increased from an average of 7.9 percent to 14 percent in some project areas and 
dropout rates fell from 14.7 percent to 3.5 percent (Haq & Haq, 1998, p. 93). Therefore, the 
GoB extended the program nationwide in 1994 which was called the ―Female Secondary 
School Stipend (FSSS)‖ program.Under this program, all girls in rural areas who enter 
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secondary school are eligible for a monthly sum ranging from Taka 25 in Class 6 to Taka 60 
in Class 10 (between US$0.37– $0.88 in July 2006). Girls receive additional payments in 
Class 9 for new books and in Class 10 for exam fees. The conditions were a minimum of 75 
percent attendance rate, at least a 45 percent score in annual school exams and staying 
unmarried until sitting for the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examination or turning 18 
year old.  
 Both the policies‘ ultimate target is to increase the total number of student enrolment 
and to raise literacy rates which are considered as two basic indicators of measuring the 
educational development of a country. High school attendance, high literacy rate, low gender 
gap in school attendance, and low urban-rural gap in educational attainment are primary 
factors of evaluating a country‘s educational performance. After the removal of military 
government26 in the year 1991, the GoB has adopted several new policies regarding 
education, health and judicial services bearing in mind to achieve a sustainable development 
in every sector of the economy. In this part of the chapter, we are concerned about two major 
education related policy measures that have been introduced since 1991. These are: (i) 
―(Obligation to) Primary Education Act (PEA), 1990‖ and (ii) ―the Female Secondary School 
Stipend (FSSS) Programme, 1994‖.27 Moreover, the GoB has taken two national education 
policies since 1990. Not the impact of any specific policy are we going to evaluate in this 
section but we are attempting to investigate the combined impact of both these education 
policies on the overall school attendance of population aged between 5 and 24 years, and on 
the literacy rates of population aged 5 years and over in the country. 
While the country made considerable progress in the last decade, primary education 
still faces a number of serious challenges. Bangladesh is unlikely to achieve universal primary 
                                                          
26In the year 1982, military has taken administrative power of the country and continued its ruling thorough 
several elections till 1991.   
27Brief discussions about these policies are given in appendix. 
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enrolment and completion by 2015 if the current trends in access and completion do not 
improve (World Bank); as in the first part of this chapter, we have found that the compulsory 
PEA has not yet brought all primary school aged population into school. Although the PEA 
has not yet been fully successful, the success in female secondary education is tremendous 
and has already achievedgender parity in primary and secondary schooling, which isone of the 
key Millennium Development Goals (MDG) (World Bank). Therefore, the FSSS programme 
of Bangladesh is replicated in other country, like Pakistan (Chaudhury and Parajuli, 2006).   
Scholarly research on the educational system of Bangladesh is few. Some studies 
focus on religious educations of Bangladesh (Asadullah, Chaudhury, & Dar, 2007; Asadullah, 
& Chaudhury, 2009; Asadullah, & Chaudhury, 2010), some studies focus on performances of 
primary education and secondary education (Ardt,& et.al. 2008; Mushtaque,& et.al. 2001; 
Rabbi ; Ahmed, & et.al. ), some studies investigate gender inequality in education system of 
Bangladesh (Asadullah, & Chaudhury, 2009; Blunch & Das 2007). There is hardly any 
meticulous study regarding the overall impact of educational policies on educational 
development of Bangladesh.In this part of the chapter, we are investigating the impact of 
these policies on two major indicators like overall school attendance and literacy rates of the 
country. We, therefore, hypothesise that during the period 1991 to 2001, all education 
policies simultaneously and significantly raise the values of both the indicators of educational 
development in Bangladesh. 
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6.2.2 Estimation method and Data 
6.2.2.1 Estimation method 
 Since our fundamental objective is to evaluate the impact of two educational policies 
on the values of educational development indicators, we create a policy dummy variable for 
the year 2001, called 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡  , to assess the combined effect of these policy measures 
onschool attendance and literacy rates – two basic educational development indicators of a 
country. We have two-time point panel data set for 62 districts of Bangladesh and the district 
level characteristics that are often unobserved, such as - agro-climatic endowments, 
geographical location, cultural diversity etc. The standard solution for this unobserved 
heterogeneity bias is to assume that it is not time-varying and, therefore, can be controlled in a 
panel data regression with fixed district effects. For making sure that our unobserved 
heterogeneity assumption is correctly taken, we have conducted Hausman (1978) test of fixed 
effects vs. random effects estimation method. In our all estimations, Hausman (1978) test 
supports fixed effects method. We,therefore, use single equation estimation method to 
estimate the following two indicators with fixed effects method. 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                        (6.10) 
𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                       (6.11) 
where, 𝑖 = district and 𝑡 = 1, 2 (year). The dependent variable in equation (6.10) 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡  is the natural log value of the number of population aged between 5 and 24 years 
of each district, attending school in 1991 and 2001.  
The dependent variablein equation (6.11) 𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the percentage of population aged 5 
years and above is literate in 1991 and 2001. 
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𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the policy dummy variable taking value 1 for the year 2001 and zero for the year 
1991.  
𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) is the random disturbance assuming that normally distributed with zero means 
and constant variance across districts. 
In equation (6.10) and (6.11), we have not included any explanatory variable except 
policy dummy to see the policy impact specifically on dependent variable; but this estimate 
might suffer from omitted variable problem and create biased estimates of parameters. We, 
therefore, have included relevant explanatory variables with policy dummy. 
We have included log value of the total geographical area of a district as an 
explanatory variable because in a big district either the total number of school going 
population is large or per capita land resource is high. In any case, the demand for school 
attendance may be positively affected with this variable when other variables are held 
constant. The variable is symbolised as 𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡  where, ′𝑖′ represents district and ′𝑡′ 
represents time for all variables. 
We assume that the higher the number of population, the greater the number of school 
going people. Thus, the variable has positive partial effect on school attendance. We, 
therefore, include the log value of total population of a district as an explanatory variable 
which is symbolised as 𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡 . 
A large family might be less interested to send its school aged children into the school 
because of the opportunity cost of attending school. Bangladesh is a poor country where more 
than 40 percent of population lies below poverty line. So, the opportunity cost of schooling is 
high. In theory, we also have seen that opportunity cost is negatively related to school 
attendance. We, therefore,expect that the variable has negative relationship with dependent 
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variable if other variables are held constant and consider it as an explanatory variable, 
symbolised as 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 . 
The annual growth rate is considered as the proxy of average income growth of 
population in a district. We expect that the variable has positive relationship with the 
dependent variable because in the theory of demand for schooling, we have found that the 
demand for education is positively related with family income. The variable is denoted as 
𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡 . 
Using ―tap-water‖, ―sanitary-toilet‖ and ―electricity‖ collectively represent the overall 
development of a district and are considered as complementary factors of demand for 
education of a district. So, we include these three development factors in our estimation.     
The percentage of population using tap-water reflectsthe development status of the 
district. The higher percentage of population in the district using ―tap-water‖ indicates that the 
people in the district are more developed than that of the other districts. We, therefore, assume 
that the variable positively affects school attendance when other variables remain controlled. 
The variable is symbolised as 𝑊𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 . 
Using ―sanitary toilet‖is also considered as a proxy of the development indicator of a 
district. The greater percentage of population using ―sanitary toilet‖ in a district implies that 
the population in the district is more advanced compared to its counterparts. So, we expect 
that the partial relationship of this variable with the dependent variable is positive. The 
variable is represented as 𝑇𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 . 
Having electricity facility in consumption purpose is also measuredas an indicator of 
the development status of a district. The higher percentage of population in a district living 
without electricity means that the population in the district is relatively less developed than 
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that of other districts. We, therefore, expect that the variable has negative partial relationship 
with dependent variable, denoted as 𝑁𝑂𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 . 
Having agricultural land may have ambiguous impact on the school attendance of 
children. One explanation is that the more agricultural land means the higher level of income 
which leads to higher demand for attending school. Another interpretation might be that the 
more agricultural land indicates more demand for agricultural labour; so, the opportunity cost 
of attending school is high which leads to low demand for school attendance. We, therefore, 
include the percentage of population possessing agricultural land as an explanatory variable, 
represented as 𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 . 
Religious belief may have an impact on school attendance especially for female 
children. We, therefore, include the percentage of population in a district belonging to Muslim 
religionas an explanatory variable to evaluate the effect of religion on school attendance. The 
variable is represented as 𝑀𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 . 
We have used single equation estimation technique to estimate the following models 
of both the indicators on policy dummy with those relevant explanatory variables related to 
economic development through fixed effects method to justify the robustness of policy impact 
with the other factors of development. We also estimate random effects method for equation 
(6.12) and (6.13), and conduct the Hausman (1978) test for fixed effects vs. random effects 
method for checking the appropriateness of our fixed effects estimation results. 
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝑊𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑁𝑂𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼10𝑀𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                           (6.12) 
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𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝑊𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑁𝑂𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼10𝑀𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                           (6.13) 
where, 𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡  is the natural log value of the number of population aged between 
5 and 24 years of each district attending schooling the year 1991 and 2001. 
𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡  indicates literacy rates of the population aged 5 years and over in a districtin the 
year 1991 and 2001. 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡  is the policy dummy variable taking value 1 for the year 2001 and zero for the year 
1991.  
𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡  is log value of the land area of a district in 1991 and 2001. 
𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡  is log value of the total population of a district in 1991 and 2001. 
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡  is the average family size in a district in 1991 and 2001.  
𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡  is the annual growth rate in a district in 1991 and 2001. 
𝑊𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡  is the percentage of population using tap-water. 
𝑇𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡  is the percentage of population using sanitary toilet. 
𝑁𝑂𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡  is the percentage of population living without electricity facility in a district in 
1991 and 2001. 
𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡  is the percentage of population having agricultural land. 
𝑀𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡  is the percentage of people belonging to Muslim religious belief in 1991 and 2001. 
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𝜀𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2) is the random disturbance assuming that normally distributed with zero means 
and constant variance across districts. 
6.2.2.2 Data 
We have used district (locally called as ―Zilla‖) level data for the year 1991 and 2001. 
There are 64 districts in Bangladesh and we have used the data of 62 districts in our analysis. 
Two districts (Manikgonj and Rajbari) are excluded from the study due to unavailability of 
information. The third and fourth population censuses were conducted in the year 1991 and 
2001 respectively. All the district level data are collected from these two censuses,where 
primary data are collected and summarised by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS), the 
only national institution of conducting national survey and census in the country. The web 
address of data source is http://www.bbs.gov.bd 
Our data therefore represent the whole country in two ways: as a cross-section of 62 
districts and as a time series of two time periods. Thus, the data set is as balanced panel data 
of two periods. We have chosen two distinct time periods because 1991 is the year before 
these policy measures were implemented in the country and 2001 is at least 6 years later time 
period after implementing both these policy measures. The ―fifth population census, 2011‖ 
was held in May 2011 for the country but results have not been publicly available yet, so we 
are unable to include those data in our analysis.  
6.2.3 Results and discussions 
Table 6.5 represents the descriptive statistics of dependent variables and independent 
variables for all districts in two time periods.  
The mean value of the number of students attending school increased more than 35 
percent during the decade. The minimum number of student attendance was in Bandarban 
 234 
 
district in 1991 that increased more than 67 percent in 2001. In Bandarban district, around 26 
percent of total school aged children was attending school in 1991 while more than 32 percent 
of total children were attending school in 2001. The maximum number of population 
attending school was in Dhaka district in 1991 which is more than 42 percent of total school 
aged children in the district and increased more than 27 percent in terms of number of 
children during the decade.  The average literacy rate increased more than 47 percent during 
the decade. The least literacy rates were in Sherpur district in 1991 and in Cox‘s bazaar 
district in 2001, while the most literacy rates were in Jhalokati district both in 1991 and 2001.  
The mean land area of a district does not change much during the period but the 
average total population in each district increased around 29 percent during the decade that 
means the average population growth rate was 2.9 percent per year during the period. The 
average family size, the number of people in a family, decreased more than 10 percent during 
the period. The average annual growth rates in district level dropped 0.44 percent from 1991 
to 2001. This drop in annual growth rate occurred because growth rate was calculated year to 
year that means growth rate of the year 1991 was the percentage change in growth between 
1990 and 1991; and similarly, the growth rate of the year 2001 was the percentage change in 
growth between 2000 and 2001. Thus, the drop occurred due to different base year growth but 
the overall growth during the whole decade was positive for every district.    
The average percentage of people using tap-water increased more than 23 percent 
during the decade. The percentage of people residing in Shariatpur and Patuakhali districts 
were minimum tap-water user in 1991 and 2001 respectively, while that in Dhaka district was 
maximum tap-water user in both 1991 and 2001.  The average percentage of sanitary-toilet 
user increased more than 229 percent during the decade. The tremendous success in sanitary-
toilet users has a great impact on health sector of the country. The death toll due to water 
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based epidemic like diarrhoea, typhoid etc was nearly eliminated from the country because of 
the improvement in sanitary-toilet users. The minimum percentage of people using sanitary-
toilet in 1991 was in Potuakhali district which was 2.6 percent, while 23.46 percent of the 
total population in this district was using sanitary-toilet in 2001. Like tap-water user, the 
maximum percentage of population was using sanitary-toilet in Dhaka district both in 1991 
and 2001. 
Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum No. 
of 
distri
ct 
1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 1991 2001 
Total 
school 
attendance 
295511.2 400222.4 280878.8 342906.2 25875 45120 1158691 1478048 62 
Literacy  
rates 
28.31 41.65 6.90 7.97 17.77 27.72 47.55 65.35 62 
Area (Sq. 
km) 
2339.87 2343.14 1181.63 1188.47 716.08 687.76 6116.13 6116.13 62 
Population 1733627 2234179 1075270 2901570 246301 250932 6163045 22465468 62 
Family size 5.46 4.90 0.33 0.43 4.80 4.13 6.49 6.02 62 
Annual 
growth 
rates 
1.93 1.49 0.55 0.66 0.79 0.41 3.79 4.38 62 
% of 
people tap-
water 
2.58 3.19 6.45 7.45 0.09 0.41 47.39 56.85 62 
% of 
people 
Sanitary 
toilet 
10.31 33.998 7.67 16.31 2.60 4.33 53.99 78.62 62 
% of 
people No  
electricity 
88.73 74.27 11.49 14.50 26.03 11.24 97.63 93.10 62 
% of 
people 
Owned 
agricultura
l land 
56.03 56.29 7.86 8.06 35.27 33.51 70.87 70.74 62 
% of 
people 
Muslim 
85.91 87.11 11.88 12.12 39.28 36.82 97.77 98.12 62 
 
The average percentage of population residing without electricity decreased more than 
16 percent during the decade. The darkest district (in terms of electricity facility) was 
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Kurigram in 1991 and Lakshmipur in 2001. The brightest district was Dhaka in both 1991 and 
2001.  
The average percentage of population owning agricultural land (any amount) did not 
change during the decade but increased 0.46 percent. This is a good signal that the proportion 
of landless people in the country decreased marginally during this time. The highest 
percentage of landless people was in Gopalgonj district both in 1991 and 2001 though the 
percentage reduced in the later years.  
The average percentage of Muslim population increased 1.4 percent; as a 
result,thepercentage of minority religious believers like Hindu, Christian and Buddhists 
decreased during the decade. 
The descriptive statistics of all these important development indicators reflect that all 
the districts of Bangladesh have developed during the decade. It may be possible that the 
development in the total number of population attending school and in literacy rate has 
happened through the tickle-down effects of the overall development of the economy during 
the decade rather than due to change in educational policies. We, now move from descriptive 
analysis to fixed effects regression analysis for getting better understanding about the impact 
of education policies on overall school attendance and literacy rates. 
Table 6.6 shows the estimated results of fixed effects models for both log value of the 
number of population attending school and literacy rate. Models where policy dummy is 
included as only independent variable, has been found to be highly positively significant at 
less than 1 percent level while regressing on both log value of the number of population 
attending school and literacy rates. These results indicate that educational policies have 
significantly improved educational attainment and literacy rates of the country during the 
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decade. Despite educational policies having significant impact on educational indicators, we 
cannot confidently depend on these results because the estimated results might suffer from 
omitted variable bias problem. We, therefore, discuss regression results in detail in the 
specified general models where policy dummy and other explanatory variables are 
considered. 
The general model (policy dummy and other independent variables) of the number of 
population attending school (specified in equation 12) fits very well. The F-statistic of the 
estimated equation is highly significant below 1 percent level although overall 𝑅2 -value is 
low which is not unlikely in panel data set. Hausman (1978) test for checking appropriateness 
between fixed effects and random effects model shows that fixed effect model is preferable. 
Similar results have been found for the general model of literacy rate (specified in equation 
13).  
Policy dummy variable has been found to be positively significant in both specified 
general models. The estimate coefficient of policy dummy for the log value of the number of 
population attending school is 0.45. We, therefore, conclude that policy dummy increases 45 
percent number of population of attending school and vice versa if other variables remain 
constant.  The estimated coefficient of the policy dummy for literacy rates is 8.34. This 
estimate implies that policy dummy increases 8.34 percent literacy rate of population and vice 
versa when other variables are fixed.  Now, we can confidently say that introducing 
educational policies after 1990 has made a significant positive impact on overall educational 
development of Bangladesh during the decade. 
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Table 6.6: Estimated results of log value of total number of school attendance and literacy rates 
 𝑳𝑵𝑨𝑻𝑻𝑬𝑵𝒊𝒕 𝑳𝑷𝑨𝑻𝑻𝑬𝑵𝒊𝒕 𝑳𝑰𝑻𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑪𝒀𝒊𝒕 
Policy dummy 
alone 
Policy with 
other variables 
Policy with 
other 
variables 
Policy dummy 
alone 
Policy with other 
variables 
Const. 
(Std. err) 
12.34*** 
(0.03) 
2.25 
(16.28) 
1.09 
(1.21) 
28.31*** 
(0.34) 
-126.07 
(175.11) 
𝑷𝑶𝑳𝑰𝑪𝒀𝒊𝒕 
(Std. err) 
0.31*** 
(0.04) 
0.45*** 
(0.12) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
13.34*** 
(0.47) 
8.34*** 
(1.33) 
𝑳𝑨𝑹𝑬𝑨𝒊𝒕 
(Std. err) 
 2.17 
(2.09) 
0.15 
(0.16) 
 17.51 
(22.56) 
𝑳𝑷𝑶𝑷𝑼𝑳𝒊𝒕 
(Std. err) 
 0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
 0.80 
(0.93) 
𝑭𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 
(Std. err) 
 -0.36** 
(0.17) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
 -5.81*** 
(1.88) 
𝑨𝑮𝑹𝑶𝑾𝒊𝒕 
(Std. err) 
 0.15** 
(0.07) 
0.01** 
(0.005) 
 1.34* 
(0.80) 
𝑾𝑨𝑻𝑬𝑹𝒊𝒕 
(Std. err) 
 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 0.65*** 
(0.24) 
𝑻𝑶𝑰𝑳𝑬𝑻𝒊𝒕 
(Std. err) 
 -0.01*** 
(0.004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
 0.03 
(0.04) 
𝑵𝑶𝑬𝑳𝑬𝑪𝑻𝒊𝒕 
(Std. err) 
 -0.0001 
(0.006) 
-0.3E-4 
(0.0004) 
 -0.05 
(0.06) 
𝑨𝑳𝑨𝑵𝑫𝒊𝒕 
(Std. err) 
 -0.05*** 
(0.016) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
 0.38** 
(0.17) 
𝑴𝑼𝑺𝑳𝑰𝑴𝒊𝒕 
(Std. err) 
 -0.04 
(0.037) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
 0.22 
(0.40) 
No. obs. 
No. grps. 
R-sq. 
w. 
b. 
o. 
F –value 
Prob>F 
Hausman test 
𝝌𝟐-value (d.f) 
Prob>𝝌𝟐-value 
Decision 
 
124 
62 
 
0.49 
.. 
0.05 
57.95*** 
0.000 
124 
62 
 
0.66 
0.014 
0.02 
9.93*** 
0.000 
 
45.01 
0.000 
Fixed effects 
model supported 
124 
62 
 
0.75 
0.001 
0.008 
15.31*** 
0.000 
 
43.88 
0.000 
Fixed effects 
model 
supported 
124 
62 
 
0.93 
.. 
0.45 
797.62*** 
0.000 
 
124 
62 
 
0.96 
0.0001 
0.09 
119.02*** 
0.000 
 
45.81 
0.000 
Fixed effects 
model supported 
Note:***, ** and * represent significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Std.err indicates standard error. No. 
obs. and No. grps. Indicate number of observations and number of groups respectively. R-sq. represents 
coefficient of determination where, w.,b., and o. represent within, between and overall value of coefficient of 
determination respectively. (d.f) indicates degree of freedom of Hausman test statistic, 𝜒2-value.   
There are some other factors which may have worked as catalyst with the change in 
policies. Now we are going to comment on these other factors.   
Family size is another significant determining factor of indicators of educational 
development. It has been found negatively significant at 5 percent and 1 percent level 
respectively for the number of population attending school and literacy rates. The estimated 
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coefficient of this variable for the log value of the number of population attending school is 
0.36 which implies that one unit decrease in family size increases 36 percent of school 
attendance and vice versa when other variables are held constant. The estimated coefficient of 
family size for literacy rates is 5.81. This indicates that a unit decrease in family size increases 
5.81 unit of literacy rates for the country. The negative sign of the estimated parameter 
implies that the larger the family size, the lower the educational development. The result is 
intuitively logical for a poor country like Bangladesh. A large family has to bear a large total 
cost (both direct and opportunity cost) of education for the whole family which is not always 
possible for a low income family; as a result, the demand for school attendance of the 
members of that low income family tends to be low resulting in a low literacy rate among 
family members.      
The annual growth rate is another positively significant explanatory variable of the 
indicators of educational development of a country. Annual growth rate variable is included in 
the models as proxy of income. It has been found to be positively significant at 5 percent and 
10 percent level respectively for the number of population attending school and literacy rates. 
The estimated coefficient of this variable for the log value of the number of population 
attending school is 0.15. The estimated coefficient indicates that a one unit increase in annual 
growth of the district increases 15 percent of school attendance and vice versa when other 
variables are held constant. The estimated coefficient of annual growth rate for literacy rates 
is 1.34. This estimated value implies that a unit increase in annual growth rate increases 1.34 
percent of literacy rates for the country. The positive sign of the estimated parameter matches 
with the theory and intuition. As income increases, the demand for education either in 
attending school or in literacy development increases and vice versa which is found in all 
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education literature. Thus, we can say that the estimated results of this variable support, 
theoretically as well as intuitively, the poor country, Bangladesh. 
The percentage of population owning agricultural land variable has been found to be a 
negatively significant determining factor of the number of population attending school. The 
estimated parameter is significant at 1 percent level and the coefficient is 0.05.  The estimated 
coefficient indicates that one unit increase in agricultural land ownership decreases 5 percent 
of school attendance and vice versa when other variables are held constant. The intuition 
behind this finding is that as agricultural land ownership increases, the demand for 
agricultural labour increases; therefore, the opportunity cost of attending school rises. Since 
most of the family in the country uses family labour for agricultural activities, that means a 
family uses its school aged child as marginal labour for agricultural production by stopping 
child‘s school attendance. This type of family behaviour is also rational because the 
opportunity cost of attending school becomes so high for the poor families which cannot be 
affordable by them.  
The percentage of population owning agricultural land variable has been found to be 
positively significant determining factor of literacy rates. The estimated parameter is 
significant at 5 percent level and the coefficient is 0.38. The estimated value of parameter 
indicates that one unit increase is land ownership increases 0.38 units of literacy rates of a 
district. The contrasting results of this variable for two indicators – school attendance and 
literacy rate, are not unusual. Because literacy rate is measured for the population aged 5 
years and above but the total number of school attendance is measured only for the population 
aged between 5 year and 24 year. It is possible that both young children and old parents may 
like to complete some level of literacy but old parents may not like to go to school. Moreover, 
gaining some level of literacy does not necessarily need to attend school on working time 
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(such as adult education, informal education etc.) so that the opportunity cost of gaining 
literacy is not as much as the opportunity cost of attending school. So, people would like to 
gain some level of literacy after their regular work. It is also likely that the percentage of 
population who possesses more agricultural land is richer than who possesses less percentage 
of agricultural land. The rich people like to gain some literacy to maintain their wealth. Thus, 
we conclude that the positive relationship between literacy rate and possessing agricultural 
land is not irrational.  
The percentage of population using sanitary-toilet is another negatively significant 
determining factor of the number of attending school. The variable has been found to be 
negatively significant at 1 percent level and the estimated coefficient of this variable is 0.01 
which implies that one percentage increase in sanitary-toilet user decreases 1 percent of 
school attendance and vice versa when other variables are held constant. The sign of the 
estimated parameter is not as expected. The descriptive statistic of this variable shows that 
there is tremendous progress in sanitary-toilet user because of the GoB health policy. 
According to the policy, every year government supplies a huge number of sanitary-toilet 
instruments without any cost for the families without having sanitary-toilet system in every 
district and its smaller units (Police station, union, and village). This implies that the 
percentage of people using sanitary-toilet is not a good proxy of evaluating a family‘s 
economic status nowadays for Bangladesh. The estimated coefficient of this variable has been 
found to be positive but is an insignificant factor of literacy rates.  
All other variables have been found statistically insignificant but have expected sign 
for each variable.  The log values of – the area of a district, the number of total population of 
a district and the percentage of population using tap-water have got positive sign but are 
statistically insignificant. The positive sign of each of these variables is expected intuitively. 
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Similarly, the percentage of population residing without electricity service has got negative 
sign but is statistically insignificant. The negative sign of this variable is also intuitively 
expected. We, therefore, rely on the estimated results and comment that specific educational 
policies have significant impact on the two important indicators of educational development 
of the country during the decade along with other development factors such as family size, 
annual growth rate and ownership of agricultural land etc. 
It is possible that the time trend might affect the impact of policy dummy in the 
estimated models. Since there are only two time periods in our data set and we have used a 
policy dummy for 2001 in the estimation, a time dummy variable is not possible to include in 
the estimation process due to collinearity. To check the robustness of our estimated results, 
we have generated a new dependent variable defined as the percentage of log number of 
school attendance to log population of the district,  𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 =
𝐿𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑁 𝑖𝑡
𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑈𝐿 𝑖𝑡
 . Then estimate 
the following model. The estimated result is reported in a separate column in Table 6.6. 
𝐿𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐿𝐴𝑅𝐸𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐿𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼6𝑊𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑂𝐼𝐿𝐸𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑁𝑂𝐸𝐿𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼9𝐴𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛼10𝑀𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                        (6.14) 
 The estimated results do not make any difference with the estimation model of 
equation (6.12), just change the values of estimated parameters without affecting the sign of 
estimated parameters. This finding helps us to make conclusion confidently about our results.  
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6.2.4 Conclusions for part two 
The objective of this section of the chapter is to evaluate the impact of two important 
educational policies on the number of population attending school and literacy rate – two 
major indicators of educational development of the country during the 1991 and 2001 period. 
Using district level census data from the ―third population census 1991‖ and the ―fourth 
population census 2001‖, we have used 124 observations of 62 districts of the country. Thus, 
the study covers around 97 percent area and population of the country. Using fixed effects 
estimation method also helps us to cover the dynamic of the rate of change in dependent 
variables due to change in policies and other explanatory variables. 
Two educational policies implemented in the early period of the 1991-2001 decade 
have significant impact on the school attendance of population aged between 5 and 24 years 
and on literacy rates in the country. Only a change in policies increases 45 percent of school 
attendance and more than 8 percent of literacy rate in the country. 
The annual growth rate is used as a proxy measure of average income of a district that 
has been found to be a statistically significant factor in determining school attendance and 
literacy rate of the country. The theory of the demand for school attendance says income 
positively determines school attendance which is supported by the estimated results. 
Family size is another statistically significant determinant of school attendance and 
literacy rate of the country. The negative correlation between school attendance and family 
size, and between literacy rate and family size explores the significance of the opportunity 
cost of attending school in a poor economy. 
Similarly, ownership of agricultural land is found as a significant determinant of 
school attendance and the negative correlation between school attendance and ownership of 
 244 
 
agricultural land again highlights the importance of opportunity cost in the demand for 
education in a poor agriculture-based economy. 
Other development indicators also have an impact on school attendance and literacy 
rate but their effects are not found to be statistically significant in the analysis. 
The time series analysis shows that the PEA 1990 has not had a very significant 
impact on educational outcome once one control for other variables that could be driving it. 
Our panel analysis shows the combined impact of the PEA 1990 and the FSSS 1994 is 
significant, this might suggest that the FSSS 1994 policy has contributed to improvement in 
educational outcome. One reason of the enormous success of the FSSS 1994 program is that it 
has included cash incentive to female students in attending secondary level of education while 
no such meaningful cash incentive has been introduced in the PEA 1990 for attending primary 
level of education. Another reason is that the opportunity cost of male child labour (aged 
between 8 years and 13 years) is higher than that of the female in a poor country like 
Bangladesh because male children start working in agricultural field and other income related 
works at a very early age of life in Bangladesh but female children of that age can do 
household work only. So it is more important to introduce cash and kind incentives (such as 
monthly stipends, meal support, food supply program for the family, free study materials, free 
medical support for the child and their family members etc) in any ―(obligation to) Primary 
Education Act‖ to achieve optimum results. Theoretically, the demand for school attendance 
in any level follows the law of demand in an economy. The law of demand says the 
opportunity cost of attending school is inversely related to the demand for school attendance. 
Empirically, we have also found that a policy measure with a sound opportunity cost 
incentive (such as the FSSS 1994) is more successful than a policy measure without such 
incentive (for instance, the PEA 1990). We, thus, conclude that for getting a maximum level 
 245 
 
of outcome from an educational policy of school attendance, policy makers should introduce 
both of the income support system and cost support system in their policy measure. 
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Appendix: Chapter Six 
 
 
Figure 6.9: Recursive estimates of specific two period lags ADL model 
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Table  6.7: Estimation results of growth of enrolment: ADL models with two and one 
period lags  
Dependent variable 
𝑮𝑬𝑹𝑴𝑻𝒕 
ADL General model with two periods lags ADL general model with one period lag 
Independent 
variables 
OLS method OLS method 
𝑮𝑬𝑹𝑴𝑻𝒕−𝟏 
(Std. err.) 
0.29 
(0.36) 
0.55** 
(0.26) 
𝑮𝑬𝑹𝑴𝑻𝒕−𝟐 
(Std.err.) 
-0.56* 
(0.29) 
 
𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕 
(Std. err.) 
0.21 
(0.12) 
0.15      
(0.15) 
𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕−𝟏 
(Std. err.) 
-0.33 
(0.21) 
-0.12       
(0.16) 
𝑳𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕−𝟐 
(Std. err.) 
0.22 
(0.19) 
 
𝑳𝑷𝑬𝑬𝒕 
(Std. err.) 
0.02** 
(0.009) 
0.007     
(0.005) 
𝑳𝑷𝑬𝑬𝒕−𝟏 
(Std. err.) 
-0.01 
(0.007) 
-7.4E-05    
 (0.002) 
𝑳𝑷𝑬𝑬𝒕−𝟐 
(Std. err.) 
0.01 
(0.007) 
 
𝑳𝑵𝑷𝑻𝒕 
(Std. err.) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
0.006     
 (0.02) 
𝑳𝑵𝑷𝑻𝒕−𝟏 
(Std. err.) 
-0.12*** 
(0.04) 
-0.10***      
(0.03) 
𝑳𝑵𝑷𝑻𝒕−𝟐 
(Std. err.) 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
 
𝑳𝑵𝑺𝑪𝒕 
(Std. err.) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.005      
(0.02) 
𝑳𝑵𝑺𝑪𝒕−𝟏 
(Std. err.) 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.06***      
(0.02) 
𝑳𝑵𝑺𝑪𝒕−𝟐 
(Std. err.) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
 
𝑷𝑬𝑨𝒕 
(Std. err.) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.003     
(0.03) 
Cont. 
(Std. err.) 
1.29** 
(47) 
0.52**       
(0.23) 
Adjusted 𝑹𝟐-value 0.98 0.98   
𝑭-value(Prob. Val) 74.36***  123.28*** 
Note: *, ** and *** represent that the co-efficient is significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ―Std.err.‖ represents 
standard error of the coefficient. ―Cont.‖ indicates the constant term of the estimated regression model. ―(Prob. Vale)‖ 
indicates the probability value of the corresponding term. 
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Table 6.8: Estimated results of Impulse Indicator Saturation (IIS) method 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-value Prob. of t-
value 
Partial 𝑹𝟐 
LERMT_1 1.04838 0.02826 37.1 0.0000 0.9942 
LSAC -3.04945 0.3700 -8.24 0.0000 0.8946 
LSAC_1 7.09983 0.6060 11.7 0.0000 0.9449 
LSAC_2 -4.05529 0.3321 -12.2 0.0000 0.9491 
LNPT 0.381045 0.02100 18.1 0.0000 0.9763 
LNPT_1 -0.454872 0.02958 -15.4 0.0000 0.9673 
I:1984 -0.0132459 0.002978 -4.45 0.0021 0.7121 
I:1985 0.0230273 0.002971 7.75 0.0001 0.8825 
I:1990 -0.0434733 0.003085 -14.1 0.0000 0.9613 
I:1992 -0.0271240 0.005124 -5.29 0.0007 0.7779 
I:1993 0.0172029 0.004053 4.24 0.0028 0.6925 
I:1996 0.0597515 0.003016 19.8 0.0000 0.9800 
I:2000 0.0490855 0.003982 12.3 0.0000 0.9500 
I:2001 -0.158236 0.005159 -30.7 0.0000 0.9916 
I:2002 -0.00902932 0.003232 -2.79 0.0234 0.4938 
I:2005 -0.0320182 0.003614 -8.86 0.0000 0.9075 
sigma        =      0.00268098             
𝑹𝟐             =     0.999711   
Adj.𝑹𝟐      =    0.999169          
no. of observations     =  24   
mean(LERMT)       =  9.51547   
AR 1-1 test:      F(1,7)    =  0.52137 [0.4937] 
Normality test:   Chi^2(2)  =   13.630 
[0.0011]** 
Hetero test: not enough observations 
Hetero-X test: not enough observations 
RSS  = 5.75011202e-005 
F(15,8) =      1844 [0.000]** 
log-likelihood  = 121.247 
no. of parameters      =   16 
se(LERMT)      =      0.272723 
ARCH 1-1 test:    F(1,22)   =  0.16700 
[0.6867] 
RESET23 test:     F(2,6)    =  0.70146 
[0.5324] 
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Table 6.9: Objectives and achievements of different five years plans for primary education 
 
First Five Year Plan (1972-73 to 1977-78) 
Objectives  (i) The percentage of primary age-group (5-10 years) students 
attending schools will increase from 58% (60 lakh) to 73% 
(85.94 lakh). 
(ii) Text-books, writing and instructional materials will be 
supplied to all children free of cost or subsidised rates. 
(iii) Drop-out rate will be reduced from 63% to 52%. 
(source: 1st five year plan, p451.) 
Achievements  (i) The share of resource allocation of primary education 
declined from 17% to 12% of total allocation in education. 
(ii) While literacy scene has remained more or less stagnant.   
(iii) The total enrolment increased to 58% (60 lakh) to 67.67% 
(70 lakh). 
(iv) The drop-out rate continued to be high. 
(source: 2nd five year plan p.XVI-3). 
Second Five Year Plan ( 1979-80 to 1984-85) 
Objectives  (i) Universal primary education.  
(ii) Students attending schools will increase from 68% (70 
lakh) to 100% (130 lakh). 
(iii) Text-books, free uniform, writing and instructional 
materials will be supplied to all children free. 
(iv) Introduce mass education programme to cover 400 lakh 
illiterate in the age group 10-45 by 1985. 
 
Achievements (i) In the second five year plan accorded top most priority to 
the introduction of universal primary education by 1985 
and about 47% of total allocation to the Education sector 
was earmarked for this program.  
(ii) The expansion of enrolment only 6.34 lakh only against 
the plan target 47 lakh additional children. This means 
ineffective use of resource. 
(iii) Drop-out rate was also high. 
(iv) In mid 1982 evaluation showed that only 7 lakh people 
could be made literate under the programme. 
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(Source: 3rd five year plan. pp.336-337) 
Third Five Year Plan (1985-86 to 1989-90) 
Objectives (i) Enrolment target was set 70% of the primary age group 
children by 1990 
(ii) Ensure their retention for completion of primary school 
cycle. That means reduce the drop-out rate nearly zero 
percent. 
 (Source: 3rd five year plan. p.340) 
Achievements (i) The primary age-group population to be 149 lakh and 
enrolment was 119.40 lakh 80% of total children. 
(ii) About 42% of the total allocation in the education sector 
was utilised in the second scheme of the universal primary 
education programme. That means, overall allocation in 
primary sector is more than 50% of total allocation in 
education sector. 
(Source: 4th FYP p. XV-2) 
Fourth Five Year Plan (1990-91 to 1994-95) 
Objectives  (i) Introduce compulsory primary education. 
(ii) Reduce mass illiteracy. 
(iii)  Construction of primary schools to expand capacity. 
(iv) Mapping the location of primary school to estimate the 
necessity of school in a location. 
(v) Expand non-formal primary education by mobilising 
NGOs activities. 
(vi) Establish ‗satellite Schools‘ to nearby primary schools 
with classes I and II for distantly located children. 
(vii) Provide uniform for girl students and feeding program in 
selective schools. 
(viii) Enrolling and ensuring regular attendance of children 
schools supply 15kg of wheat per child and maximum 
30kg for a family in some selected area. 
(Source: 4th FYP p.XV-15) 
Achievements No more five year plan is published after the fourth five year plan. 
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(Obligation to) Primary Education Act 1990 
BANGLADESH 
Primary Education (Compulsory) Act, 1990  
Act No. 27 
 
An Act made to provide for the obligation to primary education.  
Whereas it is expedient to provide for the obligation to primary education;  
Therefore the following Act is hereby made.  
1. Short title. This Act may be called (Obligation to) Primary Education Act, 1990.  
2. Definitions. Unless there is anything repugnant in the context, in this Act-  
a) "Guardian" means the child's father or, in his absence, the mother or, in the absence of 
both parents, any person taking care of the child.  
b) "Committee" means Obligation to Primary Education Committee established as under 
section 4.  
c) "Primary Education" means education for children determined or consented to by the 
Government.  
d) "Primary Education Institute" means any governmental or non-governmental educational 
institute where provision for primary education has been made.  
e) "Child" means any boy or girl between 6 and 10 years. 
3. Obligation to primary education. 
(1) The Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare primary education 
obligatory in whatever area from whenever onwards.  
(2) The guardian of any child dwelling permanently in a area where primary education is obligatory 
shall, in the absence of justified reasons, get his child admitted for the purpose of receiving primary 
education in a primary education institute of the said area in the vicinity of his place of residence.  
(3) The "justified reasons" mentioned in subsection (1) shall be understood as the following reasons, 
namely:  
a) The impossibility of admitting a child in a primary education institute for illness or any 
other unavoidable reason.  
b) The non availability of a primary education institute within 2 kilometres of the dwelling 
place of the child.  
c) The impossibility of admitting a child in a primary education institute even if applied for.  
d) The decision of a primary education officer that the education a child is receiving at the 
time being is equivalent to a primary education.  
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e) The decision of a primary education officer that it is not desirable to enter a child in a 
primary education institute on account of it's being mentally retarded. 
 
(4) In the areas where primary education shall be obligatory no person shall keep children engaged 
in such occupations as may prevent them from attending a primary education institute for the 
purpose of receiving primary education.  
4. Obligatory Primary Education Committee. 
(1) Every area where primary education shall be obligatory shall have a Committee called 
Obligatory Primary Education Committee for every ward of the union or municipal areas.  
(2) The Committee for any union ward shall be formed by the following members, namely:  
a) a member of the ward nominated by the Chairman of the Upazila Council, who shall be 
its Chairman too.  
b) two patronizers of learning nominated by the Chairman of the Upazila Council after 
taking the advice of the Chairman of the Union Council.  
c) two lady patronizers of learning nominated by the Chairman of the Upazila Council after 
taking the advice of the Chairman of the union Council.  
d) the headmaster or lady principal of a primary education institute, who shall be it's 
secretary too. 
 
(3) The Committee for any municipal area ward shall be formed by the following members, namely:  
a) a ward commissioner nominated by the Mayor of the municipal corporation or the 
Chairman of the municipal meeting, who shall be it's Chairman too.  
b) two patronizers of learning nominated by the said Mayor or Chairman after taking the 
advice of the ward commissioner.  
c) two lady patronizers of learning nominated by the said Mayor or Chairman after taking 
the advice of the ward commissioner.  
d) the headmaster or lady principal of the primary education institute, who shall be the 
secretary too. 
 
(4) There being more than one primary education institute in a ward, the headmaster or lady 
principal of any of these shall be member of the Committee and the Chairman of the Upazila 
respectively the Mayor of the municipal corporation, or the Chairman of the municipal council shall 
decide who of those shall be secretary of the Committee.  
5. Duties and Responsibilities of the Committee. 
(1) The Committee shall ensure that all children dwelling permanently in its area be entered in and 
regularly present at the primary education institute, and shall take for this purpose all measures it 
deems necessary or which are prescribed by the Government.  
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(2) The Committee shall prepare a list of all children dwelling permanently in it's area, which shall 
contain the name of the child, the name of the guardian and the age of the child; the names of the 
children to be entered in a primary education institute or to be exempted therefrom shall be 
contained in the list separately.  
(3) The list prepared according to subsection (2) shall be rectified every year in the last week of 
December; the names of those who cease to be children with the beginning of the new year shall be 
cancelled and the names of those who will be children entered.  
(4) A copy of the list mentioned in subsection (2) and the rectified list mentioned in subsection (3) 
shall be sent to all primary education institutes situated within two kilometres of the primary 
education officer and the concerned ward.  
(5) Every year in the last week of January, the headmaster or lady principal of any primary 
education institute shall send a list containing the names of all children entered in their institute to 
the concerned Committee and primary education officer.  
(6) The headmaster or lady principal of any primary education institute shall send, in the first week 
of any month, a list containing the names of all children who had been absent for at least 7 days 
during the foregoing month to the concerned Committee and primary education officer.  
(7) Where the Committee is satisfied that a child entered in its list has, without justified reasons, not 
been entered in a primary education institute or been absent for at least 7 days within a month 
without the approval of the headmaster or lady principal of the education institute, it may after 
hearing the statement of the guardian or, if necessary, investigating the case, give order that the 
guardian of the child, in case of the child's not having been admitted, admit the child within the term 
determined by the Committee in a primary education institute, or that, in case of the child's having 
been absent, he ensure that the child be present regularly at the education institute concerned.  
6. Punishment. 
(1) If any Committee fails to accomplish it's duties under this Act, any of its members shall be 
punished with a fine of not more 200 Takas.  
(2) If any guardian fails three times in a row to comply with an order given under section 5 (7), he 
shall be punished with a fine of not more than 200 Takas.  
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7. Cognizance of an offence. 
Without a complaint in written form by the Chairman of the Committee, no Court shall take 
cognizance of any offence under this Act.  
8. Power to make rules. 
The Government may, by notification in the official 
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Female Secondary School Assistance Project in Bangladesh 
In order to promote female education in the country, the government of Bangladesh 
set a goal to raise the female literacy rate from 16 percent to 25 percent in the fourth five-year 
plan (1990-1995). Previously in early 1980s the Female Education Scholarship program 
(1982 -1992) had successfully attempted to provide stipends as monetary incentives to girls in 
secondary school to cover education expenses, and thereby increase the enrolment of girls. 
The initiation of the Female Secondary School Assistance Project is made by the GOB in 
mid-1993. The project was supported by the International Development Association (IDA). 
The main objective of FSSAP project was to stimulate significant increase in 
secondary school enrolment of girls, thereby enlarging the stock of educated women capable 
of participating fully in the economic and social development of the country. 
The specific objectives of the project were as follows: 
  Increase the number of girls enrolled in grades 6-10 and assist them to pass the SSC 
(Secondary School Certificate—tenth grade) examination so that they become 
qualified for employment. 
  Increase the number of secondary education teachers in the project schools and raise 
the proportion of female teachers. 
  Provide occupational skills training to school leaving girls interested in entering the 
labour market. 
  Promote a supportive community environment for girls‘ education through 
widespread public awareness about the merits of female educational, social and 
economic development. 
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  Provide a healthier and safer environment for girls by enhancing school 
attractiveness through community participation in school-based water supply and 
sanitation programs. 
  Strengthen the Directorate of Secondary and Higher Education (DSHE) Ministry of 
Education (MOE) through support for project implementation and capacity building 
at national and district levels. 
 
The major components of the project were  
 (a) Stipend and Tuition Program;  
 (b) Teacher Enhancement Program;  
 (c) Occupational Skills Development Program;  
 (d) Female Education Awareness Program;  
 (e) Water Supply and Sanitation Program; and  
 (f) Institutional Development Program.  
The Stipend and Tuition program accounted for about 80 percent of the project costs and 
remained the focus of FSSAP. 
The districts for project implementation were identified based on economic impoverishment 
levels, low female literacy rates and low female attendance levels. Any girl residing in the 
target area who had successfully cleared Grade 5 was eligible to receive a stipend. In addition, 
stipend disbursements depended on parents agreeing to the following conditions for their 
daughters: 
 Attend school for at least 75 percent of the school year. 
 Obtain at least 45 percent marks on average in final examinations. 
 Remain unmarried through completion of SSC. 
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The tuition fees, as a part of the stipend, were directly issued to the school where the 
student was enrolled. The rest of the subsidy was paid directly to the girls in two annual 
installments in the form of deposits to savings accounts in the nearest Agrani Bank branch. 
The stipend increased by grade. 
An inter-ministerial steering committee chaired by the MOE facilitated project 
implementation and provided policy and decision-making guidance. A Project 
Implementation Unit (PIU) developed work plans and budgets, assisted with coordination and 
scheduling activities, contracted technical assistance, services and training programs and 
processed school applications. At the district level a Thana (subdivision) project office 
encouraged schools to sign the project agreement and assist them in implementing the project. 
Finally school management committees (SMCs) and parent teacher associations (PTAs) were 
formed to coordinate project functioning at the school level. 
Each school intending to receive stipends for girl students had to get registered at the Thana 
project office. Once registered, the schools had to do the following: 
  Help create public awareness and encourage girls to enroll. 
 Issue warnings to girls not fulfilling the requirements. 
 Accept the tuition fees from FSSAP at a rate as decided by the Ministry of Education. 
  Discontinue collection of tuition fees from stipend recipients. 
  Assign a unique ID number to each beneficiary student and maintain a register to 
record the same. 
Source: FEMALE SECONDARY SCHOOL ASSISTANCE PROJECT, BANGLADESH. This case study was 
prepared by a team comprising Prof. Deepti Bhatnagar and Ankita Dewan at the Indian Institute of Management 
(Ahmedabad) and Magüi Moreno Torres and Parameeta Kanungo at the World Bank(Washington DC) published 
in Empowerment Case Studies: Female Secondary School Assistance Project, Bangladesh Web address: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEMPOWERMENT/Resources/14828_Bangladesh-web.pdf 
 
 
 258 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion of the thesis 
This thesis has attempted to analyse three different issues of household economic 
behaviour both theoretically and empirically; these are, the residing arrangements of senior 
citizens in developing and developed countries, the role of public education expenditure on 
income distribution of a society and the impacts of the education policies of the Government 
of Bangladesh on school attendance. There are background literature reviews covering some 
specific aspects of these three topics. This research fills some of the gaps that are not covered 
by the literature. The findings of this study have significant implications not only for a 
specific country but also for any country – particularly for developing economics. 
7.1 Summary of Findings  
We repeat the main questions to which this thesis tries to find answers and then 
summarise what we find for each question. 
1. What are the determinants of co-residing arrangements of senior citizens in 
developing countries?  
2. What are the determinants of solitary residing behaviour of senior citizens in 
developed European countries?  
3. Can public education expenditure change income inequality of a country? 
4. Does the development status of a country help to determine the impact of public 
education expenditure on income inequality?  
5. Why has the government of Bangladesh failed to implement universal primary 
education for the last nineteen years?  
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6. What are the consequences of public education policies on school attendance and 
literacy rates in Bangladesh? 
The determinants of the co-residing decision of senior citizens of developing countries 
have been discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis to answer question number 1 which is 
currently a major issue for policymakers in developing countries. In our theoretical model of 
this chapter, we have shown how altruism, congestibility issues and negative externality to 
explain the household behaviour of younger offspring and senior parent in developing 
countries. Our theoretical model indicates that, as expected, housing price negatively affects 
the co-residence pattern of senior citizens; income, however, may positively or inversely 
affect the co-residence pattern depending on the relative importance of altruism and negative 
externality emerged from co-residence. We also empirically estimate the significant 
determinants of co-residence pattern of the senior citizens in developing countries, 
specifically, in Asia and Africa. The estimated results suggest that income has a negative and 
significant effect on co-residence of the senior citizens with their working children, the 
magnitude of this effect is slightly higher for male senior citizens compared to their female 
counterpart. The life expectancy rate has a positive and significant effect on co-residence, the 
magnitude is higher for female than that of male senior citizens. Religious culture and 
regional culture significantly influence the co-residence pattern of the senior citizens. Muslim 
religion and Asian culture have a positive impact on co-residence of the senior citizens. 
Chapter Four deals with answering the question number 2 which is a great challenge 
for the policymakers of the developed countries due to post-war baby-boomers approaching 
the state of senior citizens pretty soon. The fundamental objective of this study is to find out 
the most reliable factors affecting solitary residing patterns of senior citizens of these 
European countries. We develop a theoretical model including the congestion problem of co-
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residence that explains the co-residing behaviour of senior citizens and also determines when 
a senior citizen wants to reside alone. We have found from the theoretical model that a 
relative increase in senior citizen‘s income to working citizen‘s income encourages a senior 
citizen to co-reside with working citizen for gaining more consumer surplus from co-residing. 
We have considered an empirical analysis including life-cycle pensionable wealth of senior 
citizens, mean real income of working citizens, inflation rates, life expectancy after retirement 
of senior citizens, average years of schooling of senior citizens, labour force participation 
rates of working citizens, and religious belief variables. Using two time periodsgender-
specific macro-level panel data set, we have conducted random effects and fixed effects 
model estimation techniques. From the estimated results, we have found that life-cycle 
pension wealth of senior citizens is significantly and negatively related tothe solitary residing 
decision of senior citizens although the magnitude is very minor. Religious belief in 
Christianity is also significantly and negatively related tothe solitary residing pattern of senior 
citizens which is complementary with prior studies of cultural traits. The mean real income of 
working citizens significantly and negatively affect solitary residing patterns of the male 
senior citizens although the magnitude of coefficient is very tiny. Life expectancy after 
retirement is also a significant variable for female senior citizens in making solitary residing 
decision. 
Chapter Five of the thesis focuses to answer research question number three and four. 
Two separate theoretical macro-models have been developed for developed countries and 
developing countries. Theory says that an increase in public education expenditure reduces 
income inequality in developed countries but amplifies income inequality in developing 
countries. However, expanding public education expenditure is a Pareto improvement for both 
developed and developing countries as long as the tax rates imposed on the beneficiary of 
education expenditure is less than or equal to the marginal rate of return from education. The 
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empirical findings also support the theoretical findings that public educational expenditure 
causes change in income inequality through the endogeneity test of empirical model. Public 
education expenditure reduces income inequality for the highly developed OECD region and 
increases income inequality for the developing Latin America and the Caribbean region 
(LAAM), the developing Africa, Asia and east European region (DAAE) and the least 
developed Africa and Asian (LAA) region. Not only public education expenditure but also per 
capita GDP, corruption perception index, political stability affect income inequality of the 
highly developed OECD countries; and per capita GDP, average years of schooling of the 
adult population, total population of the country and political stability affect income 
inequality of the developing LAAM, the DAAE and the least developed LAA regions. 
Chapter Six of this thesis has analysed the answer of question number five and six 
theoretically and empirically. In this chapter, part one covers an evaluation of the ―(Obligation 
to) Primary Education Act 1990‖ in Bangladesh. We have developed a model of the demand 
for education based on family utility maximisation behaviour and have found that a family‘s 
demand for schooling positively depends on parent‘s income and negatively depends on the 
opportunity cost of child‘s attending school. In a market economy, a compulsory education 
act does not always ensure that all school aged children attend and complete the maximum 
years of compulsory education. The choice of maximum year of schooling depends on the 
family income, preference parameters and the maximum year limit of attending school.In the 
empirical analysis, we have used Hendry‘s (1987) ―general-to-specific‖ model specification 
strategy with the help of ―OxMetrics‖ software for finding the best factors that determine the 
demand for primary education and for evaluating the success of the PEA 1990. Using annual 
data from the period 1980 to 2005, we have chosen ―Autoregressive distributed lags (ADL)‖ 
model with two-period lag of each variable. The estimated result shows that the two-period 
lag of per capita income significantly and positively partially determines the number of 
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enrolment in primary school which is supported by the theoretical model and is a rational 
behaviour of a family. The public primary education expenditure of the current year 
significantly and positively partially determines the number of enrolment in primary school 
which is also predicted by the model. An increase in public primary education expenditure 
(via stipend for children) means a decrease in the opportunity cost of attending school, 
resulting in increasing enrolment in school. The two-period lag of the public primary 
education expenditure significantly negatively determines the number of enrolment which is 
intuitively sensible. The number of primary schools significantly and positively partially 
determines students‘ enrolment in primary level.  To evaluate the success of ―(obligation to) 
Primary Education Act 1990‖, a policy dummy has been included in the empirical model and 
kept fixed throughout the model specification method done by ―Automatic‖ programme of the 
―OxMetrics‖ software. The result of the specific model shows that the policy dummy does not 
have a significant impact on the enrolment although the coefficient has positive sign.To check 
the robustness of this finding, we have conducted ―Impulse Indicator Saturation (IIS)‖ 
estimation method and have found that not only the year 1993 is significantly different from 
other years but also the years 1984, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2005 are 
significantly different from the other years. This result implies that the ―(Obligation to) 
Primary Education Act 1990‖ has not made any significant change in the number of 
enrolment in primary education. This result suggests that we may conclude that the 
―(Obligation to) Primary Education Act 1990‖ has not been successfully implemented in 
Bangladesh since its inception. 
In this chapter, part two explains the answer of question number six. Using district 
level panel data and analysing fixed effects estimation technique, we have found that 
educational policies implemented in the early period of the 1991-2001 decade have significant 
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impact on the school attendance of population aged between 5 and 24 years and on literacy 
rates in the country.Only a change in policies increases 45 percent of school attendance and 
more than 8 percent of literacy rate in the country. Annual growth rates, family size and 
ownership of agriculture land are statistically significant factor in determining school 
attendance and literacy rate of the country. The theory of the demand for school attendance is 
supported by the estimated results. 
7.2 Limitations of the Study 
 Availability of data is the fundamental limitation of the thesis. We have conducted a 
panel analysis in all Chapters with the observations of only two time periods except Chapter 
Five. Panel data for the residing arrangement of senior citizens all over the world have 
observations of only two time periods in the United Nations Population Division, the only 
publicly available source of this type of data set. The study would be more interesting if 
observations of more time periods were found. Panel data for public education expenditure 
and income inequality are also quite scarce for every year for all the countries that are 
considered in the study. We had to take five year average value of both the variables to 
conduct panel analysis. Similarly, only two time periods district level panel data for school 
attendance in Bangladesh is available which is a major limitation of this study. Although the 
empirical models are predicted on solid microeconomic theoretical foundations, a more 
comprehensive data set would help us to establish more stronger results.  
7.3 Concluding Remarks with policy implications 
Since per capita income in developing countries is increasing over time, we conclude 
that co-residence will fall in developing Africa and Asia over time. Moreover, due to 
intensive family planning policy in developing countries, there are only one or two earning 
children in a family nowadays. Consequently, a growing number of senior citizens who are 
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mainly dependent on their earning children will have to maintain more vulnerable livelihood 
in near future. Besides, in this era of globalization, growing job opportunities are relocating 
the earning generation and subsequently breaking the extended family into nuclear families. 
Hence, governments of developing countries need to be more concerned about residing 
arrangements for senior citizens and they require planning for a good alternative of the 
residence system for the senior citizens. 
Population aging, increasing life expectancy, zero or negative fertility rate and 
changing living style of young citizens in developed countries raise a big challenge these days 
for policymakers to take care of solitary residing senior citizens. Policymakers need to 
develop suitable policy measures that change the norms and values of young citizens towards 
senior citizens because our empirical findings indicate that religion and culture have 
significantly reduced solitary residing attitudes of senior citizens. 
Although increased public education expenditure increases income inequality in 
developing countries, it is a Pareto improvement as long as government properly structure tax 
system of the country. Moreover, increased public education expenditure reduces income 
inequality in developed countries; so, we would like to suggest expansion of public education 
expenditure for the developing countries for building human capital and for raising growth 
level. 
The Government of Bangladesh has wisely introduced several education policies for 
developing human capital. It is not fully successful because not all the policies consider the 
importance of opportunity cost of schooling. Being a poor country, the government might 
consider the opportunity cost of schooling and give appropriate incentives before announcing 
any educational development policy. 
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